From a global perspective, psychology in the twenty-first century is characterized by two main features. First, on the world stage, psychology is dominated by the United States, which even before the collapse of the Soviet empire was described as the First World and the sole “superpower” of psychology (Moghaddam, 1987). Second, mainstream psychology, exported mainly from the United States, is now present in almost all Third World societies. Those interested in internationalizing the history of psychology must address the issue of how the United States became the dominant power in psychology and how mainstream psychology became global.

A first possibility, referred to by us as the “free-market model,” is that this situation arose out of competition in a free market of ideas. In such a free market, different ideas are put forward and critically evaluated, and the best are adopted. The free-market model assumes that psychological research evolves independently from social, political, and economic forces.

A second possibility, the “power-relations model,” is that power relations between nations and groups have an important influence on the characteristics of contemporary psychology around the world. This second possibility suggests that the ideas that are supported by those who have greater power and influence on the world stage will become internationally dominant in psychology. The assumption here is that psychological research is fundamentally shaped by social, political, and economic forces.

Our contention is that the power-relations model is more accurate. We argue that, first, the reason U.S. psychology is being exported to different...
countries around the world has more to do with the status of the United States as the sole military superpower in the world than it has with the scientific merits of U.S. psychology. Second, the global spread of mainstream psychology, which assumes cause-effect relations to underlie thought and action, is an attempt to emulate what are thought to be the research practices of the natural sciences. Thus, as a discipline with lower status and power, psychology is attempting to emulate the natural science model that is associated with higher status and power.

We will discuss the power relations model within a three worlds framework (Moghaddam, 1987), developed to describe power disparities in the domain of psychology. The first world of psychology consists of the United States, which dominates on the world stage and exports psychological knowledge around the globe. The second world consists of the other industrialized nations, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. These countries are important historic sources for modern psychology and still retain influence, particularly through former colonial ties, but their influence has faded considerably in the post-World War II era, compared with that of the United States.

**Defining Double Reification**

We apply the power-relations model in association with the concept of double reification, involving the exportation and propagation of cultural phenomena from one nation to another, and the later harvesting of the outcomes of this exportation through so-called international research, as validation for universalization. An example is the propagation of modern conceptions of human rights through international educational programs and, later, surveying social representations of human rights in the same societies to demonstrate the “universality” of rights (Spini and Doise, 2004). We use the term “double” reification to distinguish this between-nations process from reification that involves different groups within one nation (space limitations prevent us from discussing within-nation reification here).

Our perspective on the history of psychology is in line with what Gascoigne (1998) has aptly termed “science in the service of empire.” A critical literature has emerged on the relationship between colonial expansion and science (e.g., Storey, 1996), arguing that science policy has been closely tied with political and military policy. Extending this theme, we argue that psychological science, and the history told of this science, has served both external and internal colonialism by supporting intergroup power disparities in both international and national contexts. At the international level, much of the psychology dominant in most African, Asian, and Latin American societies reflects the needs and values of Western powers (Moghaddam, 1990). At the national level, this psychology is imported through a Westernized Third World elite, and the imported psychology in large part remains within the modern sector and serves the elite rather than the majority of the population who live in the traditional sector of the economy and society (Moghaddam and Taylor, 1985; 1986).

**Universalizing Psychology**

The contemporary trend of exporting psychological knowledge from the first and second worlds to the third world of psychology has its roots in the historical goal of universalizing psychology. Research methods and findings evolving out of laboratories primarily in Germany in the later part of the nineteenth century, and in the United States from the early twentieth century, were exported to the rest of the world. Initially, ex-colonial ties helped European countries dominate the growth of modern psychology in their former colonies, as in the case of Great Britain and its influence on psychology in India, France, and French Canada. However, by the second half of the twentieth century, these former colonial ties were overshadowed by the supreme dominance of the United States on the world stage, so that, for example, psychology in India (e.g., Pandey, 2000) and French Canada (e.g., Vallerand, 1994) is now to a greater degree influenced by U.S. psychology.

The attempt to universalize psychology was based on the natural science model and the assumption that human thought and action are causally determined by factors that are the same for all humankind, rather than influenced by cultural conditions that can vary considerably across societies (such as in the domain of intelligence; Moghaddam, 2005, ch. 7). By the 1930s, and perhaps earlier, the causal assumption was formalized by the adoption of the terms “independent variable” (assumed cause) and “dependent variable” (assumed effect), imported probably from the field of statistics (Danziger and Dzinas, 1997; Winston, 2004).
Why the Causal Model?

The overwhelming dominance of causal psychology needs some explanation, particularly because from the very earliest days of modern psychology, the "dissenters" included important scholars, such as William James. As E. D. Cahan and S. H. White indicate, the dissenters were in a "politically weak position".

The brass-instruments laboratory established scientific psychology in the university. It was concrete. One could show it to college presidents, colleagues, and students. Dissenters talked about the possibility and necessity of nonexperimental psychology, but they were in a politically weak position. Experimental psychologists subscribed to well-known and revered principles of natural science. They aspired to be technicians addressing themselves to facts, not values. (Cahan and White, 1992, p. 229)

A deeper exploration is needed to find out why this was and continues to be the case. The answer lies in subtle cultural trends, and the issues raised are also relevant to the exportation of causal psychology to Third World societies, which we discuss later in this chapter.

Particularly since the industrial revolution, the natural sciences gained immense prestige, first in Western and then also in Third World societies. Knowledge gained through natural science research helped to rapidly expand industrial production, leading to economic and military supremacy for Great Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century. The application of natural science research enabled enormous new industries to flourish, improving the standard of living and health for many people. The evidence seemed clear: natural science research gave results. The prestige of scientists increased, both inside and outside academia.

Links between the social sciences, humanities, the arts, and in general "nonscience" disciplines and economic growth have been far more difficult to demonstrate. There may well be very strong links, but they are less direct and less visible. Within psychology, the economic and practical "real world" benefits of some specialties, such as clinical psychology, organizational psychology, and experimental research associated with ergonomics, have been more visible than the benefits of philosophical and theoretical psychology, which are closer to the humanities than to the natural sciences.

In the status hierarchy of universities, science and those professions associated with the application of science enjoy the highest prestige. Thus, in most major societies, government funding for natural science research is higher than for research in the social sciences, humanities, and the arts. In the United States and many other major societies, the salaries of university faculty follows the same trend, with highest to lowest salaries being paid to faculty in science, social science, humanities, and the arts (faculty in the professional schools of business, law, and medicine receive the highest salaries of all, presumably because of greater demand for them in the employment market).

Because the natural sciences enjoy high economic clout, relative to areas such as philosophy and literature, many psychologists have tried to associate their discipline with the natural sciences. Consequently, mainstream psychologists have adopted the paraphernalia of natural science methods, "laboratories," "white lab coats," "instruments," "subjects," "computer modeling," and the like, even in cases where the topic of study does not warrant such an approach.

Another important factor leading to the exportation of causal psychology is the assumption that cause-effect relations, and the laboratory methods associated with causal psychology, is culture-free and can be transferred from culture to culture as an independent, mobile package. Since the purpose of mainstream experimental procedures, at least since the 1930s, is to isolate causal factors and test their effects in isolation, and since this has meant the attempt to control and exclude all cultural factors except the independent variables, then it is not surprising that causal psychology and its associated methodology came to be seen as suitable for exportation to anywhere in the world. After all, as long as the independent and dependent variables are effectively isolated, what difference does it make if a study is conducted with native people in Australia, natives of New York, or natives of the southern Sahara?

Schools of Psychology and the Universal/Causal Assumption

The first half of the twentieth century was a time of tremendous change and growth in modern psychology (Koch and Leary, 1985), but a consistent trend was the dominance of causal over normative models and the persistent attempt at universalizing psychology (Moghaddam, 2002). The dawn of the new century saw the demise of Titchener's structuralism, and
the second decade witnessed the launching of behaviorism (Moghaddam, 2005, ch. 6). The behaviorists, dominant in the United States, hoped that studies of stimulus-response (cause-effect) relations would eventually lead to the discovery of universal laws of learning. About the same time that Watson (1913) issued the “behaviorist manifesto,” Freud delivered his influential lectures at Clark University (in 1909) and launched a new era for the psychoanalytic movement in North America. Despite some changes over time, Freud’s psychology retained a core causal assumption that remained stable. Freud saw human behavior as causally determined, albeit often by unconscious factors that are not recognized or understood by the perpetrators themselves.

Thus, the two schools of psychology that were dominant, at least in the United States, for much of the first half of the twentieth century, behaviorism and psychoanalysis, assumed human behavior to be causally determined. Humanistic psychology, and to a lesser degree Gestalt psychology, followed a different path, emphasizing individual uniqueness and intentionality. However, these schools had less influence on developments in psychology in the United States than in Europe.

By the 1950s, the dominance of behaviorism in American academic psychology was being successfully challenged by the cognitive revolution. The path was prepared for the return of the mind to psychology by demonstrations in the 1930s and 1940s showing that even animals can be insightful and creative when given an opportunity to show a range of behaviors (e.g., Köhler, 1947), rather than only being given an option to press or not press a bar. In the same era, F. C. Bartlett (1932) in England demonstrated an important role for cognitive schemas in memory, and E. C. Tolman (1948) in the United States showed that rats navigate mazes using mental maps. The cognitive revolution had built up steam in the United States by the late 1950s, and cognitive psychology had become the dominant school of psychology by the end of the 1960s. From the platform of U.S. dominance, cognitive psychology was launched to world dominance by the 1980s.

But the dominance of cognitive psychology did not change the centrality of cause-effect relations and attempts at universalizing in mainstream psychological models; cognitive psychologists assumed causes to be universal cognitive mechanisms. For example, constructs such as short-term memory and cognitive dissonance are conceived as automatic causal factors rather than constructions that will probably change as cultural shifts take place (short-term memory has been reconceptualized through the concept of working memory, and the assumptions underlying cognitive dissonance are questionable even within U.S. culture; Moghaddam, 1998, ch.4).

The causal tradition continues with much of the research in neuroscience, where causes of thought and action are assumed to reside in biological processes. Findings from studies using fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) and other brain-imaging techniques are often interpreted as demonstrating the “location” in the brain that causes particular thoughts and actions. Rather than the brain serving as part of the enabling conditions for thought and action, the brain is seen as the determinant. An example is a particular location or characteristic of the brain (e.g., abnormally small prefrontal cortex or low release of serotonin) as a causal determinant of aggression (Raine, Lenez, Bihrlle, LaCasse, and Colletti, 2000).

Evolutionary psychology, increasingly influential since the 1980s, also adopts a causal approach. J. C. Gaulin and D. H. McBurney (2001) begin their text Psychology: An Evolutionary Approach with a question that guides all of their discussions: “What causes us to think, to react to others and behave in the ways we do?” (p. 1).

The strength of the causal approach in mainstream psychology is clearly reflected in introductory texts. For example, J. W. Kalat’s (2005) popular introductory text includes a discussion of the debate concerning determinism in psychology, making it clear what he thinks is the only “scientific” position to take: “Let’s note an important point here: The assumption that behaviors follow cause and effect seems to work, and anyone planning to do research on behavior is almost forced to start with this assumption” (pp. 5–6). This dubious claim is central to a psychology exported to the Third World.

**Universalism through the Exportation of Causal Psychology**

Anyone who visits psychology departments in Third World societies is immediately struck by the widespread presence of parochial Western psychology in the guise of universal psychology. Just as McDonald and Pizza Hut have been exported to the rest of the world, so has Western psychology. In this section, we point out that the psychology being exported to Third World societies is in large part causal psychology and that internationally the United States has become the dominant force in, and the main
exporter of psychology to the rest of the world. After discussing some indicators of the growth of psychology in Third World societies, we point out that the growth of mainstream cross-cultural psychology does not overcome the limitations of mainstream psychology.

**Emergence of U.S. Psychology as the First World of Psychology**

The exportation of causal psychology to Third World societies began on a small-scale in the latter part of the nineteenth century, soon after Wundt established a psychology laboratory in Leipzig in 1879. In that era, Germany was the leader in many areas of scholarship, and researchers from Russia, Japan, India, China, and elsewhere went to Wundt’s laboratory for advanced training (Jing, 2000). One might compare the growth and exportation of causal psychology to Third World societies to a growing multinational business enterprise. Wundt’s laboratory manufactured the first prototypes of a novel product: experimental psychology designed to identify causal relations. Eager entrepreneurs traveled from different parts of the world to Germany to learn how to produce this product.

The emergence of the United States as the sole superpower of psychology (Moghaddam, 1987) is in large part explained by the military and political situation after World War II. First, numerous prominent European psychologists had become uprooted because of the devastation in Europe. Some, like Freud, became refugees and did not live to see the end of the war, while many others fled to the United States. Second, in the period immediately after the war, academic institutions in Europe were left relatively weak and deprived of resources, whereas those in the United States were relatively well supported and also enriched by the flood of immigrant psychologists. Underscoring this reversal of hierarchical positions was the U.S. aid provided to Europeans for postwar reconstruction, including in the domain of psychology through the Committee on International Relations established by the American Psychological Association.

Just as the United States became the economic (and later military) superpower after World War II, so did the United States become the psychology superpower. Similarly, just as U.S. multinational corporations came to dominate the international economic market, so did U.S. psychology come to dominate at the international level (the United States has dominated psychology in a way that has not been replicated in sociology, anthropology, and other social sciences). Thus, the most important source of psychological practices and values was Germany in the nineteenth century and the United States for most of the twentieth century. The internationalization of such practices and values is reflected in trends such as growth in the numbers of laboratories and national psychology associations.

**From Laboratories to National Associations**

An important indicator of the spread of causal psychology is the establishment of psychology laboratories around the world. By 1920, psychology laboratories had been established in academic centers in Asia, Europe, as well as in North America (Table 1). National psychology associations helped to speed up the spread of causal psychology. The American Psychological Association, established in 1892, served as the model for national associations that sprung up in different countries around the world (Table 2), with Argentina, China, India, and Japan being part of the first wave of countries to establish associations in the late 1920s. The rapid exportation of causal psychology was also helped by the establishment in 1951 of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS), composed of national psychological associations. The associations of many Third World countries were early members, and the numbers of members climbed rapidly from twenty in 1951 to seventy in 2004.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Founder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>William James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Wilhelm Wundt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Vladimir M. Bekhterev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Henri Beauris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>James Sully, W. H. Rivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Yuijo Motora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>N. N. Sengupta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Chen Daqi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on data from Jing, 2000; Bruhlinsky, 1995; Trognon, 1987; Boring, 1957; Azuma and Imada, 1994; Sinha, 1987; and Yang, 1998.

**TABLE 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Western Europe and North America</th>
<th>Non-Western</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authors' compilation based on data published by Rosenzweig (1983).
The exportation of universalized causal psychology to Third World societies must be considered in the context of dual economies, modern and traditional economic sectors existing side by side in Third World societies, as well as dual perceptions, Westernized and traditional worldviews, also existing alongside one another (Moghaddam and Taylor, 1985). In much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, colonial and later imperialist ties shaped local economies and social conditions, giving rise to a Westernized elite living in a relatively small modern sector and the majority of the population living in the traditional sector. In most cases, the local economy is completely dependent on a small number of raw materials, such as rubber, petroleum, minerals like cooper and zinc, and natural gas, which tie directly into the economies of Western powers. Income from the exportation of such raw materials typically benefits a small elite, who model themselves on the West, particularly in the area of education and culture. It is through this Westernized elite that causal psychology is imported to the modern sector of Third World societies.

The Westernized elite of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is in many respects more similar to Western middle-class populations than to the traditional sector of their “own” societies. This elite is more likely to be influenced by Western psychology than by local indigenous psychology, and more likely to use the services of Westernized therapists than mainstream healers. The universities and other educational institutions supported and used by this elite tend to be modeled on Western and particularly U.S. institutions, often even in terms of course titles and course contents. Even the major texts taught in countries as “radical” as the Islamic Republic of Iran tend to be American, such as Aronson’s Social Animal, the 1999 edition of which appeared in Farsi translation in 2004 and is being used in Iranian universities.

Not only have modern-sector elites imported Western causal psychology, they also have been small-scale producers of causal psychology, as indicated by their representation in international conferences and publications. However, there is a subtle limitation to how much they have been able to influence research through their contributions, because most of their contributions have been conference presentations rather than publications in major Western journals. For example, an analysis of five meetings of the International Congress of Applied Psychology from 1982 to 1998 revealed that twenty counties contributed to over 87 percent of presentations, and eight of those top twenty countries were Japan, Israel, India, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, and China. Together, these eight counties accounted for 14.5 percent of all presentations. However, a very different picture emerges when we look at publications. An analysis of PsychLIT for the years 1990, 1994, and 1998 revealed that the top five among these countries (Japan, Israel, Russia, India, and Brazil) accounted for only 4.7 percent of total entries, whereas U.S. authors accounted for 55 percent of all entries (Adair, Coelho, and Luna, 2002). About 50 percent of the nation members of the IUPsyS had no first-authored papers (Table 3).

There is not only a difference between the level of contributions of First, Second, and Third World psychologists to conferences and publications but also a huge disconnect between the contents of conference presentations and publications included in PsychLIT. J. G. Adair, A. E. L. Coelho, and J. R. Luna (2000) found zero correlation between the frequencies of topics presented at Asian international applied congresses and Asian research topics abstracted in PsychLIT. One interpretation of this situation is that editorial boards give priority to research that conforms to the Western causal tradition, and not to the kinds of Third World research topics reported at conferences.

The failure of Third World researchers to influence U.S. psychology is also indicated by the authorship of papers in U.S. journals. For example, in the period 1965–2000, 85 percent of first authors in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP), the most frequently cited journal covering social and personality topics, were from U.S. institutions (Quinones-
Vidal, López-Garcia, Peñaranda-Ortega, and Tortosa-Gil, 2004). Roughly half of the 70 IUPsyS member countries’ institutions did not place a single article in JPSP or PsychLIT in the years reviewed by Adair et al. (2002) and Quiñones-Vidal et al. (2004).

Role of “Cross-Cultural” Research in “Internationalizing” Psychology

A possible response to the criticism that mainstream psychology is “monocultural” and needs to look beyond U.S. borders is to argue that cross-cultural research is internationalizing psychology by including samples from different populations around the world. From this perspective, cross-cultural samples are broadening the base of psychological knowledge, supporting the claim that psychology is a “science of humankind.” This is an important assertion that, if true, could blunt at least some of the criticisms made of mainstream causal psychology. Unfortunately, however, close scrutiny of the types of samples that are recruited in “cross-cultural” research shows that they are often not from different cultures.

Indeed, so-called cross-cultural research provides clear examples of what we have termed “double reification.” On the one hand, cultural phenomena, from values to technological hardware, are being exported from the United States to Third World societies, particularly to the educational institutions of the modern sector of Third World societies. This exportation is dramatically altering the thoughts and actions of students in the modern sector. In essence, these students are taking the model, the “ideal” to be Western youth. On the other hand, research methods and paradigms exported from the United States are being “cross-culturally tested” through the participation of Westernized students in Third World societies, and the results are used to “validate” the universality of the exported psychology. This double reification feeds back into mainstream psychology as “confirmation” of its assumptions, such as the assumed universality of the “Big 5” personality traits (Moghaddam, 2005, ch. 13).

Sampling Bias in Line with Double Reification

The history of psychology in the twentieth century has witnessed a schism between sampling as discussed in psychology texts and sampling as practiced in psychological research. Again, we can turn to Kalat (2005) as representative of the standard general psychology texts used to introduce causal psychology to students. Kalat defines a population as “the entire group of individuals to be considered” and then moves on to discuss a convenient sample, “a group chosen because of its ease of study” and a representative sample, which “closely resembles the population in its percentage of males and females, Blacks and Whites, young and old, city dwellers and farmers, or whatever other characteristics are likely to affect the results” (2005, p. 41). A key question of the highest practical and theoretical importance is: When is it justified to use a convenience sample as opposed to a representative or random sample?

Kalat proposes that “in some cases almost any sample is satisfactory.” These cases include research on basic sensory processes (e.g., audition, vision), as well as “the principles of learning, memory, hunger, thirst, sleep, and so forth.” In these domains, Kalat argues, humans are similar enough that “an investigator can do research with almost any group—students in an introductory psychology class, for example.” But in other domains where behavior varies from person to person, a representative or random sample is needed. Kalat adds that if we want to generalize about all human beings, the best strategy is to study cross-cultural samples, groups of people from two or more cultures, “preferably cultures that differ substantially” (2005, p. 41).

Kalat’s approach reflects fundamental assumptions underlying Western causal psychology, such as assumptions about the domains of behavior in which humans are basically the same and other domains where they differ. Such assumptions are challenged by critics who argue that, for example, central aspects of memory are part of a normative psychology, rather than mainstream causal psychology (Moghaddam, 2002, ch.10). For example, an important aspect of memory is collective reconstruction of past events, “memory as social reconstruction” where the emphasis is on collaborative meaning making, rather than attempts by isolated individuals to reproduce the past, “memory as reproduction” where the emphasis is on how accurately a single person can recall events “as they took place.”

Mainstream Violating Mainstream Tenets

Because of space limitations, in the present discussion we limit our comments to the specific assumptions (in Kalat, 2005) that:
In domains where behavior varies from person to person (and we would add, from culture to culture), representative or random (rather than convenience) samples are needed. If our goal is to generalize findings to humankind, then samples must be from two or more samples that differ substantially.

Our assertion is that mainstream causal psychology has in practice violated this basic tenet of mainstream causal psychology. The history of psychological science reflects a trend of research participants being homogeneous in cultural characteristics even when the behavior being studied varies across individuals and across cultures. This is clearly evident in the realm of social psychology, where the focus is on social behavior such as values, attitudes, discrimination, prejudice, and other such topics that clearly vary in important ways across both individuals and cultures (Moghaddam, 1998). The vast majority of social psychological studies involve a very narrow band of participants, undergraduate students (Sears, 1986; Ponterotto, 1988). On the basis of research on middle-class, 18–22-year-olds studying in U.S. colleges, social psychologists have generalized about the social behavior of humankind.

The apparent remedy to this situation is to conduct cross-cultural research. But for the same reasons (such as economy and convenience) that most psychological research in the United States is conducted with undergraduate participants, “cross-cultural” research also typically involves undergraduate students as participants. We conducted a survey of studies published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP) and the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology (JCCP), respectively the flagship journals for mainstream social psychology research and mainstream cross-cultural research, for the years 1980, 1985, 2002–2004. The trends reveal an increasing use of student samples in JCCP and a consistent use of student samples in JPSP (Table 4).

The increasing reliance on student samples in so-called cross-cultural research is problematic for a number of reasons:

1. A “student culture” that is becoming more homogeneous around the world, particularly through the influence of electronic communications and mass transportation and growing study abroad programs. This seriously puts to question the assumption that students from different universities around the world really represent different “traditional cultures.”

2. Fundamental cultural differences between students, who are part of the modern Westernized sector in Third World societies, and local populations, the vast majority of whom are part of the traditional sector.

Thus, mainstream causal psychology has been exported to the Westernized modern sector and particularly universities of Third World societies, and students from the modern sector have been recruited to “demonstrate” the universality of this psychology. However, there are signs of a new challenge to mainstream causal psychology.

### Third World Challenges to Causal Psychology

Efforts to internationalize the history of psychology should also chart the rising challenge to internationalization of mainstream psychology. First and Second World challenges are relatively well known (Crosley, 2000; Moghaddam and Harré, 1995); of more direct interest to us in this discussion is the challenge arising from the Third World. This challenge reflects serious concerns to achieve alternative, sometimes indigenous, Third World voices, in Asian (e.g., Yang, Hwang, Pederson and Diabo, 2003), Latin American (e.g., Lira, 2000), Arab (Ahmed and Gielen, 1998), and African (e.g., Serpell, 1993) contexts.

It is probably in Latin America that the challenge to universalized causal psychology has made most headway, in the form of “liberation psy-
psychology," the study of the everyday psychosocial means by which ideology is produced and reproduced and social reality is collectively constructed (Montero, 1984). Liberation psychology examines the narratives of people in everyday interaction, in relation to the wider material conditions in which these people live. Liberation psychology is action oriented, in that it is intended to change material and social conditions toward greater justice, particularly for minorities and those with less power. This politically engaged orientation is fundamentally different from the avowed disengaged and supposedly "neutral" position adopted by the mainstream psychology being exported to Latin America from Western societies.

Liberation psychology grew particularly from the mid-twentieth century out of the political context of Latin American dictatorships supported by successive U.S. administrations. Ideas now associated with action research, community psychology, critical social psychology, and political psychology merged into a psychology concerned with changing social beliefs and ideologies, particularly through local level projects involving collective citizen participation (Vásquez, 2000). "Changing minds through community projects" is one way to sum up an important aspect of liberation psychology, but the "changing" is not neutral; rather, it is directed toward greater ideological awareness.

An example of liberation psychology research is a project exploring constructions of needs in a slum neighborhood (Montero, 1994). This research project involved identifying "accepted norms" in a slum, such as lack of a reliable supply of clean water, and then intervening to achieve problematization, changes in perceptions so that what was seen to be acceptable is now seen as unacceptable. In this way, accepted norms shifted, and the new norms served as a basis for community action.

A central feature of liberation psychology is the breakout of the modern sector of Third World societies, particularly out of universities that in just about every respect copy universities in the United States, and to enter the traditional sector. Through this move, liberation psychology is able to enter urban slums and rural villages and to reach populations that tend to be far poorer, far less educated, and different in thought and action from both people in the West and the Westernized elite of the Third World. This is exactly the population that should be involved in psychological research, if and when psychological universals are to be seriously explored. Similarly, within the first and second worlds of psychology, nonstudent populations, including ethnic minorities and working-class whites, need to be far better represented in research studies. As things stand, it is mainly within the universe of middle-class students that psychological "universals" are tested.

**Concluding Comment**

Globalization has in large part meant Westernization, and more recently it has meant in particular the spread of American cultural phenomena to the rest of the world. The modern sectors of Third World societies are now populated by people who are in important respects Westernized, and this is particularly true for students. The schools and universities that train students in the modern sector are typically modeled after U.S. institutions, and with respect to music, films, clothing, and many other aspects of their lives, these students are very similar to students in U.S. institutions. We have argued that it is misleading to "test" the "universality" of psychological theories and findings by comparing the results of studies involving student participants in First, Second, and Third World countries. Such studies are "within culture" (the culture of modern students) and have simply served a double reification process. Internationalizing the history of psychology means that we must give attention to both the exportation of mainstream causal psychology to the Third World and the alternative movements, such as liberation psychology, that have evolved from the Third World.

**References**


Chapter 10

Psychology in the Eurocentric Order of the Social Sciences

Colonial Constitution, Cultural Imperialist Expansion, Postcolonial Critique

Irmingard Staeuble

Historians of Psychology had hardly started to inquire into the shaping of the discipline and profession in its Euro-American home countries when Psychology expanded rapidly outward, to Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Among historians and sociologists of science, this exciting move has not yet found the interest it deserves. The few edited books on this expansion provide hardly more than descriptive accounts of the state of Psychology around the world (e.g. Sexton and Misiak 1976; Blowers and Turtle 1987; Sexton and Hogan 1992). A notable exception is Alison Turtle's introductory chapter, which did raise essential issues to be addressed by historians and sociologists of science such as the “patterns of interaction between colony and imperialist power” and the possibility and extent of a “recognizable common form” of Psychology when its hidden world view gets “blended with or assimilated into a variety of different cultures and ideologies” (Turtle 1987, 3). An interesting attempt at assessing the advances of selected areas of Psychology in the developing world was made by Stuart Carr and John Schumaker (1996), with editors and contributors emphasizing social contexts and reflecting on the idea of a reciprocal relationship between Psychology in the “developing” and “developed” worlds. Yet the tracing of the various routes of Psychology’s move to Asian, Latin American, African, and Arabic countries, of problems involved such as uneven patterns of interaction or lack of fit between Western individualism and local notions of person and world, remains largely a task for the future. This task will require the participation of scholars who work in
Internationalizing the History of Psychology

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