Psychologists have important contributions to make to the debate on national development, particularly because human development is now viewed as central to national development. A major shortcoming of the psychological literature on national development is the lack of an adequate explanation of change. We address this gap through an account of national development based on social reducton theory and reversal theory, two recent theories that focus on change and stability.

Psychology and National Development

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There is a virtual consensus among scholars in the field that the study of the new nations has reached a state of acute crisis.... The hope such literature once contained for helping the World slowly ebbed away (Hermarri, 1980, p. 16).

The problem of access to food remains fundamental for countless poor, even in areas that have benefited from new technologies and production methods, even in the rich North. As populations relentlessly grow, particularly in areas that are already food deficient, the problem of food access is likely to attain alarming proportions (International Development Research Centre, 1992).

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For the last half century, there has been considerable discussion on the part of both practitioners and researchers concerning the meaning and conditions of national development. Although according to some criteria modest progress has been made in the social, economic, and political sectors, enormous challenges remain. For example, population increases still threaten to outpace food supply. Despite serious attempts to control the size of populations, the number of human beings *doubled* between 1950 and 1990. As many people as would constitute a city the size of New York was added to the human race each month (Brown, Kane, & Ayres, 1993). The challenges facing developing societies in the domain of population are illustrative of serious challenges in a variety of other sectors which, it seems, call for more than just economic solutions (Grilli & Salvatore, 1994).

The major models of development, which have traditionally been economic, have been the focus of intense criticism since the 1960s (Bernstein, 1973; Roxborough, 1979; Schuurman, 1993; Seers & Joy, 1971). Not only have economists debated the best economic policies (David, 1986), but there has also been a call for a broader conception of development, one that incorporates social and cultural characteristics of human societies (Dube, 1988; Hagen, 1962; Hoselitz, 1960; van Nieuwenhuijze, 1988). Our first objective in this article is to briefly but critically review changes in the conception of development itself over the latter half of the twentieth century. In doing so, we identify certain assumptions inherent in the current notions of human development that have psychological implications. Second, we shall review the psychological literature that attempts to contribute to the debate on national development. A major shortcoming of this literature, we shall argue, is the lack of an adequate account of social change. In the third part, we shall outline an account of national development based on social reducton theory (Moghaddam & Harré, 1996) in conjunction with an alternative, but complementary account of change based on reversal theory (Apter, 1989).

Changing Views of Development

Changes in the way that development is viewed seem to be subject to fashions local to industrial countries. In the post-World War II

era, these fashions have undergone considerable changes (Menon, 1980):

1948–55: Import substituting industries are the key to development.
1960–65: Import substitution is no good; export expansion is the answer.
1966–67: Industrialisation is an illusion; rapid agricultural growth is the only answer.
1967–68: Give top priority to population control policies as all other forms of development are likely to be submerged by population explosion.
1971–75: The poor masses have not gained much from development. Reject GNP growth; more equitable distribution of existing resources must come ahead of growth.

The latest avant-garde fashion in development circles is the so-called human development. This trend is to some extent reflected in the changed concept of development adopted by the European Union (EU) (for example, see report of LOME IV in *The Courier*). It is reflected much more strongly in the first *Human Development Report* (UNDP, 1990). This report demonstrated the commitment of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1993), a major international funding and planning channel for development, to the idea of development as "enlarging peoples' choices", a broader cultural rather than purely economic ideal. Associated with this trend is the replacement of purely economic indicators of change, such as Gross National Product (GNP), with the Human Development Index, which incorporates three "human" measures indicative of choices available to individuals: of purchasing power, of quality of education, and of standard of health. But many questions remain to be addressed. For example, if there is "increased purchasing power", what goods does it make possible for people to buy? And what exactly is meant by "quality of education" and "standards of health"? Even in the West those criteria are not necessarily coherent.

The high level of attention now given to human development is also reflected in the other major funding institutions as well as those engaged in research activities. As part of this trend, some in the World Bank have called for a radical reform of policies so that a central place is given to human development. For example, Woods (1984) recognises that the evolution of development theory has

divided government and assistance agencies into mutually exclusive "sectors" (for example, "agriculture" and "education"), and this limits the effectiveness of policy implemented by separate agencies responsible for each. However, like most writers in this domain, Woods (1984) places considerable emphasis on the formal "organisational structure". He neglects the informal, and we would argue the more important, aspects of organisations and institutions. Often, formal organisations and plans that seem constructive on paper have very different consequences in practice from those envisaged by their proponents. This happens when planners do not give sufficient consideration to what actually takes place in the course of development. For example, the famous post-Second World War debacle of the British ground-nuts scheme in East Africa was caused in part by inattention to cultural factors.

Some development theorists have even suggested that economic policies that are beneficial, at least in the short-term, have harmful effects when implemented in important domains such as education, health, and employment (Haq & Kirdar, 1987). During the process of economic adjustment, a soft sector such as education (and the same may be true of other social services) faces "... demands for domestic austerity and competes with higher priority items such as export promotion and military spending" (Loure, 1987, p. 170). Critics have argued that economic growth and adjustment do not automatically lead to beneficial conditions for all people. Economic indicators do not represent people, they represent the economy. Of course, this applies to rich and poor nations alike. In some respects, "poor" nations may be "healthier" than rich ones—who is to say that the problem of "over-weight" in the U.S. is any less serious than that of malnutrition in India when considered as a factor in an assessment of quality of life?

Thus, on the surface, the distinction between development as economic growth and human development seems to be becoming clearer. In response to calls for new development policies, there is now greater awareness of a need for programmes to improve primary health care, education, income distribution, and nutrition (Gall, 1992; Griffin & Knight, 1992; Goulet & Wilber, 1992). These elements, which most directly have an impact on people, are taken as the focus of development with the understanding that when people have certain basic needs cared for they can more effectively take part in the control of their own economic, political and social lives.

These basic needs are taken to be the foundations of expanding capabilities.

At a deeper level, however, the new emphasis on "human development" assumes that Western conceptions of health, education, nutrition, and so on, are universally valid. This is a huge assumption which must not go unchallenged. First, we need to differentiate between Western ideals of health and Western practices. For example, what nutritional food is supposed to be part of a Western diet, and the actual practices of eating fast-food. Ironically, it is often the latter rather than the former that are exported to the Third World.

Development and Social Behaviour

Underlying the concept of "human development" is a concern for human behaviour generally (Moghaddam, 1990, pp. 29–30; Moghaddam, 1997, ch. 5). However, once again we find that researchers have assumed certain Western values to be universal. This is reflected, sometimes explicitly, in the writings of thinkers who pioneered the new movement. For example, according to Sen (1992) economic growth is only one narrow aspect of development. More broadly, development involves "entitlements" and "capabilities". The latter is "the ability to do this or that" (ibid., p. 15), implying that the capacities of people to utilise resources and to take advantage of "opportunities" is a key component of development. However, a critical question is "opportunities to do what?". Surely in some domains, such as family life, one could argue that Western societies have limited the opportunities individuals enjoy. For example, the Western model does not allow for those joining the middle-class mainstream to participate in the personally enriching experience of life in extended families, as enjoyed in Third World societies, as well as among some minorities in the West. Surely, in the arena of family relations at least, Westerners have less rather than more capabilities.

Also, traditional societies may not approve of the very idea of "opportunities", implying a degree of choice among the younger generation that is offensive in the eyes of the old. Futhermore, too great a range of opportunities may in practice lead to anomie and despair rather than being a life-enhancing source of freedom.

Capabilities are closely tied with choices, in that increased capabilities make available greater options to choose among possibilities in different domains, such as economic, political, social, and religious spheres. But choices are not made randomly, they are guided by values. The very choice between trying to change and attempting to conserve the status quo is a value judgement (Bezanson, 1994). Clearly, values, alienation, attitudes, identity, motivation, participation, skills, and other "human" features of a population are central to the enlarged concept of development. And these are psychological factors. Perhaps this new orientation is best captured by Donaldson's (1973) description of development as, " ... bringing about basic changes in the underlying social fabric of attitudes and institutions" (p. 80). Once again, however, this begs the question of why changes toward a Western model of society should be better for all humankind. This is put into question particularly because the Western world involves greater specialisation and entails the disappearance of satisfying craftwork (Moghaddam, 1997). In many traditional societies, everyone has a part to play in the construction of houses, making clothing, cooking, musical performances, and so on.

Psychologists Enter the Debate on National Development

Parallel to the movement toward a people-centered concept of development, psychologists have become increasingly aware of their potential contribution to development taken in the enlarged sense with its obvious psychological aspects. This is not a new idea (Klineberg, 1956; McClelland & Winter, 1969), but it is an idea for which the time seems ripe because the new emphasis on "human development" presents a historic opportunity for psychologists to have an important impact. The psychological literature related to national development can be usefully conceived as comprising the following broad categories.

The Call for "Appropriate" Psychology

The issue of "appropriateness" underlies discussions of the social sciences in the Third World (UNESCO 1976a, 1977, 1980), sometimes

becoming explicit in considering of psychology specifically (Connolly, 1985; Moghaddam & Taylor, 1986). In some ways the issues raised in discussions of "appropriate psychology" are also present in discussions about "appropriate technology" transfer generally (see the journals *Appropriate Technology and Rain & Journal of Appropriate Technology*). For example, central to all such discussions are issues concerning the appropriateness of personnel (Ayman, 1985; Moghaddam, 1996; Moghaddam & Taylor, 1986), as well as problems caused by experts who are parachuted in (typically from Western countries) without adequate preparation enabling them to adapt to local conditions (Maruyama, 1974).

Sensitivity to Power Inequalities

A second theme underlying the literature, and becoming far more explicit since the 1980s, is the power inequalities that characterise the abilities of nations to influence psychology and other knowledge domains internationally (Blackler, 1983; Gielen, 1994; Moghaddam, 1987; Sloan & Montero, 1990). The United States has been described as the only "Psychology Superpower" (Moghaddam, 1987) and Gielen (1994) has shown that North American psychology is exceptionally parochial as compared to other knowledge domains such as linguistics. As a general rule, North American psychologists only read the publications of other North Americans (see also Lewicki, 1982). American psychology presents the norms of local middle-class U.S. culture as if they were universal laws of human cognition, emotion, and social interaction.

In contrast, psychologists from the Second and Third Worlds do tend to read North American publications, while Third World psychologists tend to read the publications of the First and Second Worlds. Third World psychologists are becoming more sensitive to this situation and some have called for greater efforts to build indigenous Third World psychologies and in this way to achieve control over their own national psychology arena (see Adair, 1992; Kim & Berry, 1993; Moghaddam, 1990, 1998; Sinha & Holtzman, 1984).

Direct Intervention in National Development

A third category of literature calls for direct intervention by psychologists in national development (see Carr & Schumaker, 1996) to help alleviate poverty (Connolly, 1985) and to tackle other important problems in Third World societies. It is probably in India that psychologists have shown most interest in involvement in national planning (D. Sinha, 1990). For example, J. Sinha (nd) has outlined a tradition of social psychological research in India, designed to contribute to a succession of five-year national plans. Both supporters and critics agree that the impact of such psychological research has remained minimal, and it is instructive for us to consider the reasons for this.

An array of possible reasons are mentioned in the literature. For example, psychologists have had little influence on the broader "macro" processes of development planning (Ayman, 1985). Another criticism is that the historical role of psychology has been to create underdevelopment, and to strengthen the position of colonial powers (see discussions in Sinha & Holtzman, 1984; Sloan & Montero, 1990). This may be in part because traditional psychology encourages the imitation of Western models of development.

In addition to these considerations, we believe part of the reason why psychologists have had minimal influence on national development is the lack of effective psychological explanations of social change. This may become apparent when we consider some of the main psychological models.

One of the major contributions in the area of national development was McClelland and Winter's *Motivating Economic Achievement* (1969). It is mentioned in nearly all the discussions on the subject of the potential contributions of psychologists to national development programmes. MeClelland and Winter developed a programme through which they believed they could alter people's motivations for achieving economic growth. These programmes took the form of training sessions for Indian businessmen and they were aimed at reworking goals, skills, and approaches to work. One can see similarities between this agenda and that of a rehabilitation programme: both attempt to change the participants' motivations for behaviour through external and causal reasoning. After the training sessions, follow-up studies revealed that nearly all of the participants seemed to "have forgotten their resolutions and are sliding back into their old ways" (McClelland & Winter, 1969).

What made it possible for the participants, despite their good intentions, to revert to their old behaviours? One likelihood is that the environment to which they returned influenced them in such a way as to encourage their original patterns of conduct. While the model lacked the means to effect a significant change in behaviour, it did recognise one underlying factor, namely the need for achievement as being a potential area where change might occur. McClelland and Winter's isolation and manipulation of this variable provided a new and seemingly logical approach to the study of change, but unfortunately the results of this idea in practice only strengthen the case for viewing change from a normative, rather than a causal perspective.

Triandis (1984) approached the issue of development by considering certain characteristics of societies which either foster or slow change. In particular, Triandis made use of two dichotomies: predictability *vs.* unpredictability and loose *vs.* tight societies. Predictable societies are those which have clearly-developed norms. The way a society will react to change, Triandis suggests, can be foreseen by observing the norms of that society. Predictability, according to Triandis, leads to stability, which is needed for economic growth (that is, through investments). However, perhaps it is that very stability which acts as a resistance to economic change. For example, there could hardly be more clearly developed norms than among the camel herders of Saharan Sudan but their way of life has been static for a thousand years.

Triandis also distinguished between loose and tight societies. Tight societies are those which encourage strict adherence to norms, which in turn fosters social cohesion. Triandis believed this cohesion to be beneficial for economic growth; however, tight societies lack the openness necessary to adopt the new methods proposed by development strategies, which leads to stability rather than change. Loose societies might lack cohesion, but they tend to be more open to creative and new strategies for social change.

In addition to these models, other discussions have identified specific areas of contribution for psychologists in development programmes without questioning the nature of social change itself. However, they suffer from three weaknesses: (*a*) they are trained in causal metaphysics leading to confusion between causal and normative explanations of social behaviour; (*b*) they give high priority to the process sustaining formal organisations, rather than those involved

in maintaining informal social life; and (*c*) they assume change is actually being managed in the West (the source of their original model of development). These weaknesses are well known but have not been taken sufficiently seriously. The present discussion attempts to address the nature of change in general and explore its application to national development, and, in so doing, try to move development programmes a step forward.

National Development and Psychology

In the most general term, there are two ways of attempting to understand social change. One is to try to understand it at the level of the change itself, seeing such change as following its own rules in relation to various organisational characteristics. This is the level of sociology, political science, economics, and so on. Explanation of this kind can be regarded as structural, with Marxism serving as the classic example. The other approach involves the level of the individuals who make up the society or organisation, and attempting to understand social change in terms of change or lack of change in their psychological characteristics. This second approach necessarily involves two levels of analysis rather than one, that is, structural and individual factors. It requires that some attempt be made to show how these two levels interact with each other.

One way of pursuing the second approach has already been discussed in this article. McClelland and his associates attempted to understand societal processes in terms of individual motivation, emphasising the deferential needs that individual people have for achievement, affiliation, and power in different societies and in the same society at different historical periods.

The point of departure for the social reducton theory (Moghaddam & Harré, 1996) approach to national development, the second way in which psychological factors can be brought into focus, is the insight that change at the "macro" societal level, involving political and economic transformations, can often come about much quicker than change at the "micro" level of everyday social behaviour. This becomes particularly apparent when one considers the outcomes of major political revolutions, from those in the past (French revolution) to the contemporary (China, Iran). Whereas political and

economic institutions can be brought crashing down overnight (for example, the fall of the emperor and the collapse of an economic system based on private property in China), the everyday social practices of people are much more stable, resilient, and resistant to change.

From this insight, social reducton theory proposes a solution to the puzzling relationship between macro and micro processes. Social reductons are the elementary, small scale social forces by means of which the patterns of everyday life are sustained, such as the ways of greeting, and of organising life in the family and home. We shall elaborate on this solution in the following pages, but before that it will be useful to highlight an implication derived from social reducton theory that has considerable applied significance: There are severe limitations to the traditional "top down" approach of attempting to achieve national development through manipulations in economic, and political structures just because of the resilience of everyday practices to change. Those concerned with planning and implementing national development programmes need to pay more attention to skills involved in everyday social practices.

A third way of trying to make sense of social change through an understanding of individual psychological processes, is that which is provided by reversal theory (Apter, 1982, 1989), which we shall now examine. As we shall see, this approach is compatible with both social reducton theory and the theory of the MeClelland type, and may even act as a bridge between them.

Reductons and their Hierarchical Structures

Actions Performed and Acts Accomplished. To analyse social phenomena adequately it is necessary to distinguish between the actions that must be performed to convey certain social meaning and the acts, or the meanings so conveyed. Among the types of actions that can be used in social interactions are speaking, gestures, and so on. It is useful to extend the notion of action to include patterns or sequences of gestures, speaking, etc., and even choice of costume and the like. Actions are the intended behaviour of social actors. Acts are what actions mean and in particular what they are taken to mean.

To develop that point we need to distinguish between individual actions, for example the things a person says, from the joint acts

accomplished when what that person says is taken up as having a certain meaning by those to whom a speech or gesture is addressed. For example, someone may wave to an acquaintance across the campus, intending the action as a greeting, but it may be taken by the other person as a summons. Only in the completed interpersonal act does the full social meaning of an action or pattern of actions comes to be. This is because only thus is the action significant for the further unfolding of the social relations and events in which it has a part.

Correlations of Actions and Acts. At the local level and within one ethnicity and at one time, there may be quite a strong correlation between type of action performed and act accomplished. For example, invitations may be extended routinely by the use of the question format, for example, "Why don't we take in a movie?". Elsewhere this correlation may not be found. Gestures vary widely in the correlation of gesture type and act conveyed. Notoriously the forming of a circle with forefinger and thumb has one meaning in Western Europe and another in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The elementary "units" of social interaction, "reductons" have a hierarchical structure. There are elementary actions, and elementary acts, differently completed in different societies and even in different institutions within one society. A "dismissive" gesture may have one meaning in the classroom and quite another in a meeting of the faculty called over some contentious issue, and so on.

Change and Resistance to Change. To understand why some reductons are malleable and others are resistant to change we need to develop the action/act analysis further. There seem to be two main reasons why some reductons are resistant to change, that is temporally invariant. One, when a practice is unattended and habitual it is resistant to change. What was initially for an infant a form of behaviour that was inculcated and maintained by explicit rule-following or equivalent becomes habitual. It takes on the outward character of the kind of pattern that has a causal explanation, though it does not. Habitual wiping of the feet on entering a house can look as much like a causal sequence triggered by the event of entering as a genuine causal sequence such as the eyebrow flash emitted on encountering another human being. When rule-following has become habitual or pseudo-causal it is unattended, just something that

happens. It is not even available as a topic for change, and especially if it is confused with genuine causal sequences.

Second, when a practice is biogenic, the running of a genetically programmed fixed action pattern, it is also resistant to change. For example, much that has been redefined as "sexual harassment" may be biogenic, part of the inherited patterns of interaction between the sexes, human ethology, though these action patterns are usually heavily overlaid with cultural variations. The matter is complicated in that there are many examples of action/act pairs in which one is biogenic and the other sociogenic. Social patterns can be found exemplifying all possible combinations of the biogenic and sociogenic. For example, there are biogenic actions used to perform biogenic acts, for instance frowning to warn. Then there are sociogenic actions used to perform biogenic acts, for instance a victory cavalcade to signify triumph over an adversary or the sending of a Valentine card, American style, that is one that is signed to indicate an interest in a member of the opposite sex. There are biogenic actions used to perform sociogenic acts, for example, handshaking to settle a bet. Finally, there are sociogenic actions to perform sociogenic acts, such as signing a contract to get a mortgage.

It is tempting to identify the carrier of a reducton as the biogenic action, so that in researching the field of persisting practices one would concentrate on the fixed action patterns, the ethology of social interaction, such as handshaking and eyebrow flashing. These, it might be assumed, cannot be changed in less than hundreds of generations, so the focus for a theory of national development as a theory of social change ought to be on the local social meanings, the acts, that the ethological repertoire can be used to perform. The kiss, an ethological reducton, can be used to greet, to initiate a sexual encounter, and in the garden of Gethsemane, to betray.

However this assumption does not seem to be supported by a casual glance at the historical record. It is often the sociogenic reductons, be they behavioural practices or socially meaningful acts, that seem to be found persisting through macro changes, be they political or economic or both. For example, the pay-offs that are so characteristic of Italian life, and even now are seemingly resistant to majority disapproval, have been a feature of that culture for hundreds of years, regardless of Garibaldi's unification, of becoming part of the European Union, of notable economic advancement and of the efforts of crusading magistrates. This suggests that the very notions

of a "carrier" and what is carried may be an unsuitable pair of analytic concepts for applying reducton theory to the problem of deep resistance to change. Since the point about reductons is that they are unmotivated patterns of social interaction it is not surprising that they seem to frustrate motivated change.

Carriers are integrated into complex dynamic social practice systems that often survive fairly intact across generations in the same cultural group. They are "the way things are done" in a particular domain of social life, for example, the preparation and distribution of food in the family.

Carriers are formalised to different degrees. An example of a highly formalised carrier is the Catholic mass. The mass consists of many different reductons, integrated in a way that is meaningful, but also dynamic in the sense that the mass may change, but the entire body of action/acts itself could still be recognised over generations. Ballet is another example of a fairly formalised carrier, of all sorts of conventions and assumptions not only about deportment but also about social role.

An example of a less formalised carrier is the Christmas festival with the exchange of presents, the formal dinner and so on. Of course, the less formalised carriers do not have less of an influence on behaviour.

Carriers can be transported to other cultures, but their role and meaning will change when this happens. For example, the Catholic mass can be transported to Third World countries and Christmas dinner exported to the Australian summer.

So far we used the term "carriers" to include reductons at various levels, for example, action–reductons and act–reductons. Reductons as structured sequences of action/act patterns raise some further points about the hierarchical character of the act/action patterns, of which such carriers as the mass consist. To keep the terminology unambiguous we shall use the term "complex carrier" for such sequences as taking the bread or taking the wine.

There is a further level of complexity in this analysis, in that it frequently happens that more than one action is needed for complex carriers individuated at a higher level in the hierarchy by the social force of the performance. For example, the act of greeting may involve a sequence of actions, including bodily gestures. A wave, then a handshake and, at the same time, "Well, how are you doing then?". One act is accomplished through the medium of a stylised pattern of elementary actions.

Now criteria of identity become problematic. What is it about the mass that, through all the changes that have occurred, makes it still "the mass"? In this case the answer is simple: it consists of the same indispensable acts in the same sequence, however much the actions required to perform them have changed. Perhaps we do not know which acts are regarded as indispensable until reducton change is in the air. It may also be the case that the repertoire of acts regarded as indispensable may itself change. Though we doubt this is true of the mass it is certainly true of the ceremony of marriage in the Christian world.

We are now in a position to define more precisely the task of the psychologist with respect to the management of social change. If the persistence of reductons reproduces the old social order then change in reductons is the necessary condition for real change, be it developmental or regressive. Reducton theory suggests that the weak point in a social order is the correlation between actions and acts. The most stable social order, the most resistant to change will be one in which the correlation between actions and their local meanings is so taken for granted as to seem causally necessary. Obviously acts and actions which are both biogenic are immune from managed change in the time span of a "development" programme. Correlated pairs of this character must be tolerated as defining the human form of life in general. But once we are aware of the difference in aetiology of causal from habitual patterns of behaviour, and use our research techniques to seek out the rules from which habits have evolved, we are in a position to change the reducton conditions which carry a social order from one generation to the next. While social reducton theory focuses more on stability and social relations, we now turn to insights from a theory that highlights intra-personal change.

Personal Meanings in Relation to Social Change: Reversal Theory

To put reversal theory in perspective, we need to make a distinction between social and personal meaning. When we start to look at social phenomena at the micro level we are dealing with individuals interacting with each other by means of particular sequences of actions which go to make up acts of various kinds as described by Harré and Secord (1972). As these authors point out, such acts have agreed social meanings, for example, paying a bill, having dinner with the family, watching television, attending a mass. Some of

these meanings are formal and recognised and even legitimated by higher level authorities and institutions—going to mass, for example. Others are less formal and less structured, for example, watching television. But someone in that society watching that act would have little difficulty describing it in a way that others, including the actor, would agree with. This kind of social meaning lies at the heart of discursive psychology and also of reducton theory which is essentially discursive in this sense.

But this is not the whole picture. We also have to look at the personal meanings of the actions and acts for the actors themselves if we are to fully understand the significance of what is happening, since a given socially defined act can have many different personal meanings. For example, watching television can be about immediate enjoyment, sharing something with others, gaining information to use at work, and so on. Only the person who is doing the watching can say which of these kinds of personal meaning apply in his or her case at a particular time.

This is where reversal theory becomes relevant, because it provides a systematic way of examining such personal meaning, arguing that all such meanings relate to one or another basic psychological motives (or combinations of such motives). In other words, acts in the sense of discursive psychology not only have social meanings but personal meanings, and the latter relate to personal motivation. Putting things in this way emphasises the manner in which reversal theory has the potential of linking McClelland's ideas and those of reducton theory.

What are these basic motives, according to reversal theory? Before listing them, there are three points to be made. The first is that these are psychological rather than biological motives. They are to do with mental health rather than physical health, the personality rather than the body. This does not mean that they are not innate, but that they are to do with the individual person's sense of identity, well-being and happiness. (The complex relation between biological and psychological needs will not be pursued further here.) The second point is that these psychological motives, according to reversal theory, come in pairs of opposites. As one or another, within each pair, takes precedence, so a reversal may be said to occur—hence the name of the theory. One implication is that it is impossible for every psychological need to be satisfied simultaneously, and indeed it follows that the more one need is satisfied over time, the less the

opposite need will be. Third, each need is associated with a state of mind (these states are called, for reasons which we need not go into here, "metamotivational states"). While the basis of the state is a particular kind of psychological motive, it is also characterised by a certain way of looking at the world (what one might, perhaps, call a "discursive style") and a unique range of emotions.

There are four pairs of such states. The first pair is made up of what reversal theory calls the "telic" and "paratelic" states. The basic motive of the telic state is to achieve something important, and pleasure comes from a feeling of progress towards this. Here ongoing actions are experienced as being important beyond themselves and the state can be characterised as serious-minded. In contrast, the basic motive of the paratelic state is to have a good time, and pleasure comes from having fun. In this case the state can be characterised as playful and the orientation is towards the present moment and its enjoyment.

The second pair is constituted by the "conformist" and "negativistic" states. The basic motive of the conformist state is to belong, and rules, conventions and the like are experienced as supportive and as providing desirable structure. The basic motive of the negativistic state is, by contrast, that of freedom and independence. Here rules of every kind are experienced as essentially restrictive and confining.

The third pair consists of the "mastery" and "sympathy" states. The basic motive of the former is power and control, and of the latter is intimacy and care. The former sees the world in terms of struggle and the latter in terms of cooperation and the desire for harmony.

The fourth pair is made up of the "autic" and the "alloic" states. In the autic state the basic motive is attention to the self, and it is what happens to the self which matters. In the alloic state the basic motive is to devote oneself to another.

These pairs can be combined in a variety of ways. For example, when the autic state is combined with the mastery state, the outcome is a need for personal power. But when it is combined with the sympathy state the overall need is to be cared for. When the alloic state is combined with the mastery state, the resulting need is to help make some "other" (for example, the team one belongs to) strong. And when it is combined with the sympathy state it is to care for and look after another (for example, one's child).

Each of these pairs may be said to operate in terms of its own "domain of discourse". Thus the domain of discourse of the telic

and paratelic states is that of means and ends, that of the negativistic and conformist states that of rules, that of the mastery and sympathy states is that of transactions, and that of the autic and alloic states is that of relationships. Each of these domains makes its own contribution to the overall personal meaning of any given situation which an individual finds himself in, and at any given time they together make up the personal meaning space of the individual. This personal meaning in turn interweaves with the social meaning of the situation. Thus at a wedding it is the social meaning of the acts involved, which constitutes "getting married", that provide a route to the possible satisfaction of personal desires (for example, to care for someone and to be cared for by them).

Now if we are looking at how cultures differ from each other in terms of the individual psychological level of society, we need to make reference to such personal meaning states as those identified in reversal theory. These should be manifest in the kinds of reductons in use. There are, in principle, two ways in which societies and cultures may differ in this respect:

(*a*) The first is that they express the pursuit of different basic psychological motives to different extents. For instance, the most cursory acquaintance with Spanish culture will disclose that it is a culture imbued with an emphasis on immediate enjoyment and *joie de vivre*, whereas the German culture is generally more serious and achievement-oriented. In reversal theory terms, Spanish culture has a paratelic and German culture a telic bias. Whether it is an innate tendency in the people who make up a culture which determines this, or whether it is determined at the individual level by some overall determining factor in the culture, is difficult to say; perhaps both are involved.

(*b*) The second is that of the particular linkage of acts with basic psychological motives. That is, in different societies, people will tend to pursue given goals through different acts. This is an obvious point. In the paratelic state, people in Spain may go to a bullfight, whereas in the same state in California people may go surfing. But there are also more general characteristics which seem to emerge, that is, different generalised acts which go with different motivational states

> in different cultures. For example, it would be possible to argue that French people pursue status (which is one version of the need for mastery) through the look of things—wearing clothes which are chic, displaying impeccable taste in home furnishings, etc. In contrast, it could be said that Americans tend to pursue status more through quantity and size—size of house, number of cars, etc.

When culture changes, then, it may according to reversal theory change in any of these ways, or any combination of them. First, it may change in the emphasis it places on different basic psychological motives. For example, if we consider English culture over the centuries, it is possible to discern periods when there has been a strong paratelic bias in the culture, emphasising the need for immediate enjoyment and excitement. Such periods would include the Restoration, the Edwardian era, the Gay Twenties and the Swinging Sixties. These would appear to contrast with a more normal telic bias in English culture. To give another example, any country which has undergone a revolution, such as France and Russia during their respective revolutions, and China during the Cultural Revolution, will have experienced a period during which the negativistic state has dominated. In these periods of negativism, the need for freedom, and the desire to break away from old rules and restrictions, become paramount. The second kind of change consists of the kinds of acts which people perform to satisfy their basic motives. Here we see a complex picture of changing (and unchanging) habits, customs and skills. But in a historical perspective certain trends are obvious. For example, the way in which people behave both in pursuit of paratelic entertainment and telic progress has been changed radically by information technology and particularly by the advent of television and the personal computer; the ends have remained the same but the means have been transformed beyond all recognition. Third, changes can occur in a society in respect of which basic motives become subservient to other motives. Thus when a country goes onto a war footing for some purpose, all motives become subservient in that country to the mastery motive. Even the paratelic need for excitement is called into service to this end (Apter, 1992).

A culture may also remain the same in any of these three ways, even while one or both of the others undergo change. In particular, people in a given society may continue to perform the same acts

even though many other kinds of changes are going on. This of course, as we have seen, is one of the arguments of reducton theory. This is not at all inconsistent with reversal theory, except that reversal theory would suggest that what tends to remain are not just acts, but links between certain acts and certain psychological motives. To return to a previous example, in French culture, dressing with style may be seen as a reducton—and certainly it has endured across regimes, republics, and historical periods for all except the peasant classes. Even some of the communist students in the streets of Pairs in 1968 wore designer jeans and Gucci shoes (and did not seem to notice any contradiction in doing so). But wearing good clothes is not just a motiveless habit; it is part of a self-conscious desire to maintain a certain standing.

Concluding Comment

As a theory of personality, reversal theory is unusual, in that it emphasises change rather than stability. As a cultural theory, reducton theory is unusual in that it emphasises stability rather than change. We have proposed that the two together can provide new insights into the stabilities which underlie cultural change and the changes which contribute to cultural stability. Most importantly, these theories help to highlight key psychological issues involved in change at micro and macro levels, and in this way facilitate contributions psychologists could make to national development internationally.

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