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The Springboard to Dictatorship and the Arab Spring in the Context of Additive and Subtractive Globalization: A Psychological Assessment

Fathali M. Moghaddam

Dictatorship, not democracy, has been the historical norm for human societies, and our psychological characteristics have evolved largely within the context of social relations in dictatorships. Even contemporary democracies still have within them elements that could influence a return to dictatorship. Although there is agreement that the Arab Spring reflects a world in transition, it is still not clear if "Additive Globalization," which strengthens democracy and expands choices, will emerge as a greater force than "Subtractive Globalization," which ultimately diminishes choices and nourishes dictatorships. Numerous revolutions have toppled dictators without making the psychological changes necessary to remove the "springboard" that a potential dictator uses to leap to power, resulting in the replacement of one dictator with another. The "springboard to dictatorship" model highlights the need for citizens to acquire the basic psychological skills to participate in and sustain a democracy. Social programs are necessary to develop these skills in post-revolution societies; otherwise the springboard to dictatorship will once again enable the rise of another potential dictator.

The Springboard Model in the Context of a World in Transition

How can supporters of democracy move toward greater openness in a changing world? Globalization both helps and hinders this goal. The term *additive globalization* describes shared knowledge and improved information flow, greater access to goods and services, increased life choices for ordinary people, and the spread of ideas about universal human rights and duties. But *subtractive globalization* is also a powerful force that hinders the transition toward democracy, as dictatorial powers gain greater opportunities to spread their influence, religious fundamentalists move more freely in both Western and non-Western societies, and multinational businesses

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increase economic inequalities, limit competition, restrict information, and diminish real choices for ordinary people. There is general agreement that the world is transitioning toward a new order. It is not certain that this movement will favor genuine democracy: that additive globalization will overcome subtractive globalization. We need more effective assessments of the changes taking place.

Our failure to better understand and predict recent global changes, including the Arab Spring,[1] has arisen in large part from a deficiency in theoretical models, particularly of change. This discussion, which is grounded in an integrated psychological science,[2] begins by suggesting a typology of change that clarifies. The term 'transition' assumes change from one state of being to another, but it is important to clarify the different types. Most importantly, this essay will highlight the contradiction between change at the macro level of economic and political systems and the micro level of cognitive and social processes.[3]

The second part of the discussion introduces a *springboard to dictatorship model*[4] to better understand transitions from dictatorship to democracy, or democracy to dictatorship. Dictatorship, not democracy, has been the norm for human societies since over the last 12,000 years, when more complex human settlements began, and our psychological characteristics have largely evolved within this context of social relations. All societies, including the contemporary democracies of North America and the European Union, still have within them powerful psychological elements that could influence a return to dictatorship. The enormous challenges faced by pro-democracy groups in steering societies toward greater openness during times of rapid transition and regime change, including Iran from 1978–1979, Russia from 1989–1991, and most recently in some Arab societies, highlight the limitations that psychological factors impose on the extent to which change actually takes place.

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From a psychological perspective, there are potential dictators in every human group. However, the "springboard to dictatorship" is available to potential dictators only under certain conditions. Two important parts of the springboard concern the psychological characteristics of a population and leader-follower relations. Many revolutions topple a dictator without

making the necessary changes to dismantle the springboard. When the springboard survives, one dictator may replaced by another. Such transitions might be called "democratic dictatorships," which masquerade as genuine open societies (for example, by fraudulent elections) but are actually closed and corrupt, like contemporary Russia and Iran.

Typology of Change

As I discovered when I returned to research and teach in Iran in the spring of 1979, people experiencing life after a revolution are often confronted by the so-called 'paradox of revolution': "*plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*." On the one hand, major changes have taken place: the government has been replaced, new formal laws have been established, and often a new constitution has been adopted. The rhetoric and narrative of everyday life, as well as espoused values, all seem new. On the other hand, there is a strong sense that, at a deeper level, things remain the same. Leaders have changed, but the nature of leader-follower relations has not. The authorities have changed, but conformity and obedience to authority figures have been re-established along traditional lines. There is a paradoxical persistence[5] and continuity to cognitive and behavioral processes. In order to make sense of this complexity, it is useful to delve deeper into types of change.

First, it is necessary to distinguish between two major influences on human thought and action: formal "black-letter" law and the informal normative system, consisting of values, norms, and rules.[6] We tend to focus on the role of formal law in society, and neglect the powerful role of the informal normative system. But almost a century of empirical psychological research has demonstrated the tremendous power of the informal normative system to regulate behavior, particularly through processes of conformity and obedience.[7] Indeed, human behavior is often guided by the informal normative system in ways that contradict formal law. Many people routinely behave according to norms and rules that violate "black letter" law, for example, by photocopying and using copyrighted materials.[8] Most people are a little "dishonest,"[9] in the sense that they violate formal law a little. However, this "law breaking" typically occurs within the bounds of informal normative systems.

The divorce between formal law and the informal normative system is considerable with respect to speed of change. According to the "macro-micro rule of change,"[10] formal law can be changed overnight, but the normative system, which regulates everyday cognition and social relations, often takes much longer to change. For example, formal law can be changed overnight to make racial discrimination illegal, but the stereotypes, attributions, and various cognitive processes associated with racism in everyday life often persist for decades or longer. Research demonstrates that even the implicit introduction of the stereotype that women are not good in mathematics results in lower scores among female students on an objective mathematics test—even in 21st century America, where women and men are equal before formal law.[11] Similarly, a new constitution can be ratified with a single vote,

changing a political system from dictatorship to democracy, but it takes far longer to change cognitive styles and behaviors from those suitable for functioning in a dictatorship to those supportive of democracy.

Given this discrepancy in the pace of change in different spheres, it is useful to further distinguish between three types of systems with respect to group-based injustices. A *First-Order System* exists when both formal law and the informal normative system endorse group-based inequalities, such as during the time of slavery in the American South. A *Second-Order System* involves a formal legal system that supports just and fair inter-group relations, but the informal normative system still supports some measure of racism, sexism, and other forms of group inequalities. The ideal form of society is a *Third-Order System*, in which both formal law and the informal normative system supports just and fair inter-group relations. No major society has yet to achieve the Third-Order System ideal.

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Within-system change, or change that is limited within each of these three systems, is far easier to achieve and more common than *between-system change*, which involves movement from one system to another. Within-system change maintains the basic social relationships and does not require new psychological skills. For example, within-system change happens when one dictator replaces another, but the political system of dictatorship continues (for example, the December 2011 passage of power from North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il to his son, Kim Jong Eun), or when, through an election, the leader of one political party replaces the leader of another in a democracy. In contrast, between-system change involves transition from one system to another, for example, when a dictatorship ends and a genuine democracy evolves. This change requires a different set of psychological and social skills, including a new form of consciousness, to sustain the new system.

This difference between within-system and between-system change can be clarified through an example inspired by the Palo Alto group of therapists.[12] Imagine that you are having a nightmare, in which you are swimming as fast as you can in a piranha-infested river. The piranhas are closing in around you, but you just manage to reach the riverbank and climb out of the water to safety. This is within-system change, where you experienced transition (from water to land) while still in a dream. In contrast, between-system change is when you are swimming as fast as you can in the same river, but you awake and *exit your dream*. In this case, your transition was from one state of consciousness to another, from dreaming to being awake, and represents between-system change.

With respect to international politics, the theme of a "world in transition" implies change, but it is necessary to clarify more precisely the kind of change underway. On the surface, revolutions such as the ones that brought an end to the monarchy in Iran and to communism in Russia, as well as those constituting the Arab Spring, appear to be significant because they involve regime change. However, my contention is that, so far, these have involved within-system change; to return to the above example of the swimmer, these revolutions have failed to achieve a change equivalent to moving from dreaming to being awake, or from one form of consciousness to another. In order to explain the deeper processes involved, I turn next to discuss the 'springboard model of dictatorship.'

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The Springboard to Dictatorship

"Not, then, men and their moments. Rather moments and their men."
Ervin Goffman[13]

The concept of a springboard to dictatorship gives priority to context and stands in contrast to traditional reductionist approaches, which focus on the personality of the individual dictator and reference to intra-personal psychological traits of leaders and followers in explaining dictatorship. However, this reductionist approach to understanding dictatorship is misleading, because in every human group there are individuals who score high on traits such as authoritarianism and narcissism, often higher than dictators, but never have the opportunity to become the dictator of a nation. As Goffman states, in explaining behavior we must give highest priority not to men and their moments, but to moments and their men—to the contexts that enable an individual to behave in particular ways.

Consequently, the important issue is: what are the *conditions* that enable a potential dictator to seize and hold power? Following the empirical psychological research of Milgram,[14] Zimbardo,[15] and others, demonstrating the power of the context to shape behavior, the springboard model of dictatorship gives highest priority to the conditions that enable a potential dictator to come to power. Milgram demonstrated the power of context with studies that explored obedience to authority. He assigned participants the role of teacher in studies that were ostensibly about learning. The student in these studies (who was actually an actor) had the task of learning word-

associations. After each incorrect answer, the teacher (the naïve participant in the study) was instructed by an authority figure, a scientist in a white laboratory coat, to punish the learner with an electric shock of increasing voltage. Thus, the naïve participant was placed in a situation where he was pressured to obey an authority figure to do harm to another person (the learner).

The actual results proved themselves to be shocking: about 60% of participants proceeded to increase the level of electric shock and punish the learner to dangerous levels and even 'death' (of course, no one was actually hurt in the study). The level of obedience to the authority figure (the scientist) decreased when there were two scientists present and they disagreed as to whether the teacher should continue to increase the level of punishment, and also when the distance between the scientist and the teacher increased. The basic finding of Milgram's studies is that that people with normal psychological profiles would, under certain conditions, obey authority and inflict serious harm to others. It is a testimony to the power of context to shape behavior.

Zimbardo also demonstrated the power of context in a study conducted in a simulated prison at Stanford University. The participants in his study were healthy young men, divided randomly into two groups: the first group served as prison guards and the second served as prisoners. The task of the prison guards was to keep order in the prison, where there were bars on the doors, clubs for the guards, uniforms, and strict visiting hours for outside visitors. The prisoners were brought to the prison in handcuffs by members of the local police, who cooperated to make the study more realistic. Unexpectedly, the study had to be ended after only five days, because the prison guards were mistreating the prisoners so badly. Several prisoners experienced psychological breakdowns, and there was serious abuse of power by the guards. Again, normal healthy individuals had been transformed by the power of the situation to harm others; this time it was the role of the prison guard and the context of the prison that changed behavior.

Thus, a robust body of psychological research strongly suggests that context can influence behavior in powerful ways. An important implication is that, in explaining the rise or maintenance of a dictator, even after major revolutions, we must consider context too, not just the characteristics of the individual who may use the springboard to dictatorship.

At the same time, the springboard model acknowledges that some potential dictators are more skilled than others in helping to create the springboard, which they then use to obtain power. For example, potential dictators can help shape the springboard through manipulating 'crisis incidents', such as Hitler's use of the Reichstag fire incident on February 27, 1933. The Reichstag in Berlin was set on fire by a Dutch left-wing extremist. Hitler claimed that Germany was threatened by a communist conspiracy and imposed severe restrictions on civil liberties, paving the way for Nazi repression. Another important, more recent example is Ayatollah Khomeini's use of the Iranian hostage crisis. In 1979, the hostage crisis presented the moderate Islamic government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan with a

thorny dilemma: if it condemned the hostage taking, they would be branded by the radicals as "American stooges," but to condone the hostage taking would compromise their own principles of support for international law. Unable to resolve this dilemma, Bazargan resigned and the moderates were swept aside, opening the way for a takeover by radical factions and absolute power by Khomeini and his successors. The deadly assaults on Western embassies in Libya, Egypt, and other Muslim countries in September 2012 was intended to achieve the same end: the toppling of moderate governments, so that the revolutionary surge of the Arab Spring could be taken over by Islamist radicals.

The Three Main Components of the Springboard
The springboard to dictatorship consists of three main components: first, *perceived threats* that create the psychological climate conducive to dictatorship; second, situational factors that present dictatorship as the best solution to overcome current problems; and third, the potential dictator and the "revival" he launches to "resurrect" society. The first two components are associated with subtractive globalization, in the sense that they are outcomes of globalization that weaken rather than support democratization.

The emergence and continuation of dictatorship is often associated with intense perceived threats and the resulting psychological distress of the general population. These threats typically arise out of economic and political uncertainty, as well as a strong sense that society is under attack from both internal and external enemies. Germany during the interwar period serves as an example, when political and economic instability and the lingering humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles created a sense of crisis among the German people. An impressive body of psychological research, using a variety of research methods and models, supports the proposition that feelings of uncertainty and threat among a population results in greater conformity, intolerance of dissent, and support for authoritarian leadership.[16] For example, in Sherif's classic inter-group studies,[17] group members became more conformist and supportive of aggressive leadership as inter-group conflict intensified. Researchers examining evolutionary and historical trends have also produced evidence that perceived threat and societal anxiety result in leaning toward ideologies that provide categorical, "black-white" thinking and "certainty."[18] This includes narrative research by Billig into the link between uncertainty and extremism,[19] as well as studies by McGregor and his associates on goal-regulation processes that we share with other vertebrates.[20] This model implies that the anxieties resulting from goal frustration can result in coping strategies such as running or grooming in animals and religious zeal in humans. In essence, categorizing the world in terms of good versus evil, placing the in-group in the "good" category and the out-group in the "evil" category, helps to relieve anxieties and heightens in-group cohesion and morale through difficult times.

Perceived collective threats have also been exacerbated by accelerating globalization. When humans began their evolutionary migration out of Africa, they travelled on their own legs, and it is only recently in human

evolution that animal power helped to speed up human transportation. Very recently, faster ships, trains, automobiles, and aircrafts have similarly greatly sped up the movement of humans around the world. As demonstrated most clearly during World War II, tens of millions of people can now be moved across entire continents in a matter of weeks. The same powerful transportation system serves the global labor market, where workers move across countries or continents to seek better employment and economic opportunity. These rapid, large-scale movements of people have resulted in sudden contact with no previous history of contact.

The psychological consequences of sudden contact can be seen in the continuing struggles of minority groups in North and South America to develop positive and distinct social identities and achieve positive collective esteem when confronted by the more powerful European majority. The 1960s was an important turning point in this struggle, as various ethnic minority movements sought to re-define their characteristics (e.g., "Black is beautiful") and to re-position their collective identities. This struggle continues today against the transformation of racism from its old-fashioned explicit forms to new symbolic forms that are more subtle, implicit, and indirect.[21]

For traditionalists and fundamentalists in many non-Western societies, globalization has been associated with a general sense of societal decline and threatened collective identity.[22] This is clearly evident in Islamic societies, where radicalization has taken place in the face of a perceived cultural invasion from the West, and from American Hollywood culture in particular. Globalization has also created a sense of threat among right-wing nationalists in Western societies, worried about a non-Western, Islamic invasion. A tragic sign of this is the Norwegian extremist who, in July 2011, reacting against "an Islamic Invasion," detonated a car bomb near the office of Norway's Prime Minister, then went on a shooting rampage at a youth camp, eventually killing over 70 people and seriously injuring many others.

Globalization increases the probability of ethnocentrism and support for strong aggressive leadership, particularly during times of economic and political difficulties. When people feel that the present system is not able to solve societal problems, they are more inclined to give up power to "a savior" to lead them out of their problems. Post-World War I Russia and Germany, and post-revolution Iran serve as examples. These traumatic national experiences culminated in Stalin, Hitler, and Khomeini's eventually gaining absolute power in the Soviet Union, Germany, and Iran.

A second set of factors contributes to the view that dictatorships can best solve ongoing societal problems. These factors include support for dictatorships from groups and institutions with power and resources, such as the business community, the church, and the military. The key feature of these groups and institutions is that they enforce *continuity* of styles of meaning, making and behavior that support dictatorship in important ways, even across major revolutions.

Finally, the characteristics of the potential dictator and the 'revival' he espouses are critical components of the springboard to dictatorship. Potential dictators differ in their abilities to bring about and use the springboard

to dictatorship. The vast majority of psychological studies of dictatorship have given priority to the personality characteristics of dictators, with particular focus on *narcissism*, a state in which only the needs, feelings, wishes, and desires of the person are real. These traditional studies have also given importance to the socialization of the future dictator, following the example of an early landmark study that proposed a "hierarchical, authoritarian, exploitative parent-child relationship is apt to carry over into a power-oriented, exploitatively dependent attitudes toward one's sex partner and one's God, and may well culminate in a political philosophy and social outlook which has no room for anything but a desperate clinging to what appears to be strong and disdainful rejection of whatever is relegated to the bottom."[23] Although the particular characteristics of potential dictators and their supporters do play a role in the continuation of dictatorships, such micro-level factors are influential only within the constraints of context. As in the studies by Milgram, Zimbardo, and others, the personality of the participant had a limited impact on overall conformity and obedience. The context was the dominant factor shaping behavior.

Why Dictatorships Persist

Psychological factors have a pivotal role in the process of between-system change, and in this section I will provide brief illustrative examples. As a guiding principle, in order to appreciate the role of psychological factors in between-system change and in shaping the 'psychological citizen' more broadly,[24] it is necessary to conceive of psychological phenomena as arising through and from social interactions and participation in collective life, rather than being the properties of isolated individuals. For example, how people categorize the social world and relate to in-group and out-group members, including their tolerance of differences, arises through socialization in a cultural context. Narratives about the correct ways of categorizing the world and behaving are key in inter-group contexts.

Categorization is a 'hard-wired' process, as all humans intuitively categorize phenomena.[25] There is almost infinite information in the environment, and the effective processing of information can only be achieved through categorization. Thus, all humans construct categories of things as well as people. While categorization is a universal process, the contents of categories and how we treat categories can vary across time and culture. For example, the color categorizations children learn vary to some degree across cultures.[26]

One of the most important contributions to our understanding of categorization processes came through research into the categorization of non-social phenomena.[27] This research highlighted two consequences of categorization: first, exaggeration of between-group differences; and second, the minimization of within-group differences. Later research showed continuity in these consequences across non-social (lines of different lengths) and social (people of different skin color) phenomena. In effect, when humans are categorized into two groups, such as men and women, there is a tendency to

exaggerate differences between the groups and minimize differences within them. The outcome is often biased and inaccurate stereotypes of the two groups that are perpetuated in the larger society.

Categorization is also the cognitive first step toward ethnocentrism and attributional biases favoring the in-group. Research using the "minimal group paradigm,"[28] an experimental procedure that arbitrarily places individuals in different categories, has demonstrated that in-group favoritism can arise without the assumed necessities of group solidarity, such as common leadership, shared culture, and social interactions. The experimental evidence demonstrates that under certain conditions, in-group favoritism can arise simply out of the knowledge that "I am in group X, and that other person is in group Y." Thus, research on categorization has highlighted the general human tendency to categorize the social world, and experiments on the minimal group paradigm have demonstrated that categorization even on trivial criteria can result in inter-group biases.

Given that humans categorize the social world, and often show inter-group biases, the toleration of out-groups is important for democratic societies. While majority rule is a component of democracy, upholding the rights of minorities is absolutely essential. Indeed, toleration and protection of minority rights represent one of the most significant differences between democracy and dictatorship. In a democracy, there is a high level of tolerance for differences and the rights of minorities are upheld; this is not true in a dictatorship, where terror is used to subjugate minorities. I witnessed exactly this kind of terror during my years of work in post-revolution Iran, and there are many historical accounts to match my experiences. A witness to the terror unleashed by Lenin and his followers provides the following analysis: "Terror is a calculated register of punishments, reprisals, and threats by means of which the government intimidates, entices, and compels the fulfillment of its imperative will. Terror is a heavy, suffocating cloak thrown from above over the entire population of the country . . . "[29] The ultimate goal of terror is the same, regardless of label (Communist, Islamist, or other): to create the ideal citizen according to the regime's ideology. Whereas the terror used by Khomeini and his followers was intended to create the ideal Muslim citizen, the terror used by Lenin and his followers was supposed to create the ideal communist citizen. In both cases, the ideal citizen is highly ethnocentric and intolerant of out-group differences.

The psychological citizen shaped in dictatorships learns intolerance toward out-groups and differences more generally. This learning takes place in the context created by dictatorial leadership, a hallmark of which is categorical thinking and intolerance of ambiguity. The source of this is the dictatorship's drive to achieve ideological purity and monopoly. The major 20th century dictators, Hitler, Stalin, and Mao, as well as the more recent dictators like Mubarak, Ben Ali, and Gaddafi, used terror to instill a culture of intolerance, encouraging categorical "we are right, they are wrong," and "we are the righteous, they are the enemy," types of thinking.

Psychological evidence shows that intolerance of difference and out-groups tends to increase in times of threat and insecurity.[30] This tendency

is associated with subtractive globalization and results in a paradoxical outcome during revolutions: on the one hand, revolutions are a time of liberation, but on the other hand, revolutions bring economic, political, and social instability and pose a variety of threats. The result is often a lowered tolerance for differences and greater persecution of minorities. For example, the Arab Spring has been associated with greater persecution of religious minorities in Arab societies, rather than greater tolerance and more harmonious inter-group relations.

Ideology and Between-System Change

The springboard model turns on its head the traditional view of ideology and between-system change. The so-called "dominant ideology thesis"[31] is founded on two main assumptions: first, that most people in societies adopt the dominant ideology of their society, be it Maoist communism in China, Khomeinist Islam in Iran, or Putinist state capitalism in Russia; and second, that this ideology serves to lead the non-elite masses to accept their lower status positions.

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The springboard model rejects this thesis in the context of dictatorships, arguing that the role of ideology is fundamentally different in dictatorships as compared to its role in capitalist democracies.

According to the springboard model, the dominant ideology plays a crucially important role in maintaining cohesion among the ruling elite in dictatorships the ruling elite can only survive if it strictly adheres to the same ideology; ideological fractions and deviations would result in the downfall of the dictatorial regime, as obedience among subordinates declines when there is disagreement among authorities.[32] This explains why dictators are utterly intolerant toward rival factions, and why dictatorships tend to "eat their own children" as the leadership attempts to develop and force obedience to an official ideology. Consider as examples Bani Sadre, Mousavi, Karoubi, and many other "dethroned" Iranian revolutionaries.

But the non-elite masses in dictatorships seldom appropriate the dominant ideology. Indeed, as anyone who has lived in a dictatorship understands, it is primarily the guns pointing at their heads, and not ideology, that keep the non-elite masses in line. Most people living in dictatorships

are well aware of the corruption, injustice, and lack of freedom, but they dare not rebel, because the consequences for themselves, their families, and friends are often dire.

This has implications for the most effective means to bring about change in dictatorships. Change arises through ideological factionalism among the ruling elite, which creates the space for the non-elite masses to mobilize for and achieve regime change. The non-elite masses may need help to organize and mobilize, but do not need to be liberated from the dominant ideology, which they see through and never adopted.

The situation is very different in capitalist democracies, where the ruling elites disagree ideologically and formally change and re-form on a continual basis. In this context, the dominant ideology is far more likely to be appropriated by the non-elite masses. Thus, in exploring how change comes about in dictatorships, we must remember the different roles of ideology in dictatorships and capitalist democracies.

Concluding Comment

The difficulties that post-Arab Spring societies face in increasing their tolerance toward the other are examples of the psychological barriers that must be overcome in the struggle for more open and democratic societies. Of course, this struggle never ends, as even advanced democratic societies have within them powerful elements that could enable a return to dictatorship, particularly during times of perceived threat and societal distress. In these threatening situations, the springboard to dictatorship can re-emerge and be exploited by a potential dictator, as it was in 1930s Germany.

The workings of the springboard to dictatorship highlight a key point: we must not assume that a changing world will move in only one direction or have only one ending, that additive globalization will necessarily prove more powerful than subtractive globalization. Indeed, sudden inter-group contact is resulting in increased perceived threats, particularly among some traditional groups (Salafists in Islamic communities and right-wing nationalists in Western societies) that fear invasion of foreign peoples and cultures. As a result of these perceived threats, there is greater danger of support for dictatorships and a possible move away from democracy, at least among extremist groups. To

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assume that change moves inevitably in one direction is the mistake Marx made, and it is a mistake others make in their arguments for liberal capitalism as "the end of history." History does not have an inevitable end, but it does have psychological limits to how change takes place.

Post-Arab Spring societies now face these psychological limits on change. Pro-democracy forces must leverage mass media and educational tools to help Arab societies change to become more tolerant of differences, to acquire the social skills needed to tolerate and protect—not attack—dissimilar out-groups.

Finally, the springboard to dictatorship model has important implications for helping both power elites and non-elite masses to end dictatorship. Power elites need help to become more open and allow greater ideological diversity within their ranks. Non-elite masses need to acquire the basic psychological and social skills to participate in a democracy. These skills include more flexible categorizations, greater tolerance for differences and diversity in values and lifestyles, as well as better knowledge about and support for human rights and duties.

In conclusion, social programs are needed to develop and nurture the basic psychological skills necessary for participation in democracy, through the media and the education system in particular. A failure to implement such programs makes it more likely that the springboard to dictatorship will re-emerge, supported by forces of subtractive globalization, and enable another dictatorship.

Notes

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