World Psychology, 1995, *1* (4): 47-78

BUT IS IT SCIENCE? TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

by Fathali M. Moghaddam, Georgetown University, District of Columbia, U.S.A.

Rom Harré, Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom

Alternative social psychologies continue to flourish, particularly outside North America, but their impact on traditional social psychology remains minimal. Indeed, traditional social psychology has become even more inward-looking since the so-called "crisis" days. This crisis had some impact on microlevel issues, such as the ethics of how individual subjects are treated in laboratory experiments, but failed to raise macrolevel ethical concerns, such as those related to the ideological and international role of psychology. For example, the "underclass" in Western societies remains neglected, and inappropriate psychology continues to be exported to non-Western societies. The "second cognitive revolution" provides the backdrop for this assessment of the alternative social psychologies, including ethogenics, discursive psychology, narrative psychology, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and activity psychology, particularly with respect to how well they meet the criteria of science. We propose that the alternative approaches, based on normative rather than causal models of social behavior, *are* scientific and herald a new era in the evolution of social psychology as a discipline.

We are grateful for Wallace E. Lambert and anonymous reviewers for comments made on an earlier draft of this paper.

Correspondence should be addressed to Fathali M. Moghaddam, Psychology Department, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057, U.S.A.

We know that the tail must wag the dog,
For the horse is drawn by the cart;
But the Devil whoops, as he whooped of old:
"It's clever, but is it Art?"
Rudyard Kipling (The Conundrum of the Workshops)

The "crisis of confidence" experienced in the field of social psychology during the 1960s and 1970s was associated with profound and complex issues, such as the requirements for a discipline to count as a science of social behavior. Traditional social psychologists were criticized with respect to weaknesses in research methodology (Miller, 1972; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1969), unethical research procedures (Kelman, 1968; Ring, 1967), ideological biases (Armistead, 1974; Billig, 1982; Sampson, 1981), and for failing to conform to established procedures for a proper scientific enterprise, in particular for adopting a metaphysics at odds with the subject matter investigated (Harré & Secord, 1972). It was also argued that social psychology should be interpreted as a historical enterprise, since it was capable of describing social behavior only at particular historical periods (Gergen, 1973). At the heart of all these and many other related criticisms was the underlying question: it may be a way of studying social behavior, but is it science?

In any debate about the value of innovation, the question of appropriateness and inappropriateness of its *metaphysics* to the topic in hand remains paramount--that is, the question of the viability of the assumptions made about the nature of the phenomenon under investigation. Defenders of traditional social psychology have continued to uphold a cause-effect scheme for the explanation of social behavior, to be considered as outcomes or events, whereas many of those advocating alternative social psychologies are united in their support for normative accounts of behavior based upon the conception of patterns of human joint actions which are the result of active agents recognizing, interpreting, and choosing to follow particular rules, not necessarily consciously.

Of course, the contrast between causal and normative accounts of human behavior is not new. Normative psychologies of social action were proposed by many in Germany, for instance Weber (1904/1958, 1947), and long ago by Aristotle (Robinson, 1988). However, the point of this paper is to examine the contemporary scene. The shift from behaviorism to cognitive psychology involved a move from a science of behavior, in which actions are treated as if they are caused by external stimuli, to a science of mental life, a general cognitivism that has been referred to as the first cognitive revolution (Harré, 1994). This has been followed by two, not necessarily incompatible, ways of interpreting cognitivism. Artificial Intelligence has nourished a cognitive science

based on the computer/brain analogy, using the hypothetico-deductive methodology. Alternatively the discursive turn (Harré & Gillet, 1994) involves a shift from a science of mental life to a science of normative action, in which persons, rather than environmental or sub-personal contingencies, activating "mental mechanisms," are posited as the sources of action. This has been called the second cognitive revolution. Alternative social psychologies within the discursive paradigm focus on rule-following as a skilled behavior, and examine how individuals become knowledgeable about, and skilled in, the recognition and use of normative systems.

Much recent debate about the status of mainstream psychology (Leary, 1990) has highlighted the persistence of logical empiricism or positivism in the metaphysical and methodological assumptions of many psychologists. It is evident that this is because it has been assumed that what it is to be "scientific," to produce reliable classifications and explanations of phenomena, is prescribed by that philosophical position. The seven alternatives we examine in this paper do not conform to the tenets of logical empiricism, and there has been a tendency for mainstream social psychologists to dismiss them as "unscientific." However, it is now generally agreed that positivism gives a poor account even of physics--once taken as a paradigm of logical empiricism (J.L. Aronson, 1984). In conformity to contemporary thought in philosophy of science, we simply reject adherence to the limits of logical empiricism as a criterion for scientific respectability. Indeed we would hold that following that prescription is enough to ground the rejection of an investigation procedure on the grounds that it is mere pseudoscience.

It is particularly appropriate that we hold this discussion in an international rather than exclusively North American arena, because much of the current development in alternative paradigms is taking place elsewhere, though several have a North American origin.

We begin by highlighting contrasting interpretations of what has taken place in the "post-crisis" years, the period since the most recent outburst of criticism of what is now mainstream social psychology. This analysis raises at least two substantial questions. First, has traditional social psychology become more pluralistic in its research methods? Second, how far have alternative social psychologies become absorbed into traditional social psychology? In the first part of this paper we will address these questions. In part two, we proceed to contrast traditional social psychology with alternative orientations. These investigations are linked, since a number of critics who contributed to the crisis literature also put forward and carried out specific alternative research orientations (for example, Harré & Secord, 1972), and have published substantive bodies of empirical research (von Cranach & Harré, 1981; Mulhausler & Harré, 1992) or attempted to bring social psychology closer to

alternative orientations already in place (Armistead, 1974). Some twenty years after the peak of the crisis debates, it may be instructive to take stock of the progress made by those advocating alternative orientations.

Our objective, then, is to monitor closely the alternative orientations, and in particular to assess their status, according to the twin criteria of descriptive accuracy and explanatory power. This agenda presents us with the opportunity to introduce the common theoretical and methodological themes of the alternative orientations to a wider international audience, as these themes have emerged in the present time.

Differing Constructions of the Crisis

Given the wide range of views expressed during the debates in this era, perhaps it is not surprising that there have since emerged sharply contrasting constructions of what has taken place since the crisis. First, there is disagreement about whether the crisis has ended. Supporters in the traditional camp either dismissed the crisis even at the time it was supposed to be underway (Elms, 1975), or have since described the crisis as over (Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & Gonzales, 1990). In sharp contrast, some critics feel that social psychology continues to be in crisis, as suggested by the title of Parker's 1989 book, *The Crisis in Modern Social Psychology and How to End It*.

Second, there are differing interpretations of what has happened to traditional social psychology since the crisis. The mainstream literature, perhaps inevitably, tends to depict the crisis either as not having had a significant impact on the field, or as having led to a richer and more expansive social psychology. We find the first point of view adopted in the *Handbook of Social Psychology*,

> "The crisis of social psychology has begun to take its place as a minor perturbation in the long history of the social sciences. The intellectual momentum of the field has not been radically affected by crisis proclamations..." (Jones, 1985, p. 100).

The second point of view presents social psychology as having grown as a result of the crisis, and is exemplified in a recent popular social psychology text by Brehm and Kassin (1993):

> "*An Era of Pluralism: 1976 to the Present.* Fortunately for the future of the field, both sides won. The debate on ethics led to more rigorous and uniform standards for research. Careful scrutiny of possible sources of bias produced improved procedures. Concerns about historical and cultural limits on scientific findings led to a more sophisticated understanding of the personal and political values that can underlie scientific activities. But just as important, the baby was not thrown out with the bath water. Laboratory experiments continued. A single-minded attachment to laboratory work evolved into an acceptance of a wide variety of research methods" (p. 10).

Given the differing reconstructions of the crisis, it is useful to try to identify how it influenced traditional and alternative social psychologies.

The Impact of the Crisis on Traditional and Alternative Social Psychologies

In some ways, the crisis seems to have had no impact at all on traditional social psychology. First, in terms of research methodology and sampling, the percentage of studies carried out in the laboratory did not change in the post-crisis era (Adair, Duchenko, & Lindsay, 1985; Sears, 1986), remaining close to 80 percent, and the central place of the laboratory in traditional social psychology has been confirmed (Aronson, et al., 1990). Nor has the very heavy reliance on college students as research subjects changed since the 1960s (Sears, 1986; Danziger, 1990). On the contrary, the tendency for most of the subjects to be white middle-class undergraduates has strengthened rather than diminished. For example, representation of articles on African-American subjects published in the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* went down from 3.1 percent during 1970-1974 to just 0.3 percent during 1985-1989 (Graham, 1992, Table 1). This is despite the fact that cross-cultural reviews reveal major limitations in the generalizability of at least some findings and concepts central to traditional social psychology (e.g., see Moghaddam, Taylor, & Wright, 1993).

Restrictions in methodology have meant limitations in the social behavior that can be studied. For example, even the more progressive researchers studying collective behavior (e.g., Tajfel, 1984) have limited themselves to looking at the reactions individuals show in one-hour laboratory experiments, and have neglected the more long-term evolution of collective behavior in everyday contexts. Related to this is the almost total absence of any serious social psychological study of social change. Obviously, the intricate long-term evolution of social change, and the interactions involving people who are often intimately associated with one another (through ties of family and community, business associations, and other group affiliations), could not be studied in brief laboratory studies that typically involve young strangers, aged 18-25 years. Such limitations have meant that mainstream psychology makes little serious contribution to the understanding of national development and other issues related to social change (Moghaddam, 1990; Moghaddam & Harré, 1995).

Second, reviews of publication and citation patterns in major journals strongly suggest that traditional North American social psychology remains *closed* to outside sources. For example, Gielen (1994) has shown that over a period of five decades (1950-1990), more than 99 percent of all editors and board members, the "gatekeepers" of major American journals, had affiliations with institutions located in North America; over 95 percent of the authors came

from North America; and only 5-8 percent of references included in these journals were to authors outside North America. In contrast, in the natural sciences and mathematics, about 44 percent of all citations given by U.S. scientists in 1980 referred to scientific publications outside the U.S. (National Science Board, 1983, cited in Rosenzweig, 1984). This ignores the serious work in social psychology in other places.

The more "open" and "international" situation that exists in the natural sciences, where competition for journal space and research funding is fierce by any standards, shows a weakness in the argument that North American social psychology remains closed because those outside North America find it too difficult to meet the stringent demands of competition. We do not deny that there is a very high level of competition for space in mainstream journals; rather, we point out that selection processes can follow many different procedures and criteria. At present, the procedures and criteria for publication in traditional journals embody a very narrow view of social behavior and very restricted methodology and ways of selecting participant samples. Researchers who employ other taxonomic metaphors and other empirical methods, stand no chance of acceptance. This "censorship" problem has led to the emergence of several journals with editorial policies open to alternative methodologies, prominent examples being *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, *Theory and Psychology*, and *Cultural Psychology*.

A third, and perhaps most important point concerning the lack of impact of a crisis, relates to the continuing exclusive adherence of traditional social psychology to a metaphysics of causal processes, in which the causes of action are either external or internal to the person, and are statistically related to states, or events as effects. This remains a central concern for various critics, particularly because it has led to a focus on explanations by reference to assumed causes inside individual minds as opposed to explanations based on *social* or *collective* sources and normative systems which people use (Pepitone, 1976). In the second part of this paper we expand on a number of efforts to provide an alternative metaphysical and methodological orientation, in which cause-effect relations play only a marginal role in the explanations of social behavior.

A Question of Ethics: Domains in Which the Crisis Has Had an Impact

However, there are some respects in which the crisis debates *have* had an impact on traditional social psychology. First, the literature on the "social psychology of the social psychology experiment" (Orne, 1962) has made researchers, or at least those writing about research methods, more aware of demand characteristics in laboratory experiments. But, second, the greatest

impact of the crisis on traditional social psychology has been in fundamental changes in ethical standards used to screen research studies. These changed ethical standards (see Fisher & Fyrberg, 1994) mean that some of the classic social psychological studies of the past could not be conducted today in their original form, including those by Milgram (1974) on obedience to authority and the Zimbardo (1972) prison simulation, because they would not be approved according to the reformed criteria (see Aronson, Brewer, & Carlsmith, 1985, p. 466). Some effort is now made to teach students about the ethical standards that should be adopted for research, and this is reflected in the contents of undergraduate texts and courses (for example, see Baron & Byrne, 1994, pp. 31-33; Myers, 1993, pp. 22-23; Worchel, Cooper, & Goethals, 1991, pp. 29-31).

In terms of implications, one view is that behind this lies a shift in the conception of the nature of human beings, from stimulus-response mechanisms to responsible social actors, marked in some discussions by a shift in terminology from "subjects" to "participants." This is obviously a step toward replacing the positivist paradigm. At the same time, we should note that the new ethical standards have had the consequence of severely restricting the ability of researchers to examine "uncomfortable" issues. Whatever the methodological flaws of the Milgram (1974) studies, they did serve an invaluable service by focusing attention on the issue of obedience to authority, just as Zimbardo's (1972) "unethical" simulation study focused attention on prison life. The fact is that poor people in Western societies, particularly in the U.S. which has the greatest wealth disparity between the economic elite and the underclass, receive unethical treatment at every turn in their everyday lives--treatment which *is* harsh and harmful, particularly compared to the treatment of participants in Milgram's (1974) studies. The ethical concerns of mainstream social psychology have been far too limited and reductionist, so that the treatment of individual subjects in laboratory experiments *is* a concern, but the treatment received by the masses of people in their everyday lives remains outside the concern of such ethics.

The Ethics of Exporting Inappropriate Psychology to the Third World

A similar ethical concern must be raised as regards the exportation of mainstream social psychology to Third World societies. Although such exportation has in rare exceptions had some benefits for Third World societies (Kagitçibasi, 1995), the most important factor shaping psychology in the international context continues to be power inequalities between and within nations. The inability of psychology to contribute to Third World development arises in large part from these inequalities (Moghaddam, 1990), and surely *this*

is an ethical issue. Putative psychological "knowledge" which is of highly questionable reliability and validity even in the Western context is being exported wholesale to Third World societies, as part of a larger exchange system ultimately driven by profits.

With respect to inequalities between nations, during the post-World War Two era the United States has established itself as the only psychology Superpower (Moghaddam, 1987). Psychology continues to be exported wholesale from the U.S. to the rest of the world, with little or no serious attention given to the appropriateness of what is being exported (Moghaddam & Taylor, 1986). Similarly, Third World psychologists are trained in the U.S. and in other Western countries, without regard to the question of the appropriateness of their training (Moghaddam & Taylor, 1987). A consequence of this global trend is that modern psychology has been incapable of making serious contributions to Third World national development. Indeed, the continued exportation of inappropriate psychological knowledge and inappropriately trained personnel from Western to Third World societies strengthens ties of dependency and continues exploitative traditions established through colonialism.

As regards inequalities within nations, the role of Western psychology in the Third World can be clarified by distinguishing between modern and traditional sectors in Third World societies (Moghaddam & Taylor, 1985). The modern sector is Westernized, affluent, urban, educated, and politically dominant. The traditional sector tends to be conservative in lifestyle, economically poor, rural-dwelling, illiterate, and with little real political power. Western psychology is imported to the modern sector, and particularly has influence on the Third World elite who, sometimes explicitly, emulate the ideology and lifestyle of the Western elite. However, Western psychology can make very little headway into the traditional sector, in large part because the vast majority of people in the Third World do not share the value system inherent in this psychology; it is culturally alien to them.

In this connection, it is important to point out that mainstream psychology has also failed to make significant contributions to national development and the lives of the poorest sectors in Western societies. The Third World acts as a mirror in this regard, bringing to our attention the fact that just as mainstream psychology is ineffective in the traditional sector of Third World societies, it remains ineffective in understanding and improving the lives of those millions who constitute the growing underclass in Western societies. A number of cultural and ideological factors have been identified as contributors to this situation (Moghaddam, Taylor, & Wright, 1993), but more attention needs to be given to the continued adherence of mainstream psychology to a logico-positivist model of science. The adoption of alternative models may lead to a

better understanding of a central issue in Third World development: the relationship between change at the micro- and macrolevels (Moghaddam & Harré, 1995). Kagitçibasi (1995) rightly points out that we must not look to the West for theory and the East for data, but we would add that in both the East and the West we must look beyond the mechanistic "causal" model for explanations (Moghaddam & Harré, 1992).

Although we agree with Kagitçibasi (1995) that we must have universal standards to apply in assessing progress, we wonder if her seemingly limited goals do not call for a major transformation in social life. When she asks, "Why should...positive child-rearing values be monopolized by the middle classes?" we would raise the question, "Do we not have to achieve major transformations in social relations in order to grow out of such 'monopolies'--in both East and West?" Psychology has an enormously important role to play in moving us beyond mechanistic models that assume changes in social relations will automatically and quickly follow changes at the economic and political levels. A detailed study of everyday social practices reveals that political and economic structural changes, even when brought about through major revolutions, are not inevitably or speedily followed by microlevel changes in social relations, such as those involving authority relations and gender relations (Moghaddam & Harré, 1995).

Thus, for example, although the 1979 revolution in Iran brought about fundamental political and economic changes, at another, deeper level, things stayed the same. There did not quickly evolve a normative system to guide correct behavior in an open society, nor the rule-following skills required for both leaders and masses to participate in such a society. Change at the psychological level came too slowly, and the persistence of long-established social practices acted as a brake to real political and economic progress. This same "bottom-up" process is evident in the countries of the former U.S.S.R., where economic and political reforms are being thwarted by the much slower pace of change at the microlevel of everyday social practices just when a norms-based social psychology would be of the greatest value.

But we need not look just to non-Western societies to find evidence showing the maximum speed of change at the psychological level to be slower than political and economic structural levels. Decades after legislative reforms and the "liberation" of various minorities in the U.S., including women and blacks, we hear legitimate complaints that "nothing has changed." For example, women who work outside the home are still expected to take more responsibility for children and for work inside the home than are their husbands, and blacks still experience segregation in everyday social life, on and off campuses. Thus, we argue that, even after the heightened concern with ethical issues through the crisis, there are severe limitations in the ways in which the question of ethics

has been addressed by mainstream social psychologists.

Why Have the Alternative Social Psychologies Not Influenced Mainstream Social Psychology?

And what of the impact of the crisis on the alternative orientations? Did they become absorbed into traditional social psychology? We believe not. Since the crisis years, a fairly expansive and in some ways impressive array of alternative social psychology orientations have developed in parallel to traditional social psychology. Very little is heard about these alternative orientations within the traditional literature. The work of Harré and Secord (1972), and some recent work by Bruner (1990), are among the very few examples of alternative orientations (see also Edwards & Potter, 1993) that have found their way into the traditional literature (for example, see ethogenics as discussed by Jones, 1985, pp. 98-99, in the *Handbook of Social Psychology*).

How are we to explain this almost total neglect of alternative orientations, including ethogenics, discursive psychology, narrative psychology, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, cultural psychology, autobiographical psychology, and activity psychology, by researchers in traditional social psychology?

One possibility is that increasing specialization in psychology is leading to greater fragmentation in the field (Moghaddam, 1989; Staats, 1991). Sociologists of science have documented how increased competition between researchers leads to a search for vacant spaces, social differentiation, and wider gaps between specialties (Hagstrom, 1974; Mulkay, Gilbert, & Woolgar, 1975; Starr, 1983; Stehr & Larson, 1974). This process may be in effect in social psychology, leading to a greater rift between researchers occupying different territories, so that they have different publication outlets, attend different conferences, and generally keep with others of their own kind.

A second possible reason for the immense gulf between traditional social psychology and alternative orientations is that the former continues to be reductionist, while the latter attempts to explain social behavior in relation to macrolevel social processes. There are some differences between experiences in Europe and in North America in this regard. The alternative social psychologies, particularly ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism, have influenced sociological social psychology, but not psychological social psychology in North America (see Stephan & Stephan, 1990, on the *two* social psychologies, the sociological and the psychological). On the European front, European social psychologists have made some progress in shaping a less reductionist social psychology (Lewicki, 1982; Moghaddam, 1987; Moscovici, 1972; Tajfel, 1984). The European social psychology movement has gained

strength and produced impressive new research on topics such as social representations (Breakwell & Cantor, 1992; Farr & Moscovici, 1984), collective beliefs (Hewstone, 1989), public disorder (Marsh, Rosser, & Harré, 1977) and collective memory (Billig, 1992; Middleton & Edwards, 1990). But this type of research does not dominate the mainstream on either side of the Atlantic, although it is better known in Europe than in the United States.

This is not to suggest that what we have termed alternative social psychologies are synonymous with European social psychology. A too simplistic account would neglect the seminal contributions of North Americans to the alternative orientations (for example, Goffman, 1959; also see Stryker & Stratham, 1985). It would also neglect the fact that much of European social psychology is traditional (see the *European Journal of Social Psychology*). Also, a few Europeans, such as Tajfel and Moscovici, have influenced traditional social psychology, but mostly in research domains that remain marginal in the mainstream context, such as minority-majority relations (see Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994).

A third very important reason for the neglect of the alternative orientations is that they are often seen by those in traditional social psychology as being "unscientific." This issue is of the highest importance, because an explicit goal of modern social psychology is to achieve the status of a science. If the perception that the alternative orientations are unscientific is correct, then social psychology should, indeed, neglect them. Ironically one of the major complaints levelled at traditional social psychology by authors outside psychology, who are often those trained in the physical sciences, is the "unscientific" character of much of that research judged by comparison with those physical sciences (e.g., see Toulmin, 1972, whose intellectual career spans physics and philosophy). The alternative paradigms for research into the psychology of social behavior belongs more to the genre of the second cognitive revolution than the first. But like cognitive science, the discursive approaches are firmly opposed to logical empiricism (Bruner, 1990; Shanker, 1992).

As we pointed out in the introductory remarks, at one level the "meta-debate" has focused on the positivist/anti-positivist contrast (Leary, 1990). But the matter is more complex. There are several different positions at odds with positivism. Each has been realized in an alternative psychology. For those anti-positivists who adhere to realism, the cognitive science approach derived from the computational metaphor is the best hope for a scientific psychology. Our view is that cognitive science seems entirely appropriate for the study of perception and motor skills. But there is another anti-positivist philosophy of science, that which focuses on meanings and rules of action. This is the discursive point of view of the second cognitive revolution (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Harré & Gillet, 1994). Only on this conceptual scheme do persons have

a place as *sources* of activity, the users of narrative systems. This distinction is reflected in the differences of emphasis between "subjects of an experiment" and "participants in an investigation."

The Alternative Paradigms: A Tabular Presentation

The work of Thomas Kuhn (1962) and Ludwig Fleck (1935), among others, has familiarized us with the idea that at any period during its history a particular scientific community is operating with and within a "paradigm." Therefore, in order to give an account of a science at some period in its development, it is advisable to lay out the currently prevailing paradigm in some detail. A paradigm, it is now generally agreed (Toulmin, 1960), has four interlocking components:

1. There is a set of assumptions as to the nature of the entities and basic processes that make up the field of the science. These metaphysical assumptions are often taken for granted and come under scrutiny only when a science is in crisis.
2. There is an agreed subject matter, which directly or indirectly realizes the basic assumptions.
3. There is a methodology, coordinate with the basic assumptions, with which the agreed subject is to be investigated and the results explained. This includes not only techniques of enquiry but also standards of "good work."
4. There are a few classic published studies that serve as exemplars of the paradigm in action.

The two tables that follow incorporate these four components and present two paradigms in use in social psychology. The first paradigm, referred to here as traditional social psychology, is the dominant one in the psychology departments of most academic institutions. The second paradigm is manifested in a number of subsystems distinguished by the fact that they are maintained by different scientific communities, rather than by any fundamental difference in their metaphysical and methodological content. Table 1 presents the major assumptions, agreed subject matter, methodology, and representative publications of traditional social psychology and the alternative orientations. We expand on this in detail below.

Table 2 treats the alternative orientations as one category and contrasts them with traditional social psychology in terms of situations studied, explanations adopted, methods of meaning determination, technical vocabulary, and anthropological assumptions.

Table 1
Characteristics of Traditional Social Psychology and Alternative Orientations

Orientation	Representative publications	Subject of Study	Main Research Method	Major Assumptions
Traditional Social Psychology	Lindzey & Aronson (1985)	Central processing mechanisms	Laboratory experiments	Social interaction is mediated causally by cognitive processes
Ethogenics	Harré & Secord (1972)	Dynamic structure of interpersonal episodes	Dramaturgical analysis account analysis	Human action is intentional and "rule governed"
Discursive Psychology	Billig (1992) Edwards & Potter (1992)	Psychological phenomena as discursive phenomena	Discourse analysis	The most important psychological phenomena are properties of discourses
Narrative Psychology	Bruner (1990) Howard (1991)	Organization of life episodes as narrative	Study of narrative conventions	The same conventions control storytelling and sequences of overt behavior
Symbolic Interactionism	Goffman (1959) Blumer (1969)	Mediating processes in everyday social interaction	Dramaturgical analysis	Interaction is mediated symbolically not causally
Ethno-methodology	Garfinkel (1967)	Creation of moment by moment interpersonal order	Disruption of social order to make implicit conventions explicit	Social order is a cultural and normative construction
Cultural Psychology	Shweder (1991)	How cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, and transform the human psyche	Account gathering and ethnographic analysis/ description in naturalistic settings	Individual behavior is regulated through normative system
Activity Psychology	Pearce & Cronen (1981)	Goal-setting and interactions toward goal-setting	Disruption of social action to make implicit goal-setting explicit	People act so as to achieve goals in accordance with locally agreed norms

Table 2
Traditional Social Psychology Compared with Alternative Orientations

Orientation	Situations studied	Explanation adopted	Meaning determination	Technical vocabulary	Anthropological assumption
Traditional Social Psychology	Static	In terms of causal regulations	Meaning predominately determined by experimenter	Neologisms	Psychological functioning independent from culture and language
Alternative Orientation	Dynamic	In terms of conformity to norms and rules	Meaning predominately determined by participants	Supplemented ordinary language	Culture and language imminent in discursive acts

Traditional Social Psychology

The most important assumption underlying traditional social psychology is that social interaction is mediated causally by cognitive processes. Traditional social psychology moved away from behaviorism insofar as it accepted mental processes as a legitimate topic of study, but it wholeheartedly retained a causal model of behavior because of the assumption that science must be about cause-and-effect relationships. This assumption had important consequences for the subject of study and also the methodology of traditional social psychology. The subject of study in traditional social psychology is central processing mechanisms, the assumed mediating cause of behavior.

As Shweder (1991) explains,

"General psychology assumes that its subject matter is a central (abstract and transcendent = deep or interior or hidden) processing mechanism inherent (fixed and universal) in human beings, which enables them to think (classify, infer, choose, evaluate), and learn. The aim of general psychology is to describe that central processing mechanism of mental life" (p. 77).

For example, following Heider (1958) and George Kelly (1955) there have been various theoretical formulations of attributional processes (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967, 1972; Nisbett & Ross, 1980), leading to a huge mountain of empirical studies on social attributions (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Officially, a major goal of attributional researchers is to discover cognitive inference mechanisms that lead to the so-called attributional errors, such as the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977), which apparently arise when

individuals discount the role of environmental factors in explaining the behavior of other people. An alternative approach to explaining such social phenomenon, without resorting to causal models of human behavior, is through discursive psychology, according to which attribution is complex patterns of reasoning, governed by situationally dependent sets of rules for narrative construction (Edwards & Potter, 1992, 1993).

The assumption that social interactions are causally mediated by cognitive processes has scarcely influenced the choice of research methods. The laboratory method has been consistently favored over other methods, specifically because it seems to match best a non-cognitive Humean causal model of behavior which underlines most of the terminology associated with laboratory experiments--control group, experimental group, independent and dependent variables, random and systematic error, and the like. As Aronson et al. (1990) have explained, hypothesis-testing in experiments is an inquiry about a "...causal sequence. The antecedent event, or 'cause,' in the proposed sequence is called the *independent variable*, because the experimenter creates it and controls its variation; it is independent of all other causative influences" (p. 12). In short, mainstream social psychology has not yet made the transition from the methodology of behaviorism to that of the first cognitive revolution. According to the latter, an experiment can only be a test of a hypothesis about the existence or the nature of an unobserved cognitive mechanism.

ALTERNATIVE ORIENTATIONS

We shall present brief sketches of the alternative orientations in two groups. In the first group are those relatively recent innovative proposals which have emerged as the direct result of the realization that there are important patterns of social behavior that would have been unmeasurable within the traditional paradigm. In the second group, we have put forward long-standing research associations which have persisted alongside mainstream social psychology, flowering in other fields of academia. These orientations have had little mutual influence. The emergence of the first group of alternative approaches has, however, led to an increasing degree of interactions between other research traditions, mediated by the newer.

Group One: Recent Innovations

Ethogenics

The basic concept in ethogenics is social episode. Episodes are analyzed into *act-action structures*, by the use of a hierarchy of models. The dramaturgical

model is used to reveal the basic structure, while other models, such as the ceremonial and the agonistic, are used to reveal the fine structure of episodes. These structures are created in the course of people acting in accordance with local norms to accomplish various projects. This has been called the *role-rule model.* Complementary to episode analysis is the collection and analysis of accounts, from which the local network of norms can be extracted. Accounts are not descriptions of subjective, causal processes, but the citation of norms to make act-structures intelligible and warranted. The test of the correctness of an ethogenic theory of some category of social episode is the degree of match between the norms as revealed by episode analysis and the norms revealed by account analysis.

A typical example of ethogenic research is the social psychology of soccer hooliganism (Marsh, Rosser, & Harré, 1977). By applying the dramaturgical model to the analysis of actual episodes of football violence, the ritualistic character of the events was revealed. A close study of the life courses of sixty fans showed that the episodes of ritual violence served as sequential rites of passage through which status in the group was created and sustained. Detailed analyses of accounts collected by Marsh, as the fans both critically commented upon and discursively reframed the events that had occurred, demonstrated the means by which the social efficacy of ritual encounters was brought into being by the interpretative schemes used by the fans themselves, in their retrospective narratives.

Public violence is not a set of responses to stimulus objects; it is an active performance by skilled actors according to norms and in pursuit of certain well-defined ends.

Discursive Psychology

The basic concept is *discursive interaction*, typically exemplified in a conversation. Certain psychological phenomena exist only as properties of a conversation. For example, two friends might discuss how they would arrange a picnic--the decisions emerging as properties of the conversation rather than of each person's cognitive activities. Such phenomena are said to be discursively constructed. The conversational forms in which this or that psychological phenomenon is constructed are constrained by relevant norms. In general, those taking part in such a conversation are ordered hierarchically with respect to their right to make individual contributions to the constructive process. The basic method is the analysis of conversations in which psychological phenomena are constructed.

A typical example of discursive research is the work of Middleton and Edwards (1990) on the discursive construction of memories, that is, of versions

of the past created in everyday conditions, in which records are scarce or nonexistent. These studies (and others using the same theory) have shown how versions of the past are negotiated among the members of a group, and in particular, how the distribution of memorial rights among the actors, defines positions in terms of which the several contributions of the interactors are given weight in the construction of the agreed-upon version. Though recollecting can be an individual activity, remembering is more often than not collective.

Narrative Psychology

The basic concepts are *lived* and *told narratives*. This orientation shares many basic principles with both ethogenics and discursive psychology, since narratologists assume both that life episodes unfold according to certain norms, and that the discursive aspects of such episodes are central matters of concern to psychologists trying to understand the processes of their genesis. The main working hypothesis of narrative psychology is that the norms according to which people construct both the episodes of daily living, and the stories which people tell about their lives are drawn from the same source: namely, the narrative conventions available in that society. Research involves a comparison between lived and told narratives, with the aim of extracting common forms (Bruner, 1990). These forms are then available as the basis for further research into the possible sources of people's knowledge of local narrative conventions, for instance in children's literature and in the contemporary media, etc.

A typical example of narrative psychology is Davies and Harré's (1990) study of the sources of the narrative conventions according to which many daily interactions between men and women in Australia are managed. Davies arranged for young children to hear feminist reworking of fairy tales, in which the traditional gender roles are recast, with "powerful" female heroes, and so on. She found that the traditional narrative conventions determined the way these children in turn retold the story, in such a way that traditional roles were accredited to the characters of the tale. The narrative conventions through which a "proper" reading of a tale is achieved must lie deeper in the culture than the current plot of any tale.

Group Two: Established Alternatives

Symbolic Interactionism

This is the oldest and best established of the alternative orientations. The basic thesis is that human interaction is mediated not by causal processes but by the use of symbols, that is, by devices that are efficacious because of what they

mean to the actors involved. There are two important consequences of adopting this point of view: one is that an entity is a symbol only inasmuch as there exists a convention making it so; and the other is that what people do is less a function of their individual intentions than of the social situations in which they are enmeshed. In the words of Goffman's famous epigram: "Not men and their moments, but moments and their men." This orientation is irreconcilable with traditional psychology, since in accordance with the ideas of one of its founders, G.H. Mead, individual minds are products of the structuring of subjective experience by patterns of social interaction, above all by the taking on of the point of view of the "generalized other."

A typical example of symbolic interaction is Goffman's study of the social psychology of "passing." In *Stigma* (Goffman, 1968) he analyzes and catalogues the symbolic displays and devices through which people collude in concealing their "spoiled identities." He developed an elaborate analytical apparatus, involving particularly the idea of fatefulness, the idea that certain episodes in people's lives, if known, would transform their current situation and standing. The structure of interpersonal interaction is controlled, in part, by the necessity to prevent the discovery of stigmata, or to facilitate collusion in their redefinition.

Ethnomethodology

In the development of Garfinkel's (1967) ethnomethodology, we can see the gradual emergence of a key psychological concept that is implicit in each of the orientations which we have described so far, the concept of *skill*. Each of the points of view so far discussed involves the idea of correct and incorrect conduct in the way in which what is performed in an episode, or thought in soliloquy, is tied in with the structuring norms of the local social order. The basic working assumption of ethnomethodology is that the methods by which skilled actors produce their thoughts, conversational contributions, and social and practical actions are not explicitly known. These methods have the same characteristics as manual skills. The originating power of persons as social actors is taken for granted.

One who has learned to ice skate is not necessarily able to give a discursive account of the way to carry out that skilled performance. The aim of ethnomethodology is to make explicit the implicit methods by which human life is constructed, moment by moment, including those bits of human life we call "doing sociology," as well as those which we call "standing in line to buy a train ticket," or "shopping."

A typical example of ethnomethodological research is the study by Schegloff and Sacks (1974) of the procedures by which conversations are routinely and

acceptably terminated. A classic is Garfinkel's (1967) study, "Agnes," of the implicit methods by which an impression of womanhood is constructed and sustained. "Agnes" began "her" career as an adolescent boy, who by careful observation of the conventional devices by which "being a girl" was systematically achieved in social settings, was able to pass as female. According to the theory of ethnomethodology, "Agnes" had explicit, formulatable knowledge of the implicit conventions through which biological females did "being a girl." Ever thorough in "her" impersonation, "Agnes" stole hormone pills, and took them to reshape "her" hormone profile sufficiently to present herself for sex-reassignment surgery successfully. By studying those who deliberately create and present themselves in this or that social role, or by forcing people to attend to the details of their management of daily activities, the cognitive resources (normative constraints) according to which such management occurs can be discovered.

Cultural Psychology

The term is new (Shweder, 1991) and some of its most interesting research is relatively recent, but the basic idea behind this orientation goes back into the history of anthropology. A new term for this orientation was felt to be necessary to distinguish it from cross-cultural psychology (Triandis, 1980-81). Cultural psychology shares with discursive psychology the idea that psychological phenomena are properties of discourses and not the attributes either of overt behavior or of an inner mind stuff. It shares with ethogenics the thesis that how people act and think is profoundly influenced, even in some cases determined, by local norms of proper and improper behavior, and of correct and incorrect patterns of thought.

Research in cultural psychology aims to reveal the implicit conventions of highly diverse societies, from which the existence of psychological universals may or may not emerge. Cultural psychology is eclectic in its methodology, eschewing only the transport of laboratory techniques to the investigation of the psychology of other cultures. Thus, account analysis, discourse analysis, and the search for implicit methods for skilled performances all have a part.

A typical example of cultural psychology is the work of Lutz (1988), which aimed at revealing the structure and significance of an exotic emotion system that exists among the Ifaluk in the Philippines. Her method involved the comparative study of vocabularies and the collection and analysis of accounts as they were relevant to actual episodes of daily life in which the exotic emotions of the Ifaluk were significantly engaged. For instance, she was able to show that the central "fear/anxiety/embarrassment" emotion, *metagu*, is centered on social failure rather than physical danger. In the latter type of

situation, the Ifaluk emotion belongs in the "despair/helpless/sad" cluster. Emotion displays are sequential and semantically structured as if they were speech-acts having their proper place in well-defined types of episodes. A display of *sort* (righteous indignation/social offence) by A, therefore, is the occasion for a display of *metagu* by B, followed by displays of further, semantically appropriate emotions.

Activity Psychology

This has been the dominant orientation in the psychology of Eastern Europe and derives from the work of the troika, Luria, Vygotsky, and Leontiev. Activity psychology was the particular creation of Leontiev. The basic thesis is that human beings are the active sources of their own behavior (Eckensberger, 1986; Eckensberger & Meacham, 1984; Pearce & Cronen, 1981). They are not the passive spectators of the flux of psychological processes occurring "in" or around them. Activity psychology eschews particularly the causal model of human thought and action. Everything human beings do, privately in thought or publicly in behavior, should be treated as if it were goal-oriented intentional action, even though it may not appear to the actor as such.

The basic psychological schema then is the means/end pattern. Such patterns in real cases will necessarily be hierarchical, since the setting of the goals moment by moment in any slice of human life will be the product of higher order means/end patterns. The task of the psychologist is to reveal these means/end structures, as they are operative in all sorts of diverse human activities, from sailing a yacht to pushing a baby carriage, to planning the outline of a scientific paper. The main method is the close study of people performing skilled tasks, paying particular attention to the moments at which smooth performance breaks down, and to the repair strategies to which actors then resort. In these strategies, it is believed, the working schemata are particularly clearly revealed.

Typical examples of research in activity psychology can be found in the empirical studies reported in von Cranach and Harré (1981), for instance, the analysis of how small children dispute over toys, the investigation of the necessary psychological schemata needed to ski competently, and the basis of the various steps in the production of transistor radios. All can be analyzed to reveal the means/end structures that are, implicitly or explicitly, employed by active human beings in bringing off situationally correct and competent action. Von Cranach showed, in a famous experiment, that the ways that the first order means/end resources and the second order goal-setting means/end resources are employed by a pair of actors, engaged in a common task, are coordinated by explicit negotiations according to local conventions, and that at certain nodal

points, the smooth production of the joint action breaks down.

The Common Core of the Alternative Orientations, Both Recent and Long-Standing

The alternative orientations we have outlined share the following characteristics as a common core:

1. It is assumed that persons are active and intentional agents engaged, with others, in the joint accomplishment of tasks and projects (Pearce & Cronen, 1981). The intentionality of humans is a major reason for abandoning causal accounts of social behavior, whether such accounts are phrased in the language of behaviorism or of cognitive psychology. In order for an environmental contingency to be relevant to someone's actions it must be *intended* in some way. Thus it is semantically not causally relevant to action, a point made more than twenty-five hundred years ago by Aristotle. Only in the discredited Humean view of causation as regular concomitance could semantic relations be assimilated to causal.

2. The typical research object is an episode of everyday life taken as a pattern of meaningful actions, in which two or more actors are engaged. It is not a person's emitted response considered as an event correlated with some prior event.

3. The contributions of individuals to patterns of actions are to be treated as skilled performances; that is, the accomplishment of intentional actions in conformity with rules and schemata, which, once learned, are rarely attended to as such.

4. One type of pattern of social interaction, the conversation, is the most fruitful model (in the physicists' sense of model, that is, working analogue) for all other kinds of social interactions. Most conversations are organized around one or more story lines.

This common core of characteristics sets the alternative orientations apart from traditional social psychology in two dimensions. First, the object of the research is radically different in that what is to be studied are dynamic patterns of joint action evolving over time. Second, the method of research is radically different in that the precise procedure is analytical--seeking pattern in actions and rules, and in accounts thereof.

The Second Cognitive Revolution

Having sketched the outlines of each of the seven alternative social psychologies in sufficient detail for their main characteristics to be clear, we turn now to a deeper analysis of features common to them all. In this way we

shall sharpen the contrast with the psychology of the traditional mainstream. The following principles are characteristic of each of the alternative approaches, though in each they appear at different degrees of explicitness.

Aristotle's Principle

All human action, whether "in the mind" or in public conduct, is to be explained by a double potentiality schema. A person, qua human being, has certain natural powers and potentials to acquire knowledge and skills which once acquired, endow that person with powers and potentialities for specific actions in determinate circumstances. Though this principle was first enunciated in Aristotle's *Peri Psyche* (or *De Anima*, c. -385), it has been frequently revived.

The Intentionality Principle

No feature of the human environment can prompt a human being to act unless it is meaningful to that person. Expressing this well-known principle in English as "intentionality" runs the danger of misinterpretation because of the two meanings of intentional. When used to qualify actions, it can mean "directed toward some end." But when used to qualify objects, public or private, it can mean "standing for something else." In the first sense it is connected with plans, while in the second it is connected with meanings. As used in the intentionality principle, it has the latter sense. A corollary of this principle is that neither public or private objects are acted upon by a person in virtue of their material properties alone. Methodologically the principle requires an investigator to ascertain the meanings that people actually assign from moment to moment to whatever is in the public or private environment that is relevant to the activation of their powers or the exercise of their skills.

The Principle of Activity

The source of action in human conduct is the person, not any part or state of the person, or any public or private object. A corollary of this principle is the general requirement that people be treated as skilled actors, who use whatever comes to hand in pursuit of joint projects.

The Principle of Normativity

People act, *ceteris paribus*, in accordance with local standards of correctness. Methodologically this principle requires that a research program

should be directed to discovering the norms of action, which can, for convenience, be expressed as sets of rules. But as Wittgenstein (1953) pointed out, rules are expressions of norms, conformity to which is not often achieved by deliberate consultation of explicit maxims and instructions. Nor, he emphasized, does it make sense to treat rules as causes of the actions that conform to them. Someone may act contrary to what a rule specifies while sincerely accepting the rule. It is people who act, and use rules and other normative devices to ensure correctness. Thus the Principle of Normativity and the Principle of Activity are complementary. There is a corollary to this principle. It makes sense to train people into habits of action that conform to the local norms. Unless one pays attention to how a certain pattern of action is acquired, one may slip into the mistake of thinking that it is the local rule that is causing the conforming conduct.

The Principle of Structure

The phenomenon to which social psychological research should be directed is not the individual response of an actor to states of his or her environment, but the structured patterns of action comprising the joint acts of participants.

It should be easy to see that all five principles are implicit or explicit in different ways in all seven alternative social psychologies. It should also be easy to see that the methodological recommendations required to conduct research within this framework do not include experimentation, in the sense of subjecting people to stimulus objects, as a manipulation of an independent variable, while trying to record statistically significant changes in one or more dependent variables. Rather, all empirical research must be analytical, deconstructing records of real life social events, or analyzing the commentaries that actors offer on these events, in search of implicit rules and conventions for attributing meanings and the environmental conditions under which this or that pattern of action was deemed appropriate.

What is it that brings about social behavior? We need to take one further step back into the underlying principles that animate the alternative social psychologies we have been analyzing. Where are we to locate the sources of social activity? And where are we to find anything of the level of generality that corresponds to the "laws of nature" that express universal knowledge in the physical sciences? The answers to these questions take us to the heart of the alternative views, and at the same time reveal a kind of paradox that is characteristic of all human studies.

Causal concepts such as "efficacy," "power," and "genesis" have been applied to two main categories of beings, things and events. We find entity-causality and event-causality in both everyday and technical contexts. Sometimes

they are complementary and sometimes in conflict. Philosophical analysis of event-causality has led to the reduction of causal relations to mere regular concommitances between types of events because of the difficulty of making sense of events having power or efficacy to generate other events. However, the physical sciences and much everyday practical knowledge of how changes come about make use of entity-causality. "*Acid* corrodes metal," "the *ball* broke the window," "the *cook* ruined the soufflé," and so on. Alternative psychologies do not dispense with the idea of agency in general, but they are based on the model or metaphor of entity-causality, not that of event-causality.

The only roots or basic sources of activity in psychology, be it social, personality, developmental, or whatever, are individual people. The only thing that is general are sets of rules and conventions. But sets of rules are not laws of psychology in the way that Newton's Laws are the laws of mechanics. There is no guarantee that everyone will apply them in the same way even in the same circumstances. Sets of rules are not expressions of causal regularities. Aristotle pointed out that a state of the environment triggers, instigates, or releases an individual's powers to act only when it is recognized and interpreted *as* something relevant to that person's life and projects. "Same event" according to physical criteria may not be the occasion for "same action." A rule or norm could not, be a cause for an action, even though it is a kind of entity and not an event, because a rule specifies only what kind of action is called for. It does not and could not when functioning as a rule, specify a particular action.

The upshot of these reflections is the insight that generality (sets of rules) and causality (the production of action) are disconnected in the science of human action. There are not regularities linking "people as agents" with "what people do." This is in sharp contrast to the physical sciences, in which generality (laws of nature) and causality (the production of phenomena) are tightly linked since laws of nature describe what active physical entities always do (*ceteris paribus*).

But Is It Science?

In the period of controversy surrounding the criticisms of mainstream psychology that led to the crisis, it was frequently remarked that the analytic alternative social psychologies lacked real promise because they were not "scientific." This criticism is still heard from time to time. For example, during the 1993 Annual Meeting of the Society for Cross-Cultural Research in Washington D.C., a debate ended when one of the critics distanced himself from the alternative social psychologies by declaring, "I am a scientist!"

Sometimes the accusation is not wholly rhetorical. In many cases it is grounded in a certain conception of the nature of "science" as the prime source

of reliable knowledge of some field of interest. The only conception of the nature of science that would seem to stand in sharp opposition to the metaphysics and methodology of the alternative psychologies, taken together, is the positivist philosophy of logical empiricism. Only in that philosophy of science is it assumed that there are genuine data-driven research programs, and only in that philosophy is the concept of causality reduced in such a way that a regular concomitance of like events counts as a causal relation. The main alternative account of causality is based on the idea of causally active entities as causes, rather than events, which in the post-Humean conception of causality figure in causal explanations only as the impeding or releasing conditions for causal activity. According to the alternative position, people are active beings whose actions are shaped by rules and conventions, and realized or frustrated by private and/or public contingencies, which is a view closer to the alternative or non-Humean concept of causality that is in use in physics. Whether or not a research program is to get the accolade "science," then, seems to depend on the philosophical assumptions of those who make the assessment.

The very same point can be made with respect to debates about the appropriateness of experimentation as a method of garnering reliable knowledge in some field of interest. What sort of knowledge do we hope to get? Traditionally, at least since the time of the ancient Greek beginnings of science, we expect to obtain knowledge about what types of things and events there are, and of how their occurrence and behavior is to be explained. If the principle of intentionality is true, then what sorts of things and events are relevant for explaining human action are the sorts of things and events people say exist, and also what people are capable of recognizing as shown in what they do. The analytical method has at least as much claim to our loyalty as has the experimental. Indeed, the analytical method has more, in that what something is, socially speaking, is a function of where it is located and to what it is related in some complex, ongoing pattern of events.

The analytical method can help unravel the meaning of behavior, including those of both participants and experimenters, in the laboratory setting (Moghaddam & Harré, 1992). Such behavior is more accurately explained using a dramaturgical model, according to which the laboratory stage is set and the script is prepared and rehearsed, with a narrow gap being left in the script for the participant to improvise. Of course, such improvisation will most likely be made to fit the rest of the drama, so that most participants interpret the situation and improvise their part in a manner that follows a regular pattern.

The fact that behavior often does follow a pattern should not lead us to conclude that it has been "caused" by independent variable(s). For example, the presence of the scientist in the white lab coat no more "caused" participants in Milgram's (1974) study to administer lethal levels of electric shock to the

(confederate) learner, than a red light at a cross-road "causes" drivers to stop. Participants in Milgram's study followed the plot and saw it as appropriate to improvise according to local rules ("follow the experimenter's instructions when in the lab"), just as drivers on the road intentionally follow driving regulations ("red light means one has to stop"). In both cases, some individuals intentionally choose to break the rules (by telling Milgram "I will not..." and walking out of the experiment, or by putting their foot down on the accelerator and speeding through the red light). Most people do not behave this way, but tend to follow the rules for correct behavior.

The accusation against alternative psychologies, that they are not "scientific," is shallow. Insofar as it depends on the accuser's adherence to logical empiricism as a philosophy of science, it is outmoded. In addition, if a post-positivist philosophy of science is the source of criteria of assessment, the mainstream methodology and metaphysics looks decidedly less satisfactory as basis for acquiring reliable and valid knowledge of the types and sources of human social behavior than any of the alternatives.

CONCLUDING COMMENT

Much of the terminology we have used to describe the alternative social psychologies is not new. For example, a look back at the history of the first cognitive revolution shows that from the late 1950s, "cognitive scientists" distanced themselves from behaviorism by claiming that their orientation allowed for a conception of humans as intentional, purposive, active, thinking agents. The implication is that humans act upon the world, and are not just "reacting to stimuli," as the behaviorists described. Thus, advocates of mainstream social psychology would also claim that they conceive of the person as an "active, intentional agent." However, we reject this claim, on the grounds that a causal explanation of social behavior, as adopted by mainstream social psychology, is incompatible with a conception of persons as "active, intentional agents." If behavior is "caused" by factors inside or outside persons, then there is no room for agency. If, on the other hand, human social behavior is patterned by individuals choosing to follow particular norms and rules, then agency is alive and well. Such an orientation leads to a redefinition of psychology, from the "science of behavior" and its successor, the "science of mental mechanisms," to "the science of normative behavior."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adair, G., Duchenko, T.W., & Lindsay, R.C.L. (1985). Ethical regulations and their impact on research practice. *American Psychologist, 40*, 59-72.

Armistead, N. (Ed.). (1974). *Reconstructing social psychology*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.

Aronson, E., Brewer, M., & Carlsmith, J.M. (1985). Experimentation in social psychology. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (vol. I, pp. 441-486). New York: Random House.

Aronson, E., Ellsworth, P.C., Carlsmith, J.M., & Gonzales, M.H. (1990). *Methods of research in social psychology* (2nd. ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Aronson, J.L. (1984). *A realist philosophy of science*. London: Macmillan.

Baron, R.A., & Byrne, D. (1994). *Social psychology: Understanding human interaction* (7th ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Billig, M. (1982). *Ideology and social psychology: Extremism, moderation and contradiction*. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Billig, M. (1992). *Talking of the Royal Family*. London: Routledge.

Blumer, H. (1969). *Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Breakwell, G., & Cantor, D. (Eds.). (1992). *Empirical approaches to social representations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brehm, S.S., & Kassin, S.M. (1993). *Social psychology* (2nd. ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Bruner, J.S. (1990). *Acts of meaning*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

von Cranach, M., & Harré, R. (Eds.). (1981). *The analysis of action*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Danziger, K. (1990). *Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Davies, B., & Harré, R. (1990). Positioning: The discursive production of selves. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 1*, 43-63.

Eckensberger, L.H. (1986). *Action psychology*. Paper presented at the American Psychological Association Convention, New York.

Eckensberger, L.H., & Meacham, J.A. (1984). The essentials of action theory: A framework for discussion. *Human Development, 27*, 166-172.

Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1992). *Discursive psychology*. London: Sage.

Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1993). Language and causation: A discursive action model of description and attribution. *Psychological Review, 100*, 23-41.

Elms, A.C. (1975). Crisis of confidence in social psychology. *American Psychologist, 30*, 967-976.

Farr, R.M., & Moscovici, S. (Eds.). (1984). *Social representations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fisher, C.B., & Fyrberg, D. (1994). Participant partners: College students weigh the costs and benefits of deceptive research. *American Psychologist, 49*, 417-427.

Fiske, S.T., & Taylor, S.E. (1991). *Social cognition* (2nd. ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Fleck, L. (1935). *Genesis and development of a scientific fact.* (tr. F. Bradley & T.J. Trenn). Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Garfinkel, H. (1967). *Studies in ethnomethodology.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall.

Gergen, K.J. (1973). Social psychology as history. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 26,* 309-320.

Gielen, U.P. (1994). American mainstream psychology and its relationship to international and cross-cultural psychology. In A.L. Comunian & U.P. Gielen (Eds.), *Advancing psychology and its applications: International perspectives* (pp.26-40). Milan, Italy: FrancoAngeli.

Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of the self in everyday life.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books.

Goffman, E. (1968). *Stigma.* Harmonsworth, UK: Penguin.

Graham, S. (1992). "Most of the subjects were white and middle class:" Trends in published research on African Americans in selected APA journals, 1970-1989. *American Psychologist, 47,* 629-639.

Hagstrom, W.O. (1974). Competition in science. *American Sociological Review, 39,* 1-18.

Harré, R. (1994). *Social being* (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.

Harré, R., & Secord, P. (1972). *The explanation of social behavior.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Harré, R., & Gillett, G. (1994). *The discursive mind.* London: Sage.

Heider, F. (1958). *The psychology of interpersonal relations.* New York: Wiley.

Hewstone, M. (1989). *Causal attribution: From cognitive processes to collective beliefs.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Howard, G.S. (1991). Culture tales: A narrative approach to thinking, cross-cultural psychology, and psychotherapy. *American Psychologist, 46,* 187-197.

Jones, E.E. (1985). Major developments in social psychology during the past five decades. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (3rd ed., vol. 1, pp. 47-107). New York: Random House.

Jones, E.E., & Davis, K.E. (1965). From acts to dispositions: The attribution process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (vol. 2, pp. 219-266). New York: Academic Press.

Kagitçibasi, C. (1995). Is psychology relevant to global human development? Experience from Turkey. *American Psychologist, 50,* 293-300.

Kelley, H.H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine

(Ed.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation* (pp. 192-241). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Kelley, H.H. (1972). Causal schemata and the attribution process. In E.E. Jones, D. Kanouse, H.H. Kelley, R.E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), *Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior* (pp. 151-174). Morristown, NJ: General Learning.

Kelly, G. (1955). *The psychology of personal constructs*. New York: Norton.

Kelman, H.C. (1968). *A time to speak: On human values and social research*. San Fransisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Kuhn, T.S. (1962). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Leary, D. (1990). *Metaphors in the science of psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lewicki, P. (1982). Social psychology as viewed by its practitioners: Survey of SESP members' opinions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 3*, 409-416.

Lindzey, G., & Aronson, E. (Eds.). (1985). *The handbook of social psychology*. New York: Random House.

Lutz, C.A. (1988). *Unnatural emotions*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Marsh, P., Rosser, E., & Harré, R. (1977). *The rules of disorder*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Middleton, D., & Edwards, D. (Eds.). (1990). *Collective remembering*. London: Sage.

Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to authority*. London: Tavistock.

Miller, A.G. (1972). *The social psychology of psychological research*. London: Collier.

Moghaddam, F.M. (1987). Psychology in the Three Worlds: As reflected by the crisis in social psychology and the move toward indigenous Third World psychology. *American Psychologist, 42*, 912-920.

Moghaddam, F.M. (1989). Specialization and despecialization in psychology: Divergent processes in the Three Worlds. *International Journal of Psychology, 24*, 103-116.

Moghaddam, F.M. (1990). Modulative and generative orientations in psychology: Implications for psychology in the Three Worlds. *Journal of Social Issues, 46*, 21-41.

Moghaddam, F.M., & Harré, R. (1992). Rethinking the laboratory experiment. *American Behavioral Scientist, 36*, 22-38.

Moghaddam, F.M., & Harré, R. (1995). *Psychological limitations to political revolutions: An application of social reduction theory*. Paper presented at the International Congress on the Occasion of the 225th Birthday of F.

Hegel, Berlin.

Moghaddam, F.M., & Taylor, D.M. (1985). Psychology in the developing world: An evaluation through the concepts of "dual perception" and "parallel growth." *American Psychologist, 40,* 1144-1146.

Moghaddam, F.M., & Taylor, D.M. (1986). What constitutes an "appropriate psychology" for the Developing World? *International Journal of Psychology, 21,* 253-167.

Moghaddam, F.M., & Taylor, D.M. (1987). Toward appropriate training for developing world psychologists. In Ç. Kagitçibasi (Ed.), *Growth and progress in cross-cultural psychology* (pp. 69-75). Lise, Holland: Swets & Zeitlinger.

Moghaddam, F.M., Taylor, D.M., & Wright, S.C. (1993). *Social psychology in cross-cultural perspective.* New York: Freeman.

Moscovici, S. (1972). Society and theory in social psychology. In J. Israel & H. Tajfel (Eds.), *The context of social psychology* (pp. 17-68). London: Academic Press.

Mulhausler, P., & Harré, R. (1992). *Pronouns and people.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Mulkay, M.J., Gilbert, G.N., & Woolgar, S. (1975). Problem areas and research networks in science. *Sociology, 9,* 187-203.

Myers, D. (1993). *Social psychology* (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Nisbett, R.E., & Ross, L. (1980). *Human inferences: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Orne, M. (1962). On the social psychology of the psychological experiment. *American Psychologist, 17,* 776-783.

Pearce, W.B., & Cronen, V.E. (1981). *Communication, action, and meaning.* New York: Praeger.

Parker, I. (1989). *The crisis in modern social psychology and how to end it.* London: Sage.

Pepitone, A. (1976). Toward a normative and comparative biocultural social psychology. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34,* 641-653.

Ring, K. (1967). Experimental social psychology: Some sober questions about some frivolous values. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 3,* 113-123.

Robinson, D.N. (1988). *Aristotle's psychology.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R. (Eds.). (1969). *Artifact in behavioral research.* New York: Academic Press.

Rosenzweig, M.R. (1984). Psychology in its world context. *American Psychologist, 39,* 877-884.

Ross, L.D. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings:

Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in social psychology* (vol. 10, pp. 173-220). New York: Academic Press.

Sampson, E.E. (1981). Cognitive psychology as ideology. *American Psychologist, 36*, 730-743.

Schegloff, M., & Sacks, H. (1974). Opening up closings. In R. Turner (Ed.), *Ethnomethodology* (pp. 232-264). Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.

Sears, D. (1986). College sophomores in the laboratory: Influences of a narrow data base on social psychology's view of human nature. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51*, 515-530.

Shanker, S. (1992). In search of Bruner. *Language and Communication, 12*, 53-74.

Shweder, R.A. (1991). Cultural psychology: What is it? In R.A. Shweder (Ed.), *Thinking through cultures: Expeditions in cultural psychology* (pp. 73-110). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Staats, A.W. (1991). Unified positivism and unified psychology. *American Psychologist, 46*, 899-912.

Starr, J.M. (1983). Specialization and the development of sociology: Differentiation or fragmentation? *Qualitative Sociology, 6*, 66-86.

Stehr, N., & Larson, L. (1974). The rise and decline of areas of specialization. *American Sociologist, 10*, 57-64.

Stephan, C.W., & Stephan, W.G. (1990). *Two social psychologies* (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Stryker, S., & Statham, A. (1985). Symbolic interaction and role theory. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (3rd ed., pp. 311-378). New York: Random House.

Tajfel, H. (Ed.). (1984). *The social dimension* (2 vols.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, D.M., & Moghaddam, F.M. (1994). *Theories of intergroup relations* (2nd ed). New York: Praeger.

Toulmin, S.E. (1960). *The philosophy of science*. New York: Harper.

Toulmin, S.E. (1972). *Human understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Triandis, H. (General Editor). (1980-81). *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology* (6 vols.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Weber, M. (1904/1958). *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*. New York: Scribner.

Weber, M. (1947). *The theory of social and economic organization*. New York: Free Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Worchel, S., Cooper, J., & Goethals, G.R. (1991). *Understanding social psychology* (5th ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Zimbardo, P.G. (1972). Pathology of imprisonment. *Transaction/Society*, 4-8 (a).

Fathali M. Moghaddam is an Iranian born, British educated psychologist who has researched in a number of Third World, European, and North American cultures. His previous research is discussed in two books, *Theories of Intergroup Relations* (1994, with D.M. Taylor) and *Social Psychology in Cross-cultural Perspective* (1993, with D.M. Taylor and S.C. Wright). His current interests include social change, and the relationship between political and economic systems and social behavior.

Rom Harré is a Fellow of Linacre College, Oxford, and Professor of Psychology at Georgetown University. His several dozen books reflect his broad interests, from the philosophical foundations of physics and chemistry, to explanations of social behavior. Among his interests over the last quarter of a century has been the second cognitive revolution.