De-radicalization and the Staircase from Terrorism

Fathali M. Moghaddam

Synopsis: Drawing on the metaphor of a narrowing staircase leading step-by-step to the final terrorist act on the top floor of a building, proposals are made for de-radicalization programmes targeted at individuals who have reached different floors of the staircase to terrorism. Thought and action on each floor of the staircase is characterized by particular psychological processes so that different strategies are needed to move people down to lower floors and out of the building. The overall conclusion is a proposal for the main long-term goal of de-radicalization, the transformation of the psychological citizen; the psychological characteristics that citizens need to have in order to effectively participate in and sustain a particular political system.

De-radicalization and the Staircase from Terrorism

Terrorism, “politically motivated violence, perpetrated by individuals, groups, or state-sponsored agents, intended to instill fear and helplessness in a population in order to influence decision making and to change behavior” (Moghaddam, 2005a, p. 161) continues to be a major national and international challenge. Although “home grown” Western terrorists have been active in Northern Ireland (Coogan, 2002), Spain (Ballou, 2005), the United States (Linenthal, 2001) and other democratic societies, the greater challenge since

1 Address for correspondence: Fathali M. Moghaddam, Department of Psychology, White Gravenor Building (3rd floor), Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA. 20057.

Email: moghaddam@georgetown.edu

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the 1980s has been a sharp rise in terrorist activity emanating from Islamic communities in the Middle East and elsewhere, particularly in the form of suicide terrorism incited by violent Salafists and other extremist groups (Bloom, 2005; Khoshokhavar, 2005; McDermott, 2005; Oliver & Steinberg, 2005; Pape, 2005; Pedahzur, 2015). Psychologists have made important contributions to the better understanding of both the roots of terrorism and the consequences of terrorist acts for victims (Bongar, Brown, Breitenreiter, & Zimbardo, 2006; Danieli, Brom, & Waiker, 2005; Horgan, 2005; Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004; Sageman, 2004; Stout, 2002). However, more attention needs to be given to the increased radicalization of Islamic communities and the terrorism emanating from these communities in both non-Western and Western societies. This is not because other types of terrorism have ended (e.g. since 2005 terrorism is once again on the rise in Spain), but because the most serious global threat at present and in the foreseeable future is from Islamic terrorism (including in Europe, see Perlez, 2005; von Hippel, 2007).

A salient feature of many Islamic communities around the world, including in some Western societies now home to millions of Muslim immigrants (e.g. South Asians in the UK, North Africans in France, Turks in Germany), is that they express strong support for extreme positions and groups (Pew Research Center, 2006). For example, the percentages of Muslims who deny that Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks are: British Muslims 56%, French Muslims 46%, German Muslims 44%, in Indonesia 65%, in Egypt 59%, in Turkey 59%, and in Jordan 53%. Moreover, tens of millions of Muslims in both Western and non-Western societies report that violence against civilian targets is sometimes justified in order to defend Islam (British Muslims 15%, French Muslims 16%, German Muslims 7%, in Indonesia 10%, in Egypt 28%, in Turkey 17%, and in Jordan 29%). Of course radicalization does not always have negative consequences, but it can be problematic when it leads to moral or practical support for violent actions, and terrorism in particular.

In order to better understand the process of radicalization associated with terrorism, I introduced the metaphor of a narrowing staircase leading step-by-step to the final terrorist act on the top floor of a building (Moghaddam, 2005a). Imagine a staircase in a building, where everyone lives on the ground floor, but a few people eventually move up the staircase to higher floors. Thought and action on each floor of the staircase is characterized by particular psychological processes. For example, on the ground floor, where well over a billion Muslims live, thought and action is characterized by identity ( "What kind of a person am I?" "What kind of group do I belong to?"), by perceptions of fairness ( "Am I being treated fairly?"), and by psychological interpretation of material conditions (particularly related to the question of whether one's material needs are being met adequately). Some individuals become so dissatisfied with their life conditions that they move up to the first floor in changing their situation.

On the first floor, individuals are particularly concerned with opportunities for social mobility and for being included in the procedures that lead to decision making. Those who find their individual mobility paths blocked, their voice silenced, and a lack of opportunity to participate in decision making, move up to the second floor, where they are directed toward external targets for displacement of aggression. In the current political and cultural context of Islamic communities, the United States and Israel are the most common external targets.

A number of factors have enhanced the importance of the mosque as a political centre in Islamic communities, and increased the influence of fundamentalists in mosques in both Western and non-Western societies. Within a number of major Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, despotism, corruption, and the severe repression of secular opposition groups have meant that political activism is driven into mosques, where religious fundamentalists have more opportunities to exert influence. Within Western societies, the continued isolation of Muslims has meant that it is mosques rather than the offices of mainstream political parties of their adopted countries that serve as their political meeting centres. In turn, the isolation of Muslims and feelings of collective alienation have prepared the ground for fundamentalists to gain influence in some mosques.

Those individuals who continue to the third floor of the staircase to terrorism now become more disengaged from mainstream morality, that condemns terrorism, and engage with a morality that justifies terrorism. On this floor, individuals come to endorse the view that 'We must fight the evil enemy in any way we can'. Some of these individuals move up to the steps to the fourth floor where the legitimacy of terrorist organizations is accepted more strongly, and an 'us versus them' categorical thinking becomes the norm. This mirrors the 'you are either with us or against us' rhetoric adopted by some Western leaders. Finally, from among the individuals who reach the fourth floor and are psychologically prepared to become terrorists, some individuals are recruited and commit terrorist acts on the fifth floor.

The power of this incremental radicalization process is demonstrated by psychological research on conformity and obedience (Moghaddam, 2005a, ch. 15 & 16; Zimbardo, 2007). An example is the step-by-step procedure used in Milgram's (1974) studies on obedience to authority, where naive participants in the role of 'teacher' were induced to increase the punishment (apparently) inflicted on a 'learner' (actually a confederate of the experimenter) in 15 volt increments. Just as Milgram (1974) found that individual characteristics (in his studies, 'authoritarianism') were related to which particular individuals moved to the next level of obedience, individual differences are probably also related to movement up and down the staircase to terrorism. The identification of these individual differences is one aspect of the staircase that requires closer attention in future research, as is movement down the staircase.
There is an urgent need to give particular attention to psychological processes underlying de-radicalization in the post 9/11 era. First, because the main focus of discussions on de-radicalization prior to 9/11 was left-wing radical groups (e.g. see the classic discussion of Tucker, 1967, on the de-radicalization of Marxist movements, and the more recent discussion of Sprinzak, 1998, on the Weathermen, an extremist, violent left-wing American group). Second, although some criticisms of the distinction between 'old' versus 'new' terrorism are valid and 21st century terrorism does have features in common with 'old' terrorism, it is clearly the case that the 'new' terrorism has some completely new characteristics, such as its reliance on web technology (Tuley & Gvosdev, 2002). Phenomena such as al-Qaeda now exert their influence as global 'cultural carriers' (Moghaddam, 2002) that convey ideology, morality and values, in large part through electronic communications (witness the video of Osama bin Laden distributed via the Internet in September 2007).

The goal of this paper is to use the metaphor of a staircase from terrorism to explore the psychology of de-radicalization. This paper provides a general framework to guide and stimulate further exploration. In the next two parts of the paper, I first discuss radicalization and de-radicalization processes, then consider de-radicalization programmes targeted at individuals who have reached different floors of the staircase to terrorism. In the final section, my focus is on what I propose should be the main long-term goal of de-radicalization, the transformation of the psychological citizen, the psychological characteristics that citizens need to have in order to effectively participate in and sustain a particular political system.

Radicalization and De-radicalization

Almost right decades of psychological research on attitudes, from the pioneering research of LaPiere (1934) to 21st century studies (Haddock, 2004), suggest that radicalization of attitudes need not result in radicalization of behaviour. It is useful to distinguish between cognitive, affective and behavioural components of radicalization. At the cognitive level, radicalization in Islamic communities involves two features: first, knowledge about alternative moral systems that support terrorism; second, the incorporation of an alternative moral as integral to one's identity (i.e. coming to perceive oneself as a person who legitimizes terrorist attacks). At the affective level, radicalization involves undergoing social learning that prepares an individual to take terrorist action. Such learning processes focus on sidestepping the inhibitory mechanisms described by Lorenz (1966) that prevent humans from injuring or killing others, and also have to be sidestepped in military training (Grossman, 1995).

Given that such radicalization has taken place and some individuals have reached the final floor of the staircase to terrorism, how should we approach the challenge of de-radicalization?

De-radicalization

We already have some clear signposts as to how de-radicalization can best take place. First, the literature on de-radicalization (e.g. Alexander, 2002; Art & Richardson, 2007; Bernard, 2005; Crenshaw, 1991, 1995; Cronin, 2006; Ross & Gurr, 1989; United States Institute of Peace, 1999) suggests that for any given individual or group, the path to de-radicalization is not necessarily the reverse of the path to radicalization. For example, an individual who has been influenced by a separatist goal and a charismatic leader to become radicalized may become de-radicalized by a different set of factors, such as a changed political climate and a sharp drop in popular support for his group among the local population (as has been the case in Ireland particularly since the mid-1990s).

A second point is that the de-radicalization programme that would be the most successful depends in part on the particular floor of the staircase to terrorism reached by the individual, and the psychological processes that characterize that particular floor. For example, a de-radicalization programme that targets individuals on the first floor should be tailored to the psychological processes of procedural justice and individual mobility. A programme targeting individuals on the final floor should focus on de-radicalization after capture in cases where the individual is to be reintroduced into society at a later time. In this regard, particularly useful lessons can be learned from the experiences of Italian authorities with the reintegration of Red Brigades members (Catanzaro, 1991) into Italian society. The relationship between de-radicalization and the different floors is elaborated in the main section of this paper.

Third, de-radicalization programmes should also be tailored as far as possible to match the particular role an individual fulfils in a terrorist network. Too little attention has been given to the specialization that takes place as individuals move up the staircase to terrorism. Through an in-depth study of different terrorist movements, I identified nine main specialized roles (Moghaddam, 2006a): source of inspiration (serves as a symbolic figurehead to terrorist movements), strategist (makes planning and management more effective); networker (acts as the glue that holds different terrorist cells and individuals together, to create a terrorist movement); expert (applies expert knowledge, in areas such as electronic communications and explosives, to help carry out specific terrorist operations); cell manager (works to ensure the security, effective functioning, and continuation of the terrorist cell); local agitator and guide (networks between potential terrorists recruits and recruiters); cell member (serves in a small group to carry out and support terrorist attacks); fodder (functions as a tool for terrorist attack); fund-raiser (gathers
resources to support terrorist operations). These roles were distinguished on the basis of different criteria, such as asset (that an individual brings to the network), function, service length, level and type of expertise, and motivation (in a more micro-level differentiation, Nesser (2005) identified four different cell member types: 'the entrepreneur', 'the impressionist whizz kid', 'the misfit', and 'the drifter'). These nine specialized roles suggest that practitioners should develop a different type of intervention for each type of specialized role, in relation to each level of the staircase. However, because of space limitations, in this discussion I give primacy to the characteristics of the levels on the staircase, and only give secondary attention to the specialized roles in terrorist networks. Again, this is a gap that future research can rectify.

Programmes for de-radicalization should take into account that individuals in the different specialized roles are not randomly or evenly distributed on the different floors of the staircase to terrorism. For example, individuals in the role of 'fodder' are located on the final floor where the terrorist act takes place, but fund-raisers can remain on the third or fourth floor, where they have adopted a morality supportive of terrorism but are not directly involved in, or even knowledgeable about or witnesses to, specific terrorist attacks.

The Staircase from Terrorism

The staircase metaphor helps to identify more specific goals for de-radicalization programmes directed at individuals on each floor of the staircase from terrorism, starting from the final floor where individuals have received full preparation to function as terrorists.

Fifth floor

Individuals who have reached this 'top' floor have been trained to carry out terrorist attacks (mainly in the role of 'cell member' or 'fodder'). Typically the terrorist attacker is situated within a tightly knit, secretive group, and is induced to incrementally move toward the final attack. As the time of attack approaches, the potential terrorist is persuaded to write out his (the individual is typically male) will and testament, and also to make a video recording for distribution after his death. Cognitive dissonance theory and self-perception theory (see Mohaddam, 1998, pp. 114–123) both suggest that such acts will make it far more difficult for the potential suicide bomber to change his mind: because he is motivated to match his behaviour to his expressed beliefs and vows (cognitive dissonance theory) and because having behaved like a terrorist he now sees himself to be a terrorist (self-perception theory).

The number of individuals who reach the fifth floor, and consequently the size of the de-radicalization programmes needed, will be influenced by macro socio-economic-political cycles (Enders & Sandier, 2000). These cycles tend to vary in length and many terrorist groups have short lives of less than a year, but there is evidence from historical trends that religious terrorism is the longest lasting (Rapport, 1984).

One of the macro factors that can influence the number of individuals who reach the final floor of the staircase to terrorism is the size and age of the population. In societies with large youth populations, as is the case in the Near and Middle East where approximately 60% of the population is below 21 years old, terrorist recruiters have a larger pool of young men to draw from. Young men are characterized by higher risk-taking and aggression in most societies.

How might de-radicalization take place among those who have reached the final floor? First, a terrorist could be captured and de-radicalized through special educational programmes. For example, since the late 1990s the government of Yemen has conducted a state-sponsored de-radicalization programme that targets captured Islamic radicals (Taarnby, 2005). The programme involves senior clerics who debate captured radicals on central issues in Islam (such as the meaning of jihad), under conditions of mutual respect and within accepted dialogue rules. This programme has had reasonable success, although it is possible that some radicals have reported changes in their beliefs, without experiencing a genuine change, simply to win freedom.

Second, government attacks that weaken the terrorist network could eventually lead to de-radicalization. Such attacks might lead to the capture or killing of a charismatic terrorist leader. Unfortunately, this scenario is less applicable to the 'new' Islamic terrorism, because it is decentralized, more reliant on the World Wide Web and less reliant on any single leader.

Third, the number of terrorists reaching the final floor might decrease because of transformation of the terrorist network. For example, this could be because a particular goal has been achieved, or because the terrorist movement has become incorporated into mainstream political process, or because the terrorists have transformed into an organization with purely monetary criminal goals.

Fourth floor

Individuals who reach the fourth floor have already adopted attitudes supportive of a morality condoning terrorism. Now they become ensnared (by networkers or local agitators and guides) in terrorist networks, to serve, for example, as cell members or managers, or experts. Those who are recruited typically find themselves the focus of intense indoctrination, as they take on the cultural norms of their small (4–7 member) secretive cells. Two
psychological processes are central to their experiences as cell members solidification of categorical 'us vs. them' thinking, and legitimization of the terrorist cause.

One of the most important reasons for the decline of terrorist movements in the past has been a failure to continue recruitment and to pass on the 'terrorist cause' to a next generation. Given that the fourth floor is where recruitment takes place, de-radicalization programmes should give particular priority to individuals who have reached this floor. Such programmes should focus on two goals, related to the psychological processes dominant on this floor. A first goal is to defeat the push to justify a categorical 'us vs. them,' 'good vs. evil' view of the world. This can best be achieved by avoiding categorical language in messages sent to both non-Western and Western communities. Also, stronger bridges should be constructed across major groups in society by highlighting cross-cutting categories (Urban & Miller, 1998) that help people recognize continuities and overlaps in their group memberships, as well as superordinate goals that all groups want to achieve but no group can achieve without co-operation from others (such as environmental challenges facing all humankind, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994, ch. 3).

Second, programmes should attack the legitimacy of the terrorist cause. Too little has been done to unravel the premise, underlying terrorist movements, that it is legitimate to attack and kill civilians. Despite the radicalization that has taken place in Islamic societies, the majority of Muslims believe it is never justified to attack civilians (Pew Research Center, 2006). This is akin to the findings of studies of obedience and conformity, from Sherif in the 1930s to contemporary research (Moghaddam, 2005b, chs. 15 & 16), where some participants refuse to obey to harm others and resist to conform to incorrect norms. These 'disobedient' and 'non-conformist' individuals provide a springboard from which to launch a more open society, and the same function can be served by the Muslims who believe it is never justified to attack civilians.

Third floor

Engagement with a morality supportive of terrorism moves ahead on the third floor, at the same time that disenagement from a moderate morality becomes real. In many cases individuals are lured into a terrorist supportive morality through social affiliations (Sageman, 2004). De-radicalization programmes aimed at individuals who have reached this floor need to focus on strategies to engage young people in activities and goals associated with mainstream society. This is a considerable challenge, given the enormous size of the young population in most Islamic societies.

Despite the lack of educational and employment opportunities in Islamic societies such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Jordan, a great deal can be done to influence both the practice and perception of social mobility. Experimental research suggests that the perception that individual mobility is possible, even when the probability of success is low, is a powerful factor in increasing trust in the fairness of a system (following Lalonde & Silverman, 1994). Western countries can in practice improve individual mobility options in a highly cost-effective manner by increasing scholarships and fellowships in education, and helping to expand the education and training sector generally.

Psychologists need to give more attention to formulate and help implement appropriate training opportunities for developing world psychologists (Moghaddam & Taylor, 1986; Zeidan, Alamuddin, Maalouf, & Chatila, 2007). Many of the educational opportunities currently available for developing world students are designed to educate specialists for research and practice in Western societies and are not appropriate for non-Western and particularly Islamic societies (see Moghaddam, 1997, ch. 5). The outcome is inappropriately trained non-Western specialists who fail to contribute constructively to national development in their countries of origin.

Second floor

Individuals who arrive on the second floor are experiencing increasing frustration. They have already tried and found blocked various avenues to social mobility, and to gaining a voice in procedures leading to decisions that impact their everyday lives. Most importantly, they are frustrated by their strong sense of inadequate identity (Moghaddam, 2006a). Who is to blame for these inadequacies? A long line of research suggests that how this question is answered is vitally important, because the assumed 'causes' can become targets of displaced aggression (Miller, Pederson, Earlywine, & Pollock, 2003).

In the context of Islamic societies particularly, the United States is being targeted as the most serious source of problems. This is reflected in international surveys showing a sharp decline in favourable opinions of the United States (Pew Research Center, 2006). Between 2000 and 2006, the percentage of respondents who expressed favourable opinions of the United States went down from 75 to 30 in Indonesia, 52 to 12 in Turkey, and 75 (in 2002) to 15 in Jordan. There was a slight upward shift in favourable opinions in Pakistan, but this still only resulted in a 27% favourable rating in 2006 (the decline in favourable opinions of the United States extended to the EU. For example, in the UK the percentage favourable went down from 81 in 2000 to 56 in 2006).

This same anti-US trend is reflected in the percentage of respondents who perceive the United States in Iraq as the greatest danger to world peace, an even greater danger than Iran: Indonesia, US a danger 31, Iran a danger 7; Egypt, US a danger 56, Iran a danger 14; Jordan, US a danger 58, Iran a danger 19; Turkey, US a danger 60, Iran a danger 16; Pakistan, US a danger 28, Iran
a danger to the picture is more mixed in the EU, with some countries seeing Iran as a greater danger to world peace than the US.

More broadly, the US is being identified as the sole source of local and international problems, particularly in the Near and Middle East. Corruption and despotism, economic and health inadequacies, and just about every other problem is described as having only one major root cause: the US and its allies. This attributional style serves to support local despotism and corruption, by displacing negative sentiments onto the US. Of course the US must take responsibility for the consequences of its policies in the region, but de-radicalization programmes should aim to shift attitudes so that local regimes also take greater responsibility for inefficiencies and corruption in local governments.

First floor

The search for upward mobility options and opportunities to have a voice in matters that impact on their own lives leads individuals to the first floor of the staircase to terrorism. These are the first concrete steps associated with radicalization of attitudes, but individuals on this floor are still far away from supporting terrorism either in expressed attitudes or overt behaviour. They are only searching for avenues for improvement and voice, trying different doors and spaces on the first floor. Individuals on this floor do not perceive themselves as radicals.

De-radicalization programmes targeting individuals on the first floor need to be broad cultural, educational, and political programmes. In the cultural arena, programmes should expand in local cultural organizations and activities that can absorb particularly young people. These should include traditional artistic and cultural arenas, such as those reflecting indigenous arts and crafts, architecture, tapestry and carpets, and poetry. In education, far greater efforts are needed to strengthen indigenous educational resources and institutions, which could provide appropriate training for local youth and decrease dependence on imported expertise. In the political arena, indigenous traditions, such as those already available in Islamic societies (see the discussion on democratic traditions in Shia Islam in Moghaddam, 2006a, ch. 10) can be used to expand participation and voice to individuals on the first floor.

The Ground Floor and the Psychological Citizen

De-radicalization will be most effective when it is directed toward a particular goal. My proposal is that on the ground floor where the vast majority of people are situated, the goal of such programmes should be to transform the psychological citizen, through programmes that seek both “top-down” and “bottom-up” solutions to change (Moghaddam, 2002). It is not enough to focus on top-down, macro-level economic and political solutions as a way of bringing about social change, because the everyday styles of thinking and doing, and the normative systems that regulate economic and health inadequacies at the micro level can act to thwart top-down policies. This in part explains the so-called “paradox of revolution,” where even revolutionary changes at the top do not necessarily bring about desired changes at the micro level of everyday life (Moghaddam, 2002, particularly ch. 2).

The inadequacy of just relying on “top-down” policies has led to greater attention to social and psychological processes in social change, justice, and democracy (Finkel & Moghaddam, 2004; Neideman, Fletcher, Russell, & Tetlock, 1996; Sullivan & Transeu, 1999; Tetlock, 1998). There is also a wider discussion of the relationship between Islam and democracy (e.g. Hunter & Malik, 2005; Rizvi, 2004; Sadiki, 2004). But there is need for more focused and careful examination of the psychological citizen on the ground floor in Islamic societies, and the key psychological changes required of individuals in interaction in order for a political system to become more open and fair. In order to function and continue, each type of political system requires psychological citizens with particular styles of thought and action. For example, the nature of obedience, conformity, and relationship with leadership required of psychological citizens in order to sustain a dictatorship is very different from that required of citizens in order to sustain a democracy. Dictatorships require more unquestioning obedience, higher conformity, and subservience to centralized, often life-long leadership. In order to sustain democracy, on the other hand, psychological citizens must critically examine leadership choices, participate in decision-making procedures, and be prepared to be non-conformists and to act as whistleblowers in the interest of an open society. Also, psychological citizens in democracies must come to support a norm of circulation of leadership, as opposed to life-long leadership, and minimal government secrecy, as opposed to government monopoly of information.

Psychological research suggests that involvement with the procedures of decision making can serve a foundational role in transforming the psychological citizen (Tyler & Huo, 2002), particularly in increasing trust that serves as an essential building block of democracy (Warren, 1999). In the context of the Near and Middle East, individual citizens need a minimal “scaffolding” (following Vygotsky, see Moghaddam, 2005b, ch. 10) to support a basic level of involvement in decision-making procedures. Psychologists have already developed expertise in building this kind of scaffolding, for example, as evident in community psychology in Latin America where democratic processes have gained strength (Sanchez, 1996).
Universals and the Psychological Citizen: The Example of Identity Needs

Despite differences in the characteristics of the psychological citizen required to sustain dictatorships, democracies, and other political systems, psychological research also suggests certain universals. An example that is particularly important for this discussion is the identity needs of the psychological citizen across cultures. Psychological research suggests that the need for a positive and distinct identity is present across cultures and in important ways influences individuals, particularly in intergroup contexts (Moghaddam, 2006).

The universality of identity needs arises out of the function served by identity in human social evolution (Moghaddam, 2008). By training the young to seek social approval and to try to achieve self-esteem and distinctiveness (according to local norms and rules), human societies achieve an effective means of ensuring a minimal level of conformity and obedience, and thus more efficient group performance and utilization of resources. As adults, individuals will seek to meet (socially constructed and socially instilled) identity needs, and in this way become better integrated in the larger society.

Although certain identity needs are universal, there are cultural differences in the criteria used to evaluate the adequacy of identity. For example, in the tightly knit, highly radicalized small cells that operate on the fourth and fifth levels of the terrorism staircase, it is actions in support of terrorism that are evaluated most favourably. The normative system of these cells, and the influence of the (typically charismatic) cell leader, lead recruits to 'become ready' to commit suicide terrorism as a way of satisfying identity needs. In addition to focusing on the capture, destruction or transformation of such cells, long-term programmes are needed to influence the criteria used to assess identity on the ground floor where the vast majority of people exist.

Concluding Comment

The staircase metaphor suggests the need for a multi-method approach to de-radicalization, with different short-term and long-term programmes needed to target people in different specialized roles on each of the different floors. In the longer term, priority should be given to the hundreds of millions of people on the ground floor. Although international surveys suggest that radicalization has taken place among Muslims on the ground floor in the first decade of the 21st century, there is good reason to believe that de-radicalization can also take place rapidly. De-radicalization programmes will be more effective through a combination of top-down and bottom-up policies, and psychological science can help design better policies of both types.

Finally, future research should focus on a number of gaps that are implicit in this discussion. First, different types of intervention need to be developed, aimed at people in the nine specialized roles in terrorist organizations. Second, research is needed on the individual difference characteristics related to movement up and down the staircase to terrorism, to address questions such as: 'what are the individual characteristics of persons who are more likely to move up from the ground floor to the first floor, from the first floor to the second floor - and move down from the fourth floor to the third floor, from the third floor to the second floor' and so on. Third, research is needed to further clarify different processes associated with radicalization and de-radicalization of individuals as opposed to the radicalization and de-radicalization of groups.

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