The Psychology of Radical Social Change

From Rage to Revolution

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14   The Shark and the Octopus
Two Revolutionary Styles

Fathali M. Moghaddam

The chapters in Part III deal with issues that at a surface level seem different, but at a deeper level they are all concerned with how collective movements develop particular behavioral styles. My focus here is on two different behavioral styles that characterize collective movements leading to revolutions, styles I call the "shark" and the "octopus." These two behavioral styles tend to remain stable over years, probably because of limits to political plasticity (Moghaddam, 2016a). However, in the longer-term shark and octopus revolutionary styles do undergo changes, at least in some cases.

The shark is a creature of continuous movement, naturally tending to roam from place to place in search of food. The shark does not make a den, it does not select a small, well demarcated space as its home. Rather, it survives by cruising through large territories of water without borders, ready to move where food can be found. Inquisitive, eager to explore, always ready to push into new frontiers, the shark is opportunistic and ready to seize on resources in new territories.

The octopus, on the other hand, is shy and reclusive. It makes a den with clear boundaries, constructed of rocks and other objects, remains isolated, and only comes out in search of food. The octopus does not roam far from its den; it prefers to remain alone in the dark, hidden away in holes and crevices.

There are essentially two types of revolutionary movements, each with their own distinct identity and culture: those that behave like a shark, and those that behave like an octopus. The shark revolutionary movements have energy and inclination that naturally drives them outward; they are expansionist and inevitably go to war with neighbors and even geographically distant competitors. By their incessant probing, forward moving, expansionist approach, shark revolutionary movements radicalize competitors, setting off a process of mutual radicalizations and successive conflicts (Moghaddam, forthcoming).

In contrast, octopus revolutionary movements generate momentum by achieving increasing control of their immediate surroundings.

Lacking the motivation to be expansionist, octopus revolutionary movements have to look inward and focus their energies and resources on radicalizing within their own group, remaining within a limited and narrow boundary. Octopus revolutionary movements are extremely secretive and reclusive; they treasure complete domination within. Their main message to the world is, "Leave us alone!"

The key difference between these two types of revolutionary movements is that the shark style feeds on expansionism and becomes energized by forward movement, whereas the octopus style at least initially concentrates on sheer survival by being inward looking. The French Revolution (1789) is the classic example of the Shark revolutionary style at the level of the nation-state, whereas (at least in its initial years) the Russian Revolution (1917) is far closer to the Octopus revolutionary style. The expansionism of the French revolution almost immediately resulted in decades of war, whereas the self-protective, inward looking style of the Russian Revolution resulted in Russia being willing to withdraw from World War I under humiliating terms. The same trend is evident in the cases of Iran and North Korea, which on a smaller scale represent classic examples of shark and octopus revolutionary movements respectively. The revolution in Iran was expansionist and was almost immediately followed by a massive war with a neighboring state, whereas since the end of the Korean War (1951–1953), North Korea has concentrated its attention and resources to keeping the revolution alive within its own borders, and keeping the rest of the world at arm's length.

After discussing examples of shark and octopus revolutionary styles, I examine a type of leadership that goes across these styles, and is also shared by other major societies, as has become more even evident since the 2016 presidential elections in the US.

The French Revolution: The First Shark Example

From the outset . . . the great continuing strand of militancy was patriotic. Militarized nationalism was not, in some accidental way, the unintended consequence of the French Revolution: it was its heart and soul. It was wholly logical that the multimillionaire inheritors of revolutionary power – the true "new class" of this period of French history – were . . . real conquerors: the Napoleonic marshals, whose fortunes made even those of the surviving dynasts of the nobility look paltry by comparison. (Schama, 1989, p. 858)

The French revolution was fueled by its own aggression, feeding off of its own forward momentum. This was a revolution that would die if it came to a standstill. Expansionist from the start, the French Revolution was always moving away from the center, from Paris, from France, and then

from continental Europe to the rest of the world. Not just the ethos, but also the actions of the French revolutionaries were international – to push beyond local, regional, and national boundaries, to bring the practices and ideas of the new revolution to all humanity. The revolution would conquer, and as Schama points out, it was natural that the exporters of the revolution be military conquerors.

As an expansionist force, the French revolution was immediately seen as dangerous by neighboring rulers. They saw the shark for what it was; it would eat them, unless they killed it first. The inevitable result was war. In the years 1792–1797, the first French Republic that emerged from the revolution went to war against a coalition of powers that changed in membership, but most importantly included Britain, Prussia, and Austria as the most important members. By the end of this first French Revolutionary War, a young general named Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) had firmly established himself as the supreme French military leader. There was a brief lull in fighting, broken by Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798. The next year Napoleon staged a coup and made himself the First Consul of the Republic. Another coalition of nations fought against the expansionist revolutionary forces in the second French Revolutionary War, which ended in 1802. By this time, Austria and Russia had been pushed to seek peace with Napoleon, and Britain was isolated.

The expansionist, restless nature of the shark means that it is constantly on the move, creating danger for neighbors. The coming to power of Napoleon, who declared himself the first Emperor of the French in 1804, reinforced the shark character of French revolutionary. Inevitably, more wars soon followed, aptly referred to as the Napoleonic wars (1803–1815). French forces invaded country after country, sometimes invading the same territory several times after victories and defeats, spreading the legal codes and ethos of the revolution. It was the Russian winter, faced by French forces after the disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812, which finally broke the back of Napoleon's army.

But so strong was the fervor of the revolution that even after the military defeat in Russia and his exile in Elba, Napoleon was able to escape and persuade forces sent to capture him to follow him once more into battle to continue their revolution. The final defeat of French forces at the battle of Waterloo in 1815 brought to an end almost continuous fighting since 1792 – almost a quarter of a century of war. It was through this enormous war effort, involving armies of millions and dozens of nations in different coalitions, that the sheer expansionist energy of the French Revolution was finally harnessed and tamed. The French shark was caged.

The Iranian Revolution: The Second Shark Example

November 4, 1979 . . . several hundred students and activists seized the United States Embassy, taking hostage sixty-three Americans . . . On November 6 Khomeyni accepted the resignations of Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Yazdi, ending dual sovereignty. The Revolutionary Council was ordered to take over . . . The first goal of the student activists was successful: removing the moderates . . . from the center of power, forcing the political struggle to move faster (to keep the revolution "on course"). (Fischer, 1980, pp. 233–234)

Iranian radicalization and the consequent revolution that toppled the dictatorship of the Shah in 1979 was and has continued to be outward looking, expansionist, aggressively moving into new territories, and in other ways a typical example of shark revolutionary movement. The Iranian revolution cannot be anything else: it will die if it does not keep moving outward, because the energy of the revolution is re-generated by its outward movement.

From the beginning, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989) and other extremist leaders of the revolution were instinctively motivated to export their revolutionary ideology. The first major step in this exportation process was the invasion of the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran, embassies by convention being considered islands of their home country. This action also served to sweep aside the moderates, such as Prime Minister Merdi Bazargan (1907–1995), who in the first year of the revolution still occupied some leadership positions. The moderates believed it was wrong to invade the US Embassy, but could not make public their opposition for fear of being labeled as "American stooges."

Khomeini saw himself as leading a global Islamic movement, and from the start invested highly in exporting the revolution. Given that almost all Iranians are Shi'a Muslims (which make up less that 10 percent of Muslims in the world, more than 90 percent being instead Sunni Muslims) and Khomeini was a Shi'a religious leader, the most obvious places to target first in the effort to export the revolution were societies with significant Shi'a populations. The largest Shi'a population outside Iran lives in southern Iraq (about 60 percent of the Iraqi population is Shi'a Muslim), so Iraq became a prime target for efforts to export the Iranian revolution. The ruler of Iraq, Saddam Hussein (1937–2006), a Sunni Muslim, relied heavily on the Sunni minority to govern Iraq and was not about to allow Iran to stir up trouble and radicalize Shi'a Iraqis. When it was clear that the revolution might spill over from Iran to Iraq, rather than risk a revolt by the Shi'a majority in Iraq, Saddam Hussein launched an attack on Iran. There followed a devastating eight-year (1980–1988) war.

The Iran-Iraq War served to sap Iran's revolutionary energy, and for a while seemed to cage this shark. In 1980–1981, I accompanied several United Nations missions to the Iran-Iraq war front and witnessed the enormous human and material costs of the war. Entire cities were flattened and millions of people were killed or seriously injured. The shark was seriously wounded and finally forced to the peace table in 1988. Khomeini declared that making peace with Saddam Hussein was like taking a poison chalice. After eight years of grinding aggression, neither side had gained an inch of ground. It took many years before Iran could mobilize its energy and seriously renew any effort to try again to export the revolution. Ironically, it was the US that created a new and far smoother path for the shark to achieve its expansionist goals.

The 2003 ill-conceived US-led invasion of Iraq, following the almost equally misguided 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, destabilized the entire Near and Middle East and provided Iran with extraordinary new opportunities to follow a shark strategy and export its brand of Islamic revolution. Because the invasion of Iraq took place with no serious planning for postinvasion Iraq, after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime chaos ensued and a power vacuum was created, into which Iran rapidly sent people and resources. Iran took full advantage of the golden opportunity it was unexpectedly handed by the George W. Bush administration, ineptly led by Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld – an opportunity that the eight-year Iran-Iraq War had failed to win for the mullahs ruling Iran.

Iran's increased influence in Iraq was helped by historical factors. In addition to the majority of Iraqis being Shi'a Muslim, the Shi'a holy cities of Najaf and Karbala are also in Iraq. Najaf is the burial place of Imam Ali (the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Mohammad), and the holiest city in Shi'a Islam. Karbala is also an important Shi'a holy city, being the location of the Imam Hussein Shrine. Many generations of Iranians have studied and worked in Najaf and Karbala, and the ties between people in this region of Iraq and Iran are very close. In addition to these historic ties between Iran and Iraqi Shiites, ties became even stronger during the Iran-Iraq War when many leading Iraqi Shiites fled or were expelled from Iraq by Saddam Hussein and took shelter in Iran. I was living in Tehran in 1980 when the Iran-Iraq War began, and we used to refer to the Iraqi political leaders living in exile in Tehran as the "shadow Iraqi cabinet." As long as the Saddam Hussein regime survived, they remained in exile. But after the 2003 US-led invasion and the demise of Saddam Hussein's Sunni-led regime, they eagerly returned to Iraq and became highly influential in Iraqi politics – extending Iran's influence in Iraq. The shark was moving forward again.

Iran has used its success in Iraq as a platform for extending its influence in other parts of the Near and Middle East. By building up Hezbollah (a military organization, recognized as terrorist by the US, with wide ideological, cultural, and other operations, based in Lebanon) and the Qods force (the unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guards responsible for international operations), Iran has greatly increased its capability to try to export its revolution. Hezbollah and the Qods force are being used in many places abroad, in addition to Lebanon and Iraq. For example, in Syria these forces are used to prop up the dictator Bashar Assad, who is also backed by Russia; in Yemen, they are used to destabilize the Sunni government, and generate instability on the southern border of Saudi Arabia, a Sunni ally to the US and regional rival to Shi'a Iran; in Afghanistan also, Iran has extended its influence in recent decades, relying on similarities in language (Persian, the official language in Iran, is close to Dari, spoken by about 55 percent of Afghans) culture, and religion.

In addition to military operations designed to export the revolution, Iran is launching ideological assaults abroad. This is achieved by training large numbers of foreign clerics, many at the newly established Mustafa International University (MIU), to return to their countries and preach Iran's brand of revolutionary Islam. So far, forty-five thousand foreign clerics have been trained at MIU, and twenty-five thousand are being trained at present (including six thousand women). According to one authoritative source, "Other startling statistics relating to MIU include its 70 branches worldwide; regular relationships with more than a hundred other centers internationally; 150 websites; publication of 50,000 works in 45 languages as well as 70 journals; and management of 400 clubs with 8,000 members" (Khalaji, 2016, p. 5).

The French and Iranian revolutions, then, are examples of the Shark pattern of behavior, where new energy and resources are derived from expansion and continuous forward movement. In contrast, I next consider two cases of octopus revolutionary behavior, where the movement is energized by ever-increasing control of home territory.

The Russian Revolution: The First Octopus Example

The main preoccupation of those engaged in octopus style revolution is to achieve complete control in their own territory, to become the undisputed master of their own house. Their survival depends on successfully focusing their entire energy on "cleaning house." Whereas shark revolutionary movements derive their energy from expansionism and

continually moving forward, octopus revolutionary movements derive their energy by achieving tighter and tighter control of their own territories. It is only after internal control is achieved that the octopus will venture further out from home.

Gaining internal control and cleaning house were exactly the challenges the Bosheviks took up in 1917. The Bolsheviks evolved to become the "majority" faction in the Marxist Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, formed in 1898 to unite the various fragmented left-wing revolutionary movements within the Russian empire. The Bolsheviks prophesied global revolution, and eventual international victory for communist revolutionaries on behalf, and through the eventual participation, of the proletariat. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, even victory within the chaotic Russian empire seemed far off for the Bolsheviks, with their most talented leaders, including Lenin and Trotsky, exiled abroad and far removed from action in Russia.

Chaos had been created in the Russian empire by the disastrous policies of Czar Nicholas II (1868–1918), which included blundering into two major wars, first the Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905) and then the First World War (1914–1918). The Russo-Japanese war resulted in a number of surprising victories for Japan, leaving Russia utterly humiliated. The Russian experience during World War I was even worse; Russia was very poorly prepared for war when it allied with Britain and France to fight Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Italy. After some initial successes, the Russian military experienced defeat after defeat and suffered about three million casualties. Furthermore, the unpopular war created severe shortages of food and supplies and caused deep suffering in the general Russian population, leading to a number of spontaneous bread riots. During this same period, Nicholas reinstated severe political repression, after having granted the people some political freedoms in response to revolutionary anti-Czar movements in 1905. Thus, by the start of 1917 Russia was experiencing military defeat, severe economic depression and food shortages, heightened political repression, and lack of effective leadership. The Czar and the royal family were deeply unpopular, as they were blamed for the disastrous war.

The first of two important revolutions in 1917 took place in February. The main revolt centered in what is now St. Petersburg, the capital city of Russia at that time. This spontaneous revolt showed that even troops specifically tasked to defend the Czar had moved to the opposition, and there was nothing the Czar could do but to abdicate, which he did on March 15, 2017. But the collapse of the Czar's regime was not the result of revolutionary actions by workers or peasants; it was the result of

soldiers refusing to fire on civilians, and the Czar losing his authority in the midst of terrible economic and social conditions worsened by the tragic war.

The abdication of the Czar created a power vacuum. Two groups took the lead in collaborating in a plan to fill this vacuum, by forming a provisional government. The first of these groups (the Petrograd Soviet) consisted of representatives from workers and soldiers. The second group was a committee of the Duma (an assembly of representatives). The Bolsheviks and other revolutionary parties refused to participate in the provisional government; in part because they were surprised by these rapid events and did not have a clear plan for moving forward, in part because in this state of uncertainty they did not want to lend credibility to the provisional government. The real power in the provisional government rested with the Petrograd Soviet, which represented the soldiers and workers who could actually carry out orders to get things done.

The situation changed for the Bolsheviks when Lenin managed to get back into Russia from his exile abroad. Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders had failed to grasp the opportunity that now lay ahead; it was Lenin who took decisive action. He attacked the idea of compromising and coming to agreement with other groups, Marxist or otherwise. He was also against waiting – he saw the chance to grab power and wanted the Bolsheviks to take decisive command.

One such action was ending Russia's involvement in the devastating war that had brought bankruptcy to the state, and famine and misery to most people in the Russian empire. Through Lenin's influence, the Bolsheviks positioned themselves favorably in the struggle for power, "In contrast to the hesitations and divisions of the other parties, the Bolsheviks, adopting Lenin's line, now urged that the Russian people should put revolution before war. A demonstration organized by Stalin on June 18 brought several hundred thousand onto the streets, with an overwhelming number of banners proclaiming Bolshevik slogans. This represented a triumph of the party against its rivals, who at once accused Lenin of planning a coup" (Bullock, 1993, p. 52).

Was it a coup that brought the Bolsheviks nearer to monopoly power in October 1917? Or was it a revolution led by the workers and peasants, as the Bosheviks claimed? The Bolshevik Party now had almost a quarter of a million members, so it had soared in popularity. Again, the key factor in developments proved to be the refusal of troops to follow orders given by the central authority. Just as in February 1917 troops had failed to follow the orders of the Czar's government to fire on demonstrators, in October troops refused to follow orders from the provisional government to suppress what was in effect a "power grab" by the Bolsheviks,

"Astonishingly, the revolution was over in less than forty-eight hours and with little bloodshed" (Bullock, 1993, p. 54).

Although they had seized the initiative, the Bolsheviks were in a very weak position. First, they were only one of a number of competing political groups. There were strong opponents, including the Mensheviks and other competing Marxist groups as well as liberal factions of the provisional government, who would try to stop the Bolsheviks achieving political monopoly. As it turned out, the existence of a strong opposition eventually led to a civil war. Second, Russia was in utter disarray. The vast majority of people were suffering from the severe food shortages and consequences of the unpopular war. Lenin and the Bolsheviks concentrated their energies on coming to power, keeping power, and increasing their control across the vast Russian empire.

The particular talents and personality characteristics of Lenin were supremely suited for the task ahead. He was extraordinarily well equipped to keep the Bosheviks focused on fighting to achieve a monopoly of state power; it was in important respects "Lenin's revolution" (Marples, 2000). An essential ingredient of Lenin's strategy to achieve and maintain power was the use of violence and terror (Ryan, 2012). Immediately following the October 1917 power grab by the Bolsheviks, the target of Lenin's violence were other groups of revolutionaries. It was precisely because the Bolsheviks did not have sufficient control over the country, and political events in particular, that they resorted to violence.

The Bolsheviks used a number of different strategies to try to gain monopoly control. The first strategy was to sign a peace treaty (the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed March 3, 1918) with Germany and end Russian involvement in World War I, even at the expense of making significant concessions and giving up the Baltic States to the Germans. Second, they implemented a large program of land and property redistribution, giving peasants and workers "ownership" (although this turned out to be mostly in the form of collective ownership). Third, they launched into a full-scale civil war (1917–1922) that would eventually put an end to serious political opposition in the country.

Throughout the bitter civil war, the Bolsheviks, represented by the Red Army, used the same tactics they had displayed to take power in October 1917. They used summary executions against their opposition, including Czar Nicholas and his entire family, who were killed because the Bolsheviks feared they would be "rescued" by the Whites. The British, French, and Italian governments directly and indirectly intervened in the war, hoping that the weakening or defeat of the Bolsheviks would lead Russia to reconsider and continue with the war against

Germany. However, Lenin's influence continued to lead the Bolsheviks to give highest priority to the establishment and survival of the revolutionary nation.

With the end of the Russian Civil War (1922) came not only the crushing of all groups opposed to the Bolsheviks, but also the independence hopes of Tatars, Bashkirs, and other minorities. After the death of Lenin (1924), Stalin took control under the title of General Secretary of the Communist Party's Central Committee. Perhaps the most significant lesson Stalin had learned from Lenin was that getting and keeping power inside Russia had to take precedence over everything else. Adherence to this "octopus" rule had brought success, "The Bolsheviks were the smallest of the Russian socialist parties, with no more than twenty-five thousand members at the beginning of 1917, in opposition and politically isolated for most of that year. Yet before its end their leaders had emerged, unexpectedly and almost overnight, the first socialist government in the world" (Bullock, 1993, p. 91).

The North Korean Revolution: The Second Octopus Example

On August 15, 1945, two young US colonels were directed to "...withdraw to an adjoining room and find a place to divide Korea...Given thirty minutes to do so...(the young colonels)...chose the thirty-eighth parallel" (Cumings, 2005, pp. 186–187). In this way, an arbitrary line, hastily drawn on a map by two American army officers without any consultation with Koreans, began the history of North and South Korea after the end of the Second World War (1939–1945). In order to better understand why Korea came to be divided, and how North Korea came to develop an octopus revolutionary style, we need to examine the experiences of Koreans since at least the nineteenth century.

Frederick McKenzie's books *The Tragedy of Korea* (1908) discusses the plight of modern Korea, which was exploited for many decades even before being annexed by Japan in 1910. In addition to the extreme exploitation of material resources by the Japanese in Korea, the exploitation of human resources was even more tragic. During the Second World War, an estimated 200,000–220,000 women were forcibly taken from Korea and China to serve as prostitutes to "comfort" members of the Japanese military. The stories of these abducted women are only now being told (Friedman, 2015), and this is symbolic of the still hidden tragedy of modern Korea. Although Japan was the aggressor and Korea was the victim, after the Second World War Japan was kept intact,

provided considerable help, and positioned as an ally by the US (Schaller, 1997), whereas Korea, the victim of Japanese aggression, ended up being divided.

After the defeat and expulsion of the Japanese from Korea, the north of Korea was occupied first by Soviet forces and later by Chinese forces, while the south of Korea was occupied by American forces. The hastily drawn line along the thirty-eighth parallel was an attempt by the US to prevent communist (Soviet) forces from overwhelming all of Korea, which they were threatening to do. In 1946 the "Korean Workers' Party" was established, a communist party with Soviet backing. But geographically China is much closer to Korea, and the victory of Mao Zedong's (1893–1976) communist forces and the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, greatly increased the ability of China to help communists in Korea. Soon Chinese communist backing replaced Soviet support, while South Korea continued to rely on American support.

War broke out between North and South Korea in 1950 and continued until 1953. The two sides were in a precarious position, because both relied heavily on foreign powers (mainly China and the US) for their survival. The heavy reliance of the regimes in North Korea and South Korea on foreign powers, and not their local populations, for their survival meant that the ordinary people of the two Koreas had little say in decision-making in their own societies. Until the 1990s, both North and South Korea remained corrupt dictatorships. However, after the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, South Korea gradually changed to become more open and democratic. Also, from the 1980s the South Korean economy began to outperform the North Korean economy, so that the income of South Koreans is now about twenty-eight times higher than that of North Koreans (*Economist*, 2016).

The octopus style of the North Korean revolution is in large part explained by its leadership, which has been a hereditary dictatorship since 1948. The founder of the dictatorship Kim Il-Sung (1912–1994), *President for Eternity*, handed power to his son Kim Jong Il (1941/2–2011), the *Dear Leader*, who was succeeded by his son Kim Jong Eun (probably born 1984), the *Great Successor*. Under the guise of communism and using horrific repression tactics similar to those used by Stalin in the Soviet Union, the hereditary dictatorship of North Korea has survived in part by isolating the people of North Korea and severely limiting even the most basic freedoms.

The primary motivation of the North Korean regime, like the mullahs in Iran and other dictatorial regimes, is to continue to survive. Both North Korea and Iran see the US as a hostile enemy, determined to end

their "revolutionary" regimes. Whereas Iran has adopted a shark revolutionary style, pushing out and maintaining a high level of expansionist activities, most obviously in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, but also less overtly in Qatar and various other Islamic societies, North Korea has adopted an octopus revolutionary style, looking inward and threatening the world to "stay away, or else!"

The octopus style of North Korea is two pronged: severe repression and isolationism to control the North Korean population, and nuclear weapons to keep away outsiders. At home, the North Korean population is controlled by the use of gulags, severe censorship, and an enormous security and military apparatus (Hawk, 2003). A very high number of North Koreans are enmeshed in the military: out of a population of 25 million, 1.2 million are in the military, and 7.7 million are in the reserves – so about a third of the total population are either in the military of in the reserves (Moon, 2012). By comparison, "only" about one in twelve South Koreans are in the military or in the reserves. While keeping a lid on freedoms at home, the North Korean dictatorship tries to keep the rest of the world away by continuous threats, recently using missiles that could be armed with nuclear weapons.

But we should keep in mind that the cases we have considered, including Iran and North Korea, are in some respects similar to the situation in Western democracies. An important area of similarity across societies is the role of a particular style of leadership in collective mobilization, which I discuss below.

Bombastic Leadership, the Shark, and the Octopus

The eight-year assault on your Second Amendment freedoms has come to a crashing end. You have a true friend and champion in the White House. No longer will federal agencies be coming after law-abiding gun owners. No longer will the government be trying to undermine your rights and your freedoms as Americans. Instead, we will work with you, by your side . . .

We'll build the wall. Don't even think about it. Don't even think about it. Don't even think about it. That's an easy one. We're going to build the wall. We need the wall. – Donald Trump, in his keynote speech to the National Rifle Association, April 28, 2017

Both shark and octopus revolutionary movements face the challenge of mobilizing people. How does collective mobilization come about? This question underlies the chapters in Part III, as well as all the major social science theories attempting to explain revolutions and various other forms of collective action. For example, relative deprivation theory has led to a vast array of research trying to pin down the conditions in which

subjective experiences of deprivation will lead people to take action as part of a collective movement (Moghaddam, 2008; Power, Chapter 3). One of the factors that has received too little attention in this research is leadership, and particularly the kind of leadership that relies on emotions and identity as the main strategy for communicating and mobilizing followers (Moghaddam, 2016b, Chapter 6). To demonstrate this point, I focus on the leadership of Donald Trump and Ruhollah Khomeini as examples of what I term *bombastic leadership*, which has four main characteristics: first, giving primacy to emotions and "how people feel" (see the related discussion on "emotional leadership" by Humphrey, 2002); second, appeals to identity and identification with major groups, particularly based on religion, nationality, and "blood"; third, aggressive attacks against "the establishment" and elites representing the establishment; fourth, giving priority to "big ideas" and "visions" of an idealistic future, irrespective of facts and the present reality as established by "objective" or "scientific" criteria (see also Wagoner, Chapter 5).

The victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential elections was an enormous shock and disappointment to many better-educated Americans, of all political persuasions. For example, the conservative commentator George Will (2017) wrote in the *Washington Post,* "It is urgent for Americans to think and speak clearly about President Trump's inability to do either. This seems to be not a mere disinclination but a disability. It is not merely the result of intellectual sloth but of an untrained mind bereft of information and married to stratospheric self-confidence." Numerous American intellectuals, many from the political right, have been horrified by the leadership style of Trump, his inability to speak eloquently or logically, and the general disregard of the Trump movement for "facts" and science. For his part, Trump has repeatedly attacked the media, taking particular aim at the *New York Times* and other "elite" media outlets, as the "enemy of the people." Trump has also proposed slashing finding for science and academia generally, just as research centers and universities have become bastions of the anti-Trump movement.

Listening to American intellectuals talk about Donald Trump reminds me of my experiences listening to Iranian intellectuals talk about Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini in 1978–1980. Just as Trump galvanized the antiestablishment movement in the US in 2016, Khomeini became the spearhead for the anti-Shah movement in 1978–1979, the period leading up to the overthrow of the monarchy in Iran. During the first year after the revolution, Khomeini mobilized his fanatical supporters to literally wipe out all his political competitors, and by 1980 he had achieved a stranglehold over Iranian society. The hostage-taking

crisis and the invasion of Iran by Iraq in 1980 provided Khomeini with the political cover he needed to brand all opposition as "spies" and/or "enemies of Islam," and to annihilate them. He achieved this feat while being mocked by better-educated Iranians for his inability to communicate with them, and for his lack of understanding of modern science.

My argument here is that in many cases, collective mobilization, including of the type that lead to political revolutions, is achieved through bombastic leadership that influences people through emotions and group identification.

Bombastic Leadership

One of the greatest examples of bombastic leadership in the twentieth-century was Mao Zedong (1893–1976), who established the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 and founded the People's Republic of China in 1949. Mao came to wield absolute power in China, but the "Great Helmsman" steered his country into one disastrous storm after another. These disasters came about because, like all bombastic leaders, Mao was extremely effective at emotionally arousing and mobilizing the masses, but because he had little regards for scientific research and planning, the national mobilizations that he achieved at best came to nothing, but mostly had terrible and enormously damaging consequences. For example, the so-called Great Leap Forward (roughly 1958–1961) was supposed to transform Chinese society, through industrialization and collectivization. But instead of resulting in increases in productivity, the outcome was disarray and lower production. This proved to be particularly harmful in rural areas, because the failures of collective farming resulted in food scarcity and widespread famine in China (Chang and Halliday, 2005).

Another example of Mao's bombastic leadership style was the so-called Cultural Revolution, which took place during the late 1960s. Mao mobilized the Red Guards and young revolutionaries to attack "the establishment" and different types of authority figures, including those in the education system. Universities were attacked and shut down, and university professors were sent out into society to be "re-educated" through ordinary work "among the people." Mao's anti-intellectual and antielite attacks set China back decades, because an entire generation of highly educated experts was in one way or another prevented from contributing to society through their specialized professional skills.

Remarkably, in 1980–1981 Khomeini copied Mao's "Cultural Revolution" in Iran, and achieved the same results. In both cases, old bombastic leaders emotionally charged and mobilized young fanatical supports to

attack "experts," "scientists," "intellectuals," and professionals in general. In both cases, the bombastic leaders attacked universities in particular as "antirevolution," and closed them down so as to "re-educate" the faculty and nullify them politically. The outcome in Iran was just as disastrous for national development: an entire generation of highly trained professionals was lost, and Iranian universities have not recovered in terms of academic standards. In the case of China, it was only after the death of Mao that Chinese society was able to reinvest in higher education, train experts and professionals, and make up for lost ground in science and technology.

There are, unfortunately, almost endless examples of the "antiscience" and "antifacts" nature of bombastic leadership leading to disasters. Looking to the past, Josef Stalin's rejection of Mendelian genetics and his adoption of the bogus "scientific" doctrine of Michurinism, resulted in disasters in Soviet agriculture (see Moghaddam, 2013). Looking to the future, Donald Trump's rejection of scientific evidence demonstrating the role of humankind in global warming points to enormous disasters in the making.

Concluding Comment

The shark and octopus revolutionary styles are not fixed. There are cases in which in the first few years after a revolution, one style is followed but later there is a shift to the other style. For example, the 1917 revolution in Russia was followed by some years of octopus behavior, but particularly with the Second World War there opened up new opportunities for a shark revolutionary style to develop. The Soviet Union expanded and took over all of Eastern Europe, as well as East Germany. On the other hand, after a failed attempt at expansion early on, North Korea adopted and maintained an octopus revolutionary style until the present. Similarly, the revolutionary style of Iran has been consistently shark.

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