

## Chapter 3

---

# The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend

Daniel J. Dufour, Rachel Goldberg,  
and Fathali M. Moghaddam

Let me see now;  
To get his place, and to plume up my will  
In double knavery—how, how? Let's see.  
After some time, to abuse Othello's ear  
That he is too familiar with his wife

—*Othello*, Act I, scene iii, pp. 398–402

In Shakespeare's play *Othello*, the spiteful Iago hates Othello and schemes his downfall. Iago pretends to be friends with Cassio, Othello's lieutenant, and by gaining Cassio's confidence he manages to set a trap to make Othello believe his wife is having an affair with Cassio. Consequently, Othello becomes Cassio's enemy and orders his death, and for her "treachery" he murders his own wife. Then, realizing his tragic mistake, Othello kills himself. Throughout the play, the cunning Iago uses variations of the age-old tactic "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" to attack his various enemies.

The strategy "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" has been used throughout history, across cultures and in a range of situations. This strategy seems to fit with a model of humans as rational, selfish, and opportunistic (Moghaddam, 2008, chapters 3 and 4); they are willing to shift alliances to achieve particular goals. This view is in line with a number of major theoretical perspectives, including realist theory (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995; Maoz, Terris, Kuperman, & Talmud, 2007), liberal theory (Keohane & Martin, 1995; Maoz et al., 2007), the minimum resource theory of coalition formation (Crosbie & Kullberg, 1973; Gamson, 1961), social exchange theory (Curry & Emerson, 1970), and evolutionary psychology (Gavrilets & Vose, 2006).

This chapter takes a different perspective, that of positioning theory (Moghaddam, Harré, & Lee, 2008). Positioning theory looks at actors' positions and how these positions constrain and shape the actors' narratives and actions. Positioning theory does not assume that these positioning acts are rational, selfish, or opportunistic.

Thus, our goal is to explore the strategy of "an enemy of my enemy is my friend" through the lens of positioning theory. Individuals, groups, and nations use the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" strategy to classify others. This strategy is pervasive throughout history, cultures, and contexts. We discuss four case studies that illustrate the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" strategy: great power alliances during and after World War II, the United States–al-Qaeda relationship, the 2012 Republican primary, and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Egyptian revolution. This discussion takes place in the context of a "new global security" where "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" is a common tactic (Moghaddam, 2010).

## FROM WORLD WAR II TO COLD WAR ALLIANCES

The great powers alliance formations during and after World War II (1939–1945) provide an international example of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" in action. During World War II, warring nations split into two dominant alliances—the Allied powers and the Axis powers (see Table 3.1). The Allied powers positioned the Axis powers, particularly Germany, as harboring grandiose imperialist ambitions, which spurred the Axis powers to invade Poland in 1939 and advance into France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in 1940. In response, the United States and the Allied powers worked to halt Germany's "imperialistic" endeavors and prevent the Axis powers from invading other nations (Gilbert, 2004).

The relationship between Germany and the United States was obviously extremely hostile during the war. The United States' narrative reflected this hostility and clearly portrayed Germany as a U.S. enemy. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1941 Declaration of War reflects the American sentiments:

Table 3.1

**World War II Alliances: Main Axis and Allied Powers**

Main Allied Powers	Main Axis Powers
Britain	Germany
China	Italy
France	Japan
Soviet Union	
United States	

The Government of Germany, pursuing its course of world conquest, declared war against the United States . . . the forces endeavoring to enslave the entire world now are moving toward this hemisphere. Never before has there been a greater challenge to life, liberty, and civilization. Delay invites greater danger. Rapid and united effort by all of the peoples of the world who are determined to remain free will ensure a world victory of the forces of justice and of righteousness over the forces of savagery and of barbarism. I therefore request the Congress to recognize a state of war between the United States and Germany. (Roosevelt, 1941)

After long and bitter fighting, the Allied powers prevailed in 1945. When hostility ceased, Germany's economy, infrastructure, and political system lay in shambles and in its weakened state, Germany no longer threatened U.S. security and values. Germany was no longer a U.S. enemy (Gilbert, 2004).

Instead, the United States had a new concern: their former wartime ally, the Soviet Union. The United States was distrustful of the USSR even during World War II, but their shared German enemy gave these two nations common ground, allowing them to maintain a civil relationship throughout the war. Once the war ended, however, the United States and the Soviet Union had little in common politically and without Germany as a shared enemy, the U.S.-Soviet relationship quickly disintegrated, as each grew fearful of the other's ideology.

The U.S. recharacterization of the Soviet Union as an enemy prompted the United States to reformulate its foreign policy and shuffle its alliances. The wartime alliances quickly dissolved, and the emergent relationships reflect America's pervasive use of the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" policy across its relationships with multiple nations. The United States befriended many of its former enemies including West Germany, Japan, and Italy against their common enemy, the USSR. The United States also became enemies with many of their former friends including China. Some relationships remained stable, and the United States continued to ally with

**Table 3.2**  
**Alliance Shifts from 1939 to 2012**

	<b>World War II (1939–1945)</b>	<b>Cold War (1945–1991)</b>	<b>Post-Cold War (1991–2012)</b>
U.S.–East Germany	Enemies	Enemies	Friends
U.S.–West Germany	Enemies	Friends	Friends
U.S.–USSR/former USSR	Friends	Enemies	Ambiguous
U.S.–China	Friends	Enemies	Competitors
U.S.–Japan	Enemies	Friends	Friends
U.S.–Italy	Enemies	Friends	Friends
U.S.–United Kingdom	Friends	Friends	Friends
U.S. – France	Friends	Friends	Friends

France and the United Kingdom, likely because they shared an enemy both during and after World War II. Overall, the relationship shifts follow the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” pattern and reflect the incorporation of this strategy in U.S. foreign policy. Table 3.2 shows shifting U.S. positions toward various nations during World War II, the Cold War, and Post-Cold War, in accordance with the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” pattern.

One of the most salient examples of America’s mid-20th century “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” policy is the shift in the U.S. narrative regarding West Germany. Following World War II, the United States crafted a new narrative, which in stark contrast to its wartime narrative, portrayed West Germany as a friend. It allied with West Germany and collaborated to undermine their shared enemy, the USSR, using tactics such as economic sanctions, arms controls agreements, and the Berlin airlift (1948–1949). U.S. policymakers and presidents highlighted shared interests. President Ronald Reagan explained:

Despite the legacy of two world wars, which found us on opposing sides, West Germany and the United States have forged an exceptionally close relationship during the past three decades. The success of the Marshall plan, the Berlin Airlift, and the ensuing NATO partnership have led to a recognition of our common democratic ideals and joint interest in Western economic and political strength. (Reagan, 1985, p. 615)

The U.S. narrative depicted West Germany as a partner and friend in combating the Soviet threat and spreading democracy and capitalism. All of these collaborative endeavors between the United States and West Germany were attempts to reduce Soviet power and influence.



Overall, the alliance shifts that occurred from World War II to the Cold War, specifically the relationship between the United States and West Germany, reflect the U.S. use of the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" strategy.

## U.S.-AL QAEDA RELATIONS

In addition to befriending European powers, the United States befriended Islamic fundamentalist groups in several countries including Afghanistan and Pakistan in an attempt to curb Soviet expansionism during the Cold War.

This U.S. policy was in part a reaction to the expansion of Soviet influence, such as through the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet Union deployed troops in an attempt to prop up Afghanistan's weakening Communist Party, which held power at the time of the invasion. In addition, the Soviet Union wanted to gain a foothold in South Asia and hoped that control of Afghanistan would eventually provide access to oil, gas, and mineral reserves in the Gulf Region (Shaban, 2006).

In response to the invasion, Afghans organized into several armed resistance groups and fought the Soviet occupiers. These groups were collectively labeled the Mujahideen (<http://oxforddictionaries.com/?region=us>), which means individuals engaging in *jihad* or holy struggles (see <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/jihad?region=us&q=jihad>). The Mujahideen consisted of an amalgamation of Afghani Islamic fundamentalist sects as well as foreign troops recruited and transported to Afghanistan by the wealthy Arab interests, including the Saudi businessman Osama bin Laden (Maley, 2002).

The United States responded to the invasion by supporting the Mujahideen against their shared enemy, the Soviet Union. To ensure a Mujahideen victory and expulsion of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the United States trained, armed, and financed the Mujahideen resistance fighters. Estimates of the U.S. contribution vary, but some figures suggest that the U.S. provided up to \$20 billion in support for the Mujahideen, making it the largest covert operation in U.S. history (Hiro, 1999).

To carry out the operation and to ensure that it remained covert, the United States used Pakistan as an intermediary. To ensure Pakistan's continued support against Soviet expansion, the United States supported Mohammad Zia Al-Huq's military dictatorship and his Islamization of Pakistani institutions (Haqqānī, 2005). With U.S. support, Zia controlled Pakistan and instituted Shari'ia law and an Islamic political system. Zia stated:

We have no intention of leaving power till the accomplishment of our objectives of Islamization of the national polity and induction of decency in politics. Until then neither will I step down or let anyone rise. (Zia in Weiss, 1986, pp. 166–167)

U.S. President Ronald Reagan hailed Zia as a U.S. ally in the battle against communism and U.S. policy makers frequently advised Zia on matters pertaining to Soviet expansion (Haqqānī, 2005).

With the help of the United States and Pakistan, the Mujahideen ultimately prevailed and in 1989 the Soviets retreated from Afghanistan. Without the support of the Soviets, the Communists in Afghanistan remained in power for only three more years before collapsing and leaving a power vacuum, which ultimately allowed the Taliban to gain control over Afghanistan (Hiro, 1999).

The end of the Cold War shifted U.S. interests. A defining moment in the new U.S. foreign policy was the attacks on September 11, 2001, in which 19 Saudi terrorists hijacked commercial airlines and attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These attacks induced widespread fear and panic across the United States. President George W. Bush responded by declaring a "War on Terror." The goal of his campaign was to eliminate al-Qaeda and capture Osama bin Laden, the architect of these attacks. To accomplish these goals, the United States invaded Afghanistan on October 14, 2001, and overthrew the ruling Taliban regime, which tacitly supported and provided safe haven for al-Qaeda forces (National Commission, 2004).

The United States post-9/11 policies marked a radical shift from the U.S. policies enacted during the Cold War. The U.S. relationship with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and bin Laden shifted drastically from friendship and collaboration against their mutual Soviet enemy to hostility and fighting. The U.S. narrative changed from Reagan's characterization of al-Qaeda's parent organization as "freedom fighters" to Bush's description of al-Qaeda as "enemies of freedom." He explained:

These terrorists kill not merely to end lives but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way. (Bush, 2011)

The U.S. narrative toward Pakistan also changed. Although the United States outwardly characterizes Pakistan as a friend, the relationship is fraught with tension and hostility. The U.S. condemns many of Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalist groups, which it previously supported against the Communists and condemns the government for their soft-line approach to dealing with these groups. One such group is the Haqqānī network, which President Reagan supported against the Soviet Union, but members of this Pakistani group are now considered terrorists and deemed threats to U.S. national security (Rashid, 2012).

In sum, during the Cold War, the United States befriended Pakistan as well as al-Qaeda's parent organization. In the post-9/11 era, the U.S. narrative

enemy, the Soviet Union. In this situation, the U.S. implementation of "enemy on my enemy is my friend" strategy backfired and these groups currently threaten U.S. national security interests.

Having discussed examples of how "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" operates at the international level, in the next section we consider "local" cases.

## THE REPUBLICAN PRIMARY IN 2012

This next section explains how "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" strategy operated at the interpersonal level during the 2012 Republican primary. We argue that during the primary, candidates and their supporters courted voters by using this strategy. Mitt Romney, the eventual primary winner, won over primary voters by positioning himself as a businessman and the best candidate to take on the Republican voters' primary political enemy, President Barack Obama. Late in the primary, the Romney campaign also positioned Romney as the inevitable Republican candidate. The campaign argued that Republicans have a duty to accept the Romney nomination and turn their focus toward the general election to beat Obama. On the road to victory, Romney received significant challenges from several candidates who positioned themselves as conservative alternatives to a hardly conservative, moderate Romney and a liberal Obama. We examine the positions of Romney, Gingrich, and Rick Santorum.

Romney deliberately sought to capitalize on Republican voters' dislike of Obama by positioning himself as the best candidate to challenge Obama on the economy in the presidential election. Romney said the following during a primary debate:

Let's go back and talk about the question that Dave asked, which is how to get small business a break. And President Obama has done everything wrong. I happen to believe that to create jobs it helps to have a job. And I have. And having had a job in small business and in big business, I know all that you have to do is to make America the most attractive place in the world for business. (Fox News, 2011, September 22)

Instead of positioning himself as a conservative among many conservative candidates, Romney distinguished himself as a businessman with the experience needed to challenge Obama on the economy and fix it once elected. If Romney picked up supporters, it would not be because of his conservatism. For example, the Republican governor of Arizona, Jan Brewer, endorsed Mitt Romney on September 12, 2011.

Well you know, I think that he handles himself very, very well. But more than that, I think that he has that pro-business background and he has that political history that I think that he would serve America the best of all the candidates. And so it was a difficult decision. But I think Mitt is by far the person that can go in and win. (NBC, 2012, February 26)

It appears that Brewer had not initially supported the Romney campaign based on the following observations: She endorsed him months after the primary season started, said "it was a difficult decision," and in the video broadcast she appears to make a concerted effort to appear happy with her endorsement. Put simply, she endorsed Romney because she thinks Romney is the best candidate to beat their common political enemy, President Obama.

In March 2012, Romney's supporters started selling the inevitability of the Romney candidacy and the need to coalesce behind him to beat Obama. After "Super Tuesday," the Romney campaign said it would take an "act of God" or "bends the laws of reality" for Romney not to win the primary election (Haake & Novogrod, 2012, March 7). On March 29, 2012, Marco Rubio endorsed Mitt Romney on Fox News:

Well, I am going to endorse Mitt Romney and the reason why is not only because he's going to be the Republican nominee, but he offers at this point such a stark contrast to the president's record. (Fox News, 2012, March 28)

Like Jan Brewer who had not initially supported the Romney campaign, Rubio clearly stated that he was endorsing Romney because he wants a Republican to beat Obama in November. Later in the interview, he did say that "Romney will govern as a conservative" but this came as part of selling Romney and not as part of the explanation of why he endorsed Romney. Stated clearly, Romney and his supporters positioned all Republicans with the duty to support Romney, their best chance to beat Obama in the general election.

The conservative challenge to the Romney candidacy started dispersed among several candidates and eventually coalesced around Santorum.

Bachmann was one of the candidates that benefited from a conservative anti-Romney position. Bachmann polled first in national polls in July and August 2011. Two days before winning the Ames Iowa Straw Poll in August, Bachmann said the following (Fox News, 2011, August 13):

We need to have a president of the United States who stands firm on their convictions. This is what I have demonstrated for every day that I have been in Congress. I have



on my convictions. I didn't cut deals with special interests where you put the pro-life issue together with tax increase issues. That's a fundamental, it's a non-negotiable. And when we come to a non-negotiable, we must stand. And I stand.

Even without directly challenging Romney, she stood in clear contrast to Romney who had failed to establish a strong conservative position (Kim, 2011, August 15). Bachmann would eventually fall in the polls in August, but candidates positioning themselves as conservative would continue to dominate the polls until the primaries began in January (Politico, 2012).

Newt Gingrich had positioned himself as an anti-Romney conservative with bold ideas to fix problems. One of these bold ideas was that schools should hire students, so students develop a work ethic (Fox News, 2012, January 16). Four days before winning the South Carolina primary on January 21, Gingrich claimed that Perry or Santorum should stop competing and support his candidacy, because from the standpoint of the conservative movement, this would be the best move (*Wall Street Journal*; <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/01/17/gingrich-i-would-be-delighted-if-santorum-dropped-out>).

Gingrich recognized that he and Santorum shared essentially the same anti-Romney conservative position. Gingrich positioned himself as the inevitable anti-Romney conservative candidate. He positioned Rick Santorum and Rick Perry with the duty to drop out to guarantee a conservative wins the primary in South Carolina. However, Gingrich only managed to win one more primary, his home state of Georgia, and Santorum became the leader of the conservative anti-Romney movement.

Santorum located himself against Gingrich, Romney, and Obama. Santorum hammered home his ideas on government control of health care; hence he had the prior right to be the candidate. He attempted to position himself as the candidate who stands in sharp contrast to Barack Obama, as opposed to Newt Gingrich and Mitt Romney who he claimed do not provide a contrast.

Santorum located himself as fundamentally different and better than the other candidates. Like Romney, he centers his position on the necessity of beating Obama in November. Santorum tried to connect with voters who did not like Romney but were being pulled in by his anti-Obama inevitability argument. However, it did not work. Facing a likely loss in the next primary in his home state of Pennsylvania, Santorum suspended his candidacy on April 10, thus handing the Republican primary victory to Romney (Fox News, 2012, April 10).

Romney polling second and the series of conservative challengers can be explained by three factors. First, the Republican electorate did not like Romney's lack of strong conservative credentials. Second, the electorate lost its enthusiasm for Romney's challenges to Obama.



scrutinized them and exposed their weaknesses. Third, the Republican electorate always assumed that a better candidate would be found in the large pack of other conservative anti-Romney candidates. However, by the time the primaries started in January 2012, the anti-Romney electorate had not decided on a single candidate, and their votes were split between Santorum and Gingrich.

The Republican primary can be seen as a debate over two distinct storylines. The first storyline was that conservatives have a duty to support a moderate businessman to beat Obama. A part of this was the urgency of wrapping up the nomination process to focus on Barack Obama. The second storyline was that only a strong and true conservative, an enemy of both Romney's weak conservatism and Obama's liberal agenda, could win the presidency. This storyline rejected the idea that primary voters needed to compromise their beliefs and support Romney, who is left of the Republican electorate's center.

In the end, the first storyline won out over the second and it appears that the Republican electorate believed "the enemy (Romney) of my enemy (Obama) is my friend."

## THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The "enemy of my enemy is my friend" strategy is used not only in the West but around the globe. This section looks at how the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt positioned itself after the Egyptian revolution.

In early 2011, Hosni Mubarak resigned from the presidency of Egypt and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took control of the government. The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest and most organized opposition party, which was long suppressed by the Egyptian government and security apparatus, emerged as a major political player. The Brotherhood won the most seats in the new parliament and the presidency (AFP, 2012, January 21; BBC, 2012, January 23; Kirkpatrick, 2012, June 24). From the beginning of the revolution, the Brotherhood generally carefully crafted its statements so as not to antagonize other political parties.

In its public statements the Brotherhood turned upside-down the logic of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." The Brotherhood has avoided positioning itself as friend or enemy of any political actor. Rather, the Brotherhood has defined itself as a friend of the Egyptian people and an enemy to the enemies of the Egyptian people, and hence has the duty to rule. The Brotherhood's reasoning is "the enemy of my friend (the Egyptian people) is my enemy."

The strategy of avoiding saying that the Brotherhood has political friends or enemies is reflected in its political rhetoric. For example, after winning the parliamentary elections, the deputy chairman of the

Brotherhood Khairat al-Shater said the following in an interview with the state-sponsored al-Ahram:

Do not ask me now who will cooperate with us, and who will not. We extend our hand to all. Whoever responds by joining a comprehensive or partial strategic partnership, or by just cooperating with us in any way, I will cooperate with them, and we will try together to make it work, and we will build trust, with time. But, if you're asking me to divide the world from now, I cannot do that. We reach out to all. We cooperate with Europe, Asia and the United States and other nations. (al-Juneidi, 2012, January 1)

The Brotherhood clearly stated that it will not play the political power game of labeling people political friends or enemies; rather, any cooperation the Brotherhood has with others will be for the betterment of Egypt.

Avoiding locating itself as friends to any political actors, the Brotherhood instead has repeatedly positioned itself as a friend of the Egyptian people. On March 31, the Brotherhood decided to go back on a previous promise and field a presidential candidate. It gave the following reasoning in a public statement:

In the face of these changes and challenges experienced by the revolution now, and the threats it faces, the Brotherhood studied the whole situation in light of its historical and national responsibility, and the hopes and aspirations of our great people who gave us their trust, of which we are proud. Also, after debates and discussions at the General Shura Council's emergency meetings, in order to uphold the homeland's higher national interests, and to achieve the goals of the revolution, "The Muslim Brotherhood's General Shura Council decided in its emergency session today, Saturday 31 March 2012, to field a candidate for the presidency, and it hereby authorizes the Guidance Bureau in coordination with the Executive Office of the Freedom and Justice Party to take all the executive and follow-up actions as necessary." (Muslim Brotherhood & Freedom and Justice Party, 2012, March 31)

The Brotherhood described the decision to field a presidential candidate not as a play to gain political power or implement the party's agenda but rather as an effort to support the revolution out of friendship with the Egyptian people.

In early April 2012, the Brotherhood called for a protest in response to SCAF's refusal to replace the current government with a coalition government and in response to former intelligence chief Omar Suleiman's candidacy for president (al-Masry al-Youm, 2012, March 31, April 11; Muslim

Brotherhood Secretary General Mahmoud Hussein released the following statement on the Brotherhood's English Language Website:

The Muslim Brotherhood has announced that it will join with all political parties, coalitions and stakeholders in the "Protect the Revolution" million-man march on Friday April 13, 2012. This comes in response to insidious attempts by remnants of the former regime to abort the Revolution, restore the old regime and drag the country back to pre-January 25, 2011 tyranny and repression. Furthermore, this is part of a series of events in which all the Egyptian people will express their determination to defend the revolution and meet its demands, and pay tribute to the blood of the martyrs who sacrificed their most precious possessions to achieve the goals of the blessed revolution. (Hussein, 2012, April 11)

In this public statement, the Brotherhood said that it is protesting not because of narrow self-interest but because it must protect the Egyptian revolution. Like its normal procedure, the Brotherhood did not call out the enemies of the revolution directly. Rather it just called them "remnants of the former regime" even though it was fairly clear its political enemies are those that retard their political advancement (e.g., Omar Suleiman). The Brotherhood also basically labeled Ahmed Shafiq, its opponent in the second round of the presidential election, a remnant (Kirkpatrick, 2012, May 25). However, in general the Brotherhood has avoided this strategy.

In its public statements, the Brotherhood has tried to position itself as an altruistic group that puts the interests of Egyptian people before even their own interests. They had said that they have no natural enemies; rather they are only the enemies of those who oppose the people. Of course, using this logic, they end up sharing mutual enemies with the Egyptian people and other political parties. Furthermore, this narrative implicitly positions the Egyptian people with a national duty to support the Brotherhood.

Instead of telling the Egyptian people that they should support the Brotherhood because it is anti-something, the Brotherhood has told the people that it is a friend to the Egyptian people and it holds the people's interests above its own. Thus, the people's friends become the Brotherhood's friends and the people's enemies become the Brotherhood's enemies. Looking to the future, this storyline offers long-term flexibility. The Brotherhood can use its particular strategy to garner public support no matter how the political arena shifts. At a more general level, however, the Brotherhood's strategy has obscured real political dynamics and has prevented an open and truthful political discourse.

This chapter has provided strong anecdotal evidence that the strategy "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" is rational, selfish, and opportunistic. For the most part, old grudges and past enmities do not seem to slow down the shifting of alliances and the use of this strategy in narrative. For example, the United States quickly shifted alliances after World War II, and the Muslim Brotherhood offered peaceful rhetoric in a political arena filled with many enemies. However, there is some evidence that seems to contradict this conclusion.

The public use of this strategy sometimes reduces actors' flexibility going forward. The United States was somewhat stuck in its support of Islamic fundamentalism as long as the threat of the USSR existed. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has found a way to stay flexible, however. The Brotherhood flipped this strategy around by saying that it shares enemies with the Egyptian people, but only because they hold the public interest as paramount.

The Brotherhood also created a more sustainable position than other actors. The United States' alliances shifted so much in the 20th century because they were based on enmity, not friendship. Rick Santorum and Gingrich positioned themselves as strong anti-Romney and anti-Obama conservatives, but once the primary was over, they lost much of their relevance. However, the Brotherhood has positioned itself in alliance with the Egyptian people, and this narrative needs no enemy to persist.

This chapter has explored the varied uses of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" and its implications for the study of friendship and enmity at many different levels. This strategy seems timeless, and states and individuals will certainly use it in the future. In addition to short-term gains and losses, it would be prudent for them to consider longer term flexibility and sustainability.

## REFERENCES

- AFP. (2012, January 21). Egypt's Brotherhood wins 47% of parliament seats. *Egypt Independent*. Retrieved from <http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/612026>
- Al-Juneidi, S. (2012, January 1). Khairat Al-Shater to Al Ahram: We are not at war with anyone. Retrieved from IkhwanWeb: The Muslim Brotherhood's Official English website: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29835>
- Al-Masry Al-Youm. (2012, March 31). Official: Tantawi reaffirms confidence in Ganzouri's cabinet. *Egypt Independent*. Retrieved from <http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/742981>
- Al-Masry Al-Youm. (2012, April 11). Brotherhood plans rally to reject Suleiman's nomination. *Egypt Independent*. Retrieved from <http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/765376>



- BBC. (2012, January 23). Egypt's new assembly elects Muslim Brotherhood speaker. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16677548>
- Bush, G. (2011, September 20). President Bush declares war on terror. Retrieved from [http://middleeast.about.com/od/usmideastpolicy/a/bush-war-on-terror-speech\\_2.htm](http://middleeast.about.com/od/usmideastpolicy/a/bush-war-on-terror-speech_2.htm)
- CNN. (Producer). (2012, January 17). Gingrich urges Santorum to drop out. Retrieved from <http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/politics/2012/01/17/bts-gingrich-santorum-campaign-drop-out.cnn>
- CNN. (Producer). (2012, January 26). The Florida Republican presidential debate. Retrieved from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9sj5HcoGK2w>
- CNN. (Producer). (2012, February 22). The Arizona Republican presidential debate. Retrieved from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IoFfUg8YtC0#!>
- Crosbie, P. V., & Kullberg, V. K. (1973, December). Minimum resource or balance in coalition formation. *Sociometry*, 36, 476–493. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2786245>
- Curry, T. J., & Emerson, R. M. (1970, June). Balance theory: A theory of interpersonal attraction? *Sociometry*, 33, 216–238. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2786331>
- Dole, B. (2012, January 26). Bob Dole: Newt is a one-man-band. Retrieved from <http://mittromney.com/news/press/2012/01/bob-dole-newt-one-man-band>
- Dole, B. (2012, February 22). Bob Dole: Romney has leadership ability and right experience to be a great president. Retrieved from <http://mittromney.com/news/press/2012/02/bob-dole-romney-has-leadership-ability-and-right-experience-be-great-president>
- Fox News. (Producer). (2011, August 11). Iowa State University Republican presidential debate. Retrieved from [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yDSs\\_XFmacc](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yDSs_XFmacc)
- Fox News. (2011, August 13). Bachmann wins Iowa straw poll, cements her top-tier status in GOP race. Retrieved from <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/08/13/finally-here-ames-straw-poll-first-test-2012/>
- Fox News. (Producer). (2011, September 22). The Fox News/Google debate. Retrieved from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKNNN0NvVrc>
- Fox News. (Producer). (2012, January 16). The South Carolina Republican presidential debate. Retrieved from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y66pS8gLdfg>
- Fox News. (Producer). (2012, March 28). Marco Rubio: I am endorsing Mitt Romney. *Fox News*. Retrieved from <http://video.foxnews.com/v/1535492557001/>
- Fox News. (2012, April 10). Santorum suspends campaign, paving way for Romney to take GOP nomination. *Fox News*. Retrieved from <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/04/10/santorum>
- Gamson, W. A. (1961, June). A theory of coalition formation. *American Sociological Review*, 26, 373–382. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2090664>
- Gavrilets, S., & Vose, A. (2006, November 7). The dynamics of Machiavellian intelligence. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 103, 16823–16828. Retrieved from <http://www.pnas.org/content/103/44/16823.full.pdf+html>



- Gilbert, M. (2004). *The First World War: A complete history*. New York: Holt Paperbacks.
- Gingrich, N. (2012, February 10). Newt Gingrich's full speech to Conservative Political Action Conference 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhaRgo1RTUk>
- Haake, G., & Novogrod, J. (2012, March 7). Romney campaign says losing nomination would take "act of God." Retrieved from [http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/\\_news/2012/03/07/10601781-romney-campaign-says-losing-nomination-would-take-act-of-god](http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/03/07/10601781-romney-campaign-says-losing-nomination-would-take-act-of-god)
- Haqqānī, Husain. (2005). *Pakistan: Between mosque and military*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment.
- Hiro, D. (1999, January 28). The cost of an Afghan "Victory." *The Nation*. Retrieved from <http://www.thenation.com/article/cost-afghan-victory?page=0,1>
- Hussein, M. (2012, April 11). Muslim Brotherhood statement on "Protect the Revolution" demonstration, Friday, 13 April 2012. Retrieved from the IkhwanWeb: The Muslim Brotherhood's Official English website: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29873>
- Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The promise of institutionalist theory. *International Security*, 20, 39–51. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539214>
- Kim, M. J. (2011, August 15). Perry, Bachmann, Romney separate themselves from 2012 GOP pack. *U.S. News & World Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/08/15/perry-bachmann-romney-separate-themselves-from-2012-gop-pack>
- Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2012, May 25). Egypt race pits aide to Mubarak against Islamist. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/26/world/middleeast/egypt-presidential-election-runoff.html>
- Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2012, June 24). Named Egypt's winner, Islamist makes history. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslim-brotherhood-declared-as-egypts-president.html>
- Maley, W. (2002). *The Afghanistan wars*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Maoz, Z., Terris, L. G., Kuperman, R. D., & Talmud, I. (2007, February). What is the enemy of my enemy? Causes and consequences of imbalanced international relations, 1816–2001. *The Journal of Politics*, 69, 100–115. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4639936>
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994/1995). The false promise of international institutions. *International Security*, 19, 5–49. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539078>
- Moghaddam, F. (2008). *Multiculturalism and intergroup relations*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Moghaddam, F. M., Harré, R., & Lee, N. (Eds.) (2008). *Global conflict resolution through positioning analysis*. New York: Springer.
- Moghaddam, F. M. (2010). *The new global insecurity*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International.
- Muslim Brotherhood & Freedom and Justice Party. (2012, March 31). Muslim Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice Party statement on Egypt's presidency.

## Group and Intergroup Understanding

52

- Retrieved from IkhwanWeb: The Muslim Brotherhood's Official English website: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29837>
- Muslim Brotherhood. (2012, March 24). Muslim Brotherhood statement on obstacles hindering power handover to elected civilians. Retrieved from IkhwanWeb: The Muslim Brotherhood's Official English website: <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29812>
- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (2004). *The 9/11 Commission Report*. Retrieved from <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm>
- NBC. (Producer). (2012, February 26). Meet the press. Retrieved from <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032608>
- NBC. (Producer). (2012, April 1). Meet the press. Retrieved from <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032608/#46918962>
- Politico. (2012). 2012 live: Polls. Retrieved from <http://www.politico.com/2012-election/presidential-polls/#mainContent>
- Rashid, A. (2012). *Pakistan on the brink: The future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan*. New York: Viking Adult.
- Reagan, R. (1985). *American foreign policy: Current documents, 1983*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Roosevelt, F. (1941, December 11). Message to congress requesting war declarations with Germany and Italy (December 11, 1941). Retrieved from <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3815>
- Shaban, S. (2006). *The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan* (background report). Afghanistan and the War on Terror. Retrieved from [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth\\_coverage/asia/afghanistan/soviet.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/asia/afghanistan/soviet.html)
- Weiss, A. M. (1986). *Islamic reassertion in Pakistan: The application of Islamic laws in a modern state*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.